K – Empire – Michigan K Lab

Thanks to Vriti, Shawn, Emely, Jericho, Eshaan, Devin, and Easton for their help assembling this file

# NEG – EMPIRE K

### Thesis – Empire

Empire is distinct from capitalism or imperialism, though the impacts and processes are similar. First theorized in the 2000 “Empire” by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire is conceptualized as a new form of sovereignty replacing made to replace the nation-state. With a late-20th century marked by a wave of anti-imperialist movements as well as increasing economic globalization, it was clear that great powers could no longer exert control through colonial power. The tradition paradigm of imperial nation state sovereignty had declined – however, a new form of sovereignty was arising in its wake. “Empire” is not a physical system of governance, but rather a biopolitical instrument of global control. While the end of formal colonization may have been a marked increase in individual sovereignty, it also acted as a deterritorializing process which enabled the complete reterritorialization by Empire. Empire functions, in essence, as a global police power – it is legitimated by crisis and universal values that demand multilateral action in the same direction. This state of exception gradually leads to further incorporation of the world within Empire, until eventually there is not outside left – at which point, production, both economic and biopolitical, will be subject to this universal ruler.

The K can simply be articulated as “the theory of Empire is true, the AFF constructs Empire, Empire is bad” – I think the literature is conducive to both material and framework alternatives.

Below is the opening to the aforementioned book, it probably isn’t super useful as a card in round (maybe could be read in a 1-off shell or 2NC overview as a theory of power card?) but is a pretty decent explanation of the material from the source.

* Easton

#### Empire is materializing – the shift from nation-state sovereignty to international forums is not a decline of sovereignty but a transition to a new mode of globalized biopolitical control

**Hardt/Negri ‘2K** (Michael Hardt; professor of literature at Duke University. Antonio Negri; independent researcher and philosopher, previously a professor of political science at University of Padua. “Empire” pg xi-xiii 2000) // ELog

Empire is materializing before our very eyes. Over the past several decades, as colonial regimes were overthrown and then precipitously after the Soviet barriers to the capitalist world market finally collapsed, we have witnessed an irresistible and irreversible globalization of economic and cultural exchanges. Along with the global market and global circuits of production has emerged a global order, a new logic and structure of rule—in short, a new form of sovereignty. Empire is the political subject that effectively regulates these global exchanges, the sovereign power that governs the world. Many argue that the globalization of capitalist production and exchange means that economic relations have become more autonomous from political controls, and consequently that political sovereignty has declined. Some celebrate this new era as the liberation of the capitalist economy from the restrictions and distortions that political forces have imposed on it; others lament it as the closing of the institutional channels through which workers and citizens can influence or contest the cold logic of capitalist profit. It is certainly true that, in step with the processes of globalization, the sovereignty of nation-states, while still effective, has progressively declined. The primary factors of production and exchange— money, technology, people, and goods—move with increasing ease across national boundaries; hence the nation-state has less and less power to regulate these flows and impose its authority over the economy. Even the most dominant nation-states should no longer be thought of as supreme and sovereign authorities, either outside or even within their own borders. The decline in sovereignty of nation-states, however, does not mean that sovereignty as such has declined.1 Throughout the contemporary transformations, political controls, state functions, and regulatory mechanisms have continued to rule the realm of economic and social production and exchange. Our basic hypothesis is that sovereignty has taken a new form, composed of a series of national and supranational organisms united under a single logic of rule. This new global form of sovereignty is what we call Empire. The declining sovereignty of nation-states and their increasing inability to regulate economic and cultural exchanges is in fact one of the primary symptoms of the coming of Empire. The sovereignty of the nation-state was the cornerstone of the imperialisms that European powers constructed throughout the modern era. By ‘‘Empire,’’ however, we understand something altogether different from ‘‘imperialism.’’ The boundaries defined by the modern system of nation-states were fundamental to European colonialism and economic expansion: the territorial boundaries of the nation delimited the center of power from which rule was exerted over external foreign territories through a system of channels and barriers that alternately facilitated and obstructed the flows of production and circulation. Imperialism was really an extension of the sovereignty of the European nation-states beyond their own boundaries. Eventually nearly all the world’s territories could be parceled out and the entire world map could be coded in European colors: red for British territory, blue for French, green for Portuguese, and so forth. Wherever modern sovereignty took root, it constructed a Leviathan that overarched its social domain and imposed hierarchical territorial boundaries, both to police the purity of its own identity and to exclude all that was other. The passage to Empire emerges from the twilight of modern sovereignty. In contrast to imperialism, Empire establishes no territorial center of power and does not rely on fixed boundaries or barriers. It is a decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers. Empire manages hybrid identities, flexible hierarchies, and plural exchanges through modulating networks of com-mand. The distinct national colors of the imperialist map of the world have merged and blended in the imperial global rainbow. The transformation of the modern imperialist geography of the globe and the realization of the world market signal a passage within the capitalist mode of production. Most significant, the spatial divisions of the three Worlds (First, Second, and Third) have been scrambled so that we continually find the First World in the Third, the Third in the First, and the Second almost nowhere at all. Capital seems to be faced with a smooth world—or really, a world defined by new and complex regimes of differentiation and homogenization, deterritorialization and reterritorialization. The construction of the paths and limits of these new global flows has been accompanied by a transformation of the dominant productive processes themselves, with the result that the role of industrial factory labor has been reduced and priority given instead to communicative, cooperative, and affective labor. In the postmodernization of the global economy, the creation of wealth tends ever more toward what we will call biopolitical production, the production of social life itself, in which the economic, the political, and the cultural increasingly overlap and invest one another.

# LINKS

### L – Algorithmic State

#### The nation-state is a façade meant to cover mass exploitation and the rapid proliferation of smart technology in the form of AI. The 1AC’s call to emerging AI technologies in a quest for absolute rationality is one that obfuscates the role of humans in governmentality and allows algorithmic governance under silicon-based life forms.

Grech 19 - John Grech, [University of Malta](https://malta.academia.edu/), [Mulit-Faculty Affiliations](https://malta.academia.edu/Departments/Mulit_Faculty_Affiliations/Documents), Lecturer, Nation : State // Technology : Biology Global Relations in an Age of Emerging Algorithms and the Logic of Late Capitalism (Draft), Academia // eshaan

The damage these nationalist movements are wreaking is amplified when minorities such as Muslims and refugees are singled out in hate-filled discourses in popular media representations that then get immediately reinforced by social media piggy-backing. These encourage disgruntled individuals, acting as supposedly “lone wolfs”, to violently vent their anger against innocent people. Targets including religious worshippers, burka clad women, innocent children, migrant workers, asylum seekers and refugees clearly indicate that these minorities are being scapegoated for grievances against exploitative economic practices employed by the global Western order. But instead of addressing the underlying causes of such grievances, nationalist movements appear to be delivering popular masses into the hands of those controlling production and consumption. With anti-intellectual anti-elitist bitterness driving discourses, popular white nationalist movements during the first two decades of the 21st century reject analysis and reasoning for simplistic blame games exonerating white privilege while blaming those who are different and poorer than themselves. On the whole, contemporary nationalist movements would appear to be better considered as counter-revolutionary, reactionary, or conservative movements that seek to reinforce white privilege rather than address the very real problems that people face. **I backgrounded the emergence of these social movements with the changes taking place in the public sphere – the space of Nation – during the 20th century, and particularly the emergence of an ever more sophisticated notion of economy, globalisation, and technology. All these innovations and developments have reduced the scope of the national domain at the same time as opening up a relatively ungoverned international space**. There are many, entire communities in fact, disempowered by this process, not least indigenous communities who happen to be situated in the transnational resource rich spheres that global corporates such as miners and loggers decide to exploit ruthlessly. These displaced communities then provide the guest workers, refugees, illegal immigrants, and asylum seekers being targeted by disgruntled whites. Rather than protecting vulnerable individuals and communities, the realigning of State power in the latter part of the 20th century has only exposed the world to greater human exploitation while at the same time as empowering global corporations to take greater advantage of prevailing circumstances and opportunities. In a sense, this has resulted in a new form of global citizen, the multinational corporation, which is arguably now the single biggest player in a world where power, money, and influence intermingle with ever increasing subtlety and speed. Then turning to and mapping technological developments during the last 200 years suggests that the corporation itself may be in the process of being colonised as new ever smarter technology increasingly finds convenient shelter under corporate umbrellas, or, as a geek might see it, adopting corporate skins for new technological processes produced in highly integrated networks by increasingly sophisticated algorithms. If corporations remain the source of greatest power in the new emerging global order, the driving force is still the driven power-lusting individual, who stands atop the corporations’s mast and beckons those who man the oars below to follow his (for CEOs remain predominantly men) direction. **However, as the actual work of international corporations is increasingly performed by smart machines, so artificial intelligence is assuming the true locus of power with great alacrity**. Under such circumstances, the CEO may think he’s in command, but in actuality he too has become merely an operative for a greater will working surreptitiously behind the corporate’s skyscraped facade. **And it is technology which may ultimately prove to be the greatest factor to be reckoned with, not high-flyers like Rupert Murdoch, Mark Zuckerberg, Donald Trump, and Robert Mercer. Mapping the world after 2000 suggests that the real nexus of power is shifting away from the centrality biology once took for granted over social, political, and economic activity and the governmental formations that sought to control them, and towards a new form of organisation realised in and by centrally located intelligent algorithms**. While the stratification of society according to human prejudice and predispostion continues to shape the natural and the social worlds there is emerging a new machine like rationality, one that carbon-based life forms have not even started to comprehend. If this alternative new world order is still being assembled, the design, capabilities, and limitations of the system are already deeply embedded in what I’ll term the logic of global capital on the one hand, and the invisible hand of intelligent algorithms on the other. Increasingly today, resources and energies are directed not towards human and other biological requirements, but rather the increasingly hungry but still mysterious rationalities of the global order. The single most potent symbol of global capital is undoubtedly the multinational corporation, whose objective is increasingly “actualised” by and through technology, so it seems predictable that the global economy will increasingly respond to the needs of technology. In the glitzy whirpool of sparkling LEDs, who will notice the ever decreasing political economic interest in and support for sustaining biological life, particularly with the environment and the other ecological disasters that are threatening it with extinction. Enter again the multinational corporation’s heroic CEO, who, striding confidently onto a stage TEDs-like stage, stands proudly like a Caeser, Darius or Alexander Come Lately, and confidently proclaims how “his” latest innovation are about to sweep (what remains of) the world asunder. Fully expecting his company’s ever boldly blinking bottom line to continue streaking, perhaps extending its global reach and dominance to infinity, and with the kindness and generosity of the internet, he is about to tell his audience all about how they too can emulate his successes. Then at the bottom of the screen flashes an immediate alert as the global stock market responds to computer-triggered impulses from around the world. The automated(?) self governing bots have already kicked in and within nanoseconds fortunes capable of feeding the entire human population twice over for a year are made and lost. Meanwhile, unbeknownst to him, little electronic bots are preparing the final touches in the bedroom where our ‘CEO as Hero’ will soon assume his final resting place. As the long laid plans for the smooth transition from the last human CEO to the first fully computer generated New Man (this one comes with a mind made up from a network of electronic synapses) are about to be put into place. Everything has been programmed to ensure that the process will be neat and tidy as well as bloodless, a surgical extraction that neutralises an unstable component without any teetering or shimmering of the delicately balanced system and ensure there is no collateral damage as a result of this long awaited transition. **In a world where climate change and mass extinction have brought an end to the viability for carbon based organisms, it has become expedient, rational, logical, economic, as well as fiscally clever for smart silicon-based algorithms (its not called “life” anymore as that doesn’t accurately describe what it really is) to finally assume command over all ongoing processes behind what remains of the Rand Corporation**. With the redundancy of carbon-based life both imminent and certain, homo-CEO-erectus.2, the embryo like electronic child in the new Monoverse, is about to claim ascendency as the rightful evolutionary offspring to humanity.

### L – Borders

#### Compliance in a bordered nation-state paradigm invests in a logic of necropolitics that render the bodies between borders as expendable

**BUCKEL & WISSEL 10** (Sonja Buckel, Jens Wissel - Fankfurt Institute of Social Research) “State Project Europe: The Transformation of the European Border Regime and the Production of Bare Life, International Political Sociology”, Volume 4, Issue 1, March 2010, Pages 33–49, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-5687.2009.00089.x//vivi

Agamben refers to a basic problem in the constitution of modern nation states: The state as a nation implies that ancestry—in his terms ‘‘bare life’’— becomes the foundation of sovereignty. The community created by the nation is based on a biopolitical imagining, to use Balibar’s terms, on the illusionary yet powerful assumption that ‘‘generations reproducing within an almost unchang- ing territory in almost stable relationships for centuries have passed on an unchanging essence.’’ Such a ‘‘created people’’ is considered as the basis and origin of political power (Balibar 1992:107, 115). Following Agamben, refugees thus represent an ‘‘alarming factor’’ because they question the congruence of descent and nationality, of human being and citizen. Immigration to countries in the European Union has grown to such an extent that this reversal of perspec- tives is now ‘‘fully beyond doubt,’’ as a growing number of people are no longer represented in the nation. The refugee turns from the ‘‘apparent marginal figure’’ into the pivotal figure of our political present (Agamben l.c.). Agamben’s thesis ties in with thoughts Hannah Arendt had already formulated in 1955 when reflecting on her own experience as a refugee. She had argued that human rights, which claim to ‘‘originate solely from the very fact of personhood’’ regardless of any political status, are in fact questioned by the mass emergence of refugees (Arendt 1955:438). For the deviation of refugees consists in the fact that they are not officially represented by any state, since the national way of life ties the enforceability of rights to citizenship; by doing so, it expels a growing number of people into a no man’s land with neither right nor law: ‘‘Whomever the course of events expelled from the old trinity of people-terri- tory-state, grounding the nation, was left home- and stateless; whoever lost the rights guaranteed by citizenship, would remain without rights....Whoever was chased out of the country by their pursuer like a reject of humanity—Jews, Trotskyists and so on—was received as a reject of humanity everywhere else’’ (Arendt 1955:402 et seq.). The moment individuals left the state to which they were subservient by birth and national affiliation, the moment they were unable to claim their civil rights outside of their territory, they became uncertain about their fundamental human rights. So the very instant they were referred back to the rock bottom of rights which they had ostensibly gained through birth, it became apparent to them as the social construct of a nation-state, which rules the population as a people on the territory it has constituted. The borders of the nation-state that were sup- posed to mark nothing but the jurisdiction of the democratic constitution according to democratic republicanism, and were supposed to be traversable for everyone willing to accept the applicable law (Maus 2002:231), turned out to be a technique for the deprivation of rights. Once expelled from the trinity, the ref- ugee’s ‘‘nothing-but-personhood’’ catapulted them into some kind of a ‘‘state of nature,’’ in which they lost any relation to the world built by human beings. As soon as all other social and political qualities were lost, no rights whatsoever arose from the remaining mere personhood. The world showed no high regard for the abstract bareness of personhood (Arendt 1955:449). The spaces in which no rights can be asserted anymore thus stretched and assumed the shape of ex-territorial zones of an ‘‘invisible police state,’’ in which the sphere of police control expanded immensely and detention centers would become the only practical substitute for the lack of a national territory: ‘‘They are the only fatherland the world has to offer to the fatherland-less’’ (Arendt 1955:431). As far as its inhabitants are stripped of any legal status and entirely reduced to bare life, Agamben concludes in apparent parallel to Arendt (Agamben 2002:180, 183) that ‘‘the camp is the most absolute bio-political space that has ever been realized, in which power is confronted only by pure life with- out any means of mediation’’; it is the ‘‘materialization of the state of emer- gency.’’ With the loss of their citizenship, refugees do not only lose all of their rights, but more fundamentally, the ‘‘right to have rights’’ (Arendt 1955:446). By taking the European Union as an example, in the following, we would like to show that this historical analysis of European migration policy is still highly relevant, although the transnationalization of state and law has fundamentally transformed the international arrangement of states compared with Arendt’s times. As a result, we can perceive a new European state project currently reproduc- ing the loss of ‘‘the right to have rights’’ in extended form. What we want to introduce to the discourse of critical migration studies (Guild 2009:11) is a critical state theoretical approach. In our view, this is necessary as we witness a period of grave institutional displacements in the way political domination is exe- cuted, while we are at the same time confronted with a certain state-theoretical dilemma: On the one hand, the focus of mainstream migration studies is state- centric (ibid. 22); on the other hand, critical approaches abandon this statist approach to the benefit of a perspective of migratory movements—a move that is definitely a sign of progress in critical thought. However, this constellation leads to a dichotomous separation of both perspectives, and thus a failure to challenge traditional notions of the state used in mainstream migration studies and international relations alike. This traditional understanding assumes the state as a taken-for-granted entity mostly represented as ‘‘sovereignty,’’ under- stood as a legal rather than as a sociological category. To overcome this dilemma, we conceive the state following the materialist tradition as a social rela- tion, or to cite Poulantzas (2001:154) as ‘‘material condensation of social rela- tions of forces.’’ By arguing in this way, we apply from the outset a political sociological approach which seeks to transcend the dualism of state and society. The practices of migratory movements are therefore an integral part of the social relations crystallizing in the state. What follows from this is that the state can no longer be understood as a mono- lithic entity, but as an ensemble of heterogeneous competing apparatuses stitched together only by a fragile state project. Accordingly, the state is neither simply an instrument of powerful actors in control of national borders nor a problem solver in the service of common welfare, as it is seen in the tradition of German idealism. The contradictions between the demand for increased global mobility and the intention to wall off societies that we can observe in many states is conceptualized as the ‘‘liberal paradox’’ (Hollifield 2003:35 et seq.). As for our state-theoretical approach, we take this apparent paradox as a structural feature of modern state- hood and its institutions: The failure of migration control policy is per se not a loss of function; rather, such contradictions are always inherent in capitalist socie- ties. The conflicting actions of different state apparatuses are the result of varying social contradictions manifest in competing and heterogeneous apparatuses. In short, the state exists not outside of society and its contradictions. In some respect, this becomes even clearer with regard to the process of European integration. In developing this analysis, we demonstrate that in the context of Europeanization a process of rescaling the state takes place in which a new control regime of global mobility evolves producing specific zones of stratified rights (see Bach 2008:153). Our investigation focuses on the zone of illegalization: We concentrate on the two techniques that produce the ‘‘bare life’’ highlighted by Arendt: the ‘‘camp’’ and the invisible ‘‘police state.’’ It will become clear that the institutionalizing of the ‘‘the right of every human being to belong to mankind’’ (Arendt 1955:446 et seq.), and that means: to an international regime, in which ‘‘the right to have rights’’ is detached from citizenship (Benhabib 2004:68), is still lacking. In con- trast to Giorgio Agamben, we do not trace this constellation back to the collapse of the concept of human rights, but to hegemonies and power relations.

### L – China

#### The way the US views and collaborates with China is fundamentally wrong, and rather in order to recover the US’s economy, should cooperate with China, which can strengthen Asian-Pacific ties

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**An Alternative 'Grand Strategy' Toward China** if one were to propose a realistic and reasonable Grand Strategy'. one would have to start by shedding all the false assumptions and bellicose proposals put forward by the CFR and the authors of the report under review First and foremost, **the US would have to give up its self-appointed role as global policeman, reallocate its bloated Pentagon budget to finance vital domestic economic development, while rebalancing the US economy away from Wall Street speculation in the FIRE (finance, insurance real estate) sector and toward producing goods, providing quality services and financing long-overdue infrastructure development projects**. Second, **Washington would have to expand and promote long-term, large-scale exports of its advanced technology to compensate for the loss of low-value exports.** Third it should **join with China in its new infrastructure bank securing contracts via aid packages**; it should look at China's export of capital as opportunity to improve the US's deteriorating infrastructure. Washington would need to increase and expand its cyber technical ties with China via joint ventures**. It would need to replace its military bases surrounding China with industrial parks, commercial ports and regional "Silicon Valleys' and promote co-operative ventures that allow the US to ride the wave of Chinese dynamism. Since the US cannot (and should not) curtail or compete with China's growth it should join them and share it.** The US should not attempt to block China's growth and expansion; it should assist and share in its ascendancy, especially in the face of great global climate and energy challenges. **Washington is much more likely to strengthen its Asian-Pacific partnership and succeed in its diplomacy if it replaces its military posturing with robust economic growth.**

### L – Crisis

#### Narratives of crisis are foundational of Empire – the state of exception imposed by their impacts creates a universal right of intervention which enables the global expansion of the new form of sovereignty

**Hardt/Negri ‘2K** (Michael Hardt; professor of literature at Duke University. Antonio Negri; independent researcher and philosopher, previously a professor of political science at University of Padua. “Empire” pg 13-18 2000) // ELog

We must avoid defining the passage to Empire in purely negative terms, in terms of what it is not, as for example is done when one says: the new paradigm is defined by the definitive decline of the sovereign nation-states, by the deregulation of international markets, by the end of antagonistic conflict among state subjects, and so forth. If the new paradigm were to consist simply in this, then its consequences would be truly anarchic. Power, however—and Michel Foucault was not the only one to teach us this—fears and despises a vacuum. The new paradigm functions already in completely positive terms—and it could not be otherwise. The new paradigm is both system and hierarchy, centralized construction of norms and far-reaching production of legitimacy, spread out over world space. It is configured ab initio as a dynamic and flexible systemic structure that is articulated horizontally. We conceive the structure in a kind of intellectual shorthand as a hybrid of Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory and John Rawls’s theory of justice.20 Some call this situation ‘‘governance without government’’ to indicate the structural logic, at times imperceptible but always and increasingly effective, that sweeps all actors within the order of the whole.21 The systemic totality has a dominant position in the global order, breaking resolutely with every previous dialectic and developing an integration of actors that seems linear and spontaneous. At the same time, however, the effectiveness of the consensus under a supreme authority of the ordering appears ever more clearly. All conflicts, all crises, and all dissensions effectively push forward the process of integration and by the same measure call for more central authority. Peace, equilibrium, and the cessation of conflict are the values toward which everything is directed. The development of the global system (and of imperial right in the first place) seems to be the development of a machine that imposes procedures of continual contractualization that lead to systemic equilibria—a machine that creates a continuous call for authority. The machine seems to predetermine the exercise of authority and action across the entire social space. Every movement is fixed and can seek its own designated place only within the system itself, in the hierarchical relationship accorded to it. This preconstituted movement defines the reality of the process of the imperial constitutionalization of world order—the new paradigm. This imperial paradigm is qualitatively different from the various attempts in the period of transition to define a project of international order.22 Whereas the previous, transitional perspectives focused attention on the legitimating dynamics that would lead toward the new order, in the new paradigm it is as if the new order were already constituted. The conceptual inseparability of the title and exercise of power is affirmed from the outset, as the effective a priori of the system. The imperfect coincidence, or better the ever-present temporal and spatial disjunctions between the new central power and the field of application of its regulation, do not lead to crises or paralysis but merely force the system to minimize and overcome them. In short, the paradigm shift is defined, at least initially, by the recognition that only an established power, overdetermined with respect to and relatively autonomous from the sovereign nation-states, is capable of functioning as the center of the new world order, exercising over it an effective regulation and, when necessary, coercion. It follows that, as Kelsen wanted, but only as a paradoxical effect of his utopia, a sort of juridical positivism also dominates the formation of a new juridical ordering.23 The capacity to form a system is, in effect, presupposed by the real process of its formation. Moreover, the process of formation, and the subjects that act in it, are attracted in advance toward the positively defined vortex of the center, and this attraction becomes irresistible, not only in the name of the capacity of the center to exercise force, but also in the name of the formal power, which resides in the center, to frame and systematize the totality. Once again we find a hybrid of Luhmann and Rawls, but even before them we have Kelsen, that utopian and thus involuntary and contradictory discoverer of the soul of imperial right! Once again, the ancient notions of Empire help us articulate better the nature of this world order in formation. As Thucydides, Livy, and Tacitus all teach us (along with Machiavelli commenting on their work), Empire is formed not on the basis of force itself but on the basis of the capacity to present force as being in the service of right and peace. All interventions of the imperial armies are solicited by one or more of the parties involved in an already existing conflict. Empire is not born of its own will but rather it is called into being and constituted on the basis of its capacity to resolve conflicts. Empire is formed and its intervention becomes juridically legitimate only when it is already inserted into the chain of international consensuses aimed at resolving existing conflicts. To return to Machiavelli, the expansion of Empire is rooted in the internal trajectory of the conflicts it is meant to resolve.24 The first task of Empire, then, is to enlarge the realm of the consensuses that support its own power. The ancient model gives us a first approximation, but we need to go well beyond it to articulate the terms of the global model of authority operating today. Juridical positivism and natural right theories, contractualism and institutional realism, formalism and systematism can each describe some aspect of it. Juridical positivism can emphasize the necessity for a strong power to exist at the center of the normative process; natural right theories can highlight the values of peace and equilibrium that the imperial process offers; contractualism can foreground the formation of consensus; realism can bring to light the formative processes of the institutions adequate to the new dimensions of consensus and authority; and formalism can give logical support to what systematism justifies and organizes functionally, emphasizing the totalizing character of the process. What juridical model, however, grasps all these characteristics of the new supranational order? In first attempting a definition, we would do well to recognize that the dynamics and articulations of the new supranational juridical order correspond strongly to the new characteristics that have come to define internal orderings in the passage from modernity to postmodernity.25 We should recognize this correspondence (perhaps in Kelsen’s manner, and certainly in a realistic mode) not so much as a ‘‘domestic analogy’’ for the international system, but rather as a ‘‘supranational analogy’’ for the domestic legal system. The primary characteristics of both systems involve hegemony over juridical practices, such as procedure, prevention, and address. Normativity, sanction, and repression follow from these and are formed within the procedural developments. The reason for the relative (but effective) coincidence of the new functioning of domestic law and supranational law derives first of all from the fact that they operate on the same terrain, namely, the terrain of crisis. As Carl Schmitt has taught us, however, crisis on the terrain of the application of law should focus our attention on the ‘‘exception’’ operative in the moment of its production.26 Domestic and supranational law are both defined by their exceptionality. The function of exception here is very important. In order to take control of and dominate such a completely fluid situation, it is necessary to grant the intervening authority (1) the capacity to define, every time in an exceptional way, the demands of intervention; and (2) the capacity to set in motion the forces and instruments that in various ways can be applied to the diversity and the plurality of the arrangements in crisis. Here, therefore, is born, in the name of the exceptionality of the intervention, a form of right that is really a right of the police. The formation of a new right is inscribed in the deployment of prevention, repression, and rhetorical force aimed at the reconstruction of social equilibrium: all this is proper to the activity of the police. We can thus recognize the initial and implicit source of imperial right in terms of police action and the capacity of the police to create and maintain order. The legitimacy of the imperial ordering supports the exercise of police power, while at the same time the activity of global police force demonstrates the real effectiveness of the imperial ordering. The juridical power to rule over the exception and the capacity to deploy police force are thus two initial coordinates that define the imperial model of authority. Universal Values We might well ask at this point, however, should we still use the juridical term ‘‘right’’ in this context? How can we call right (and specifically imperial right) a series of techniques that, founded on a state of permanent exception and the power of the police, reduces right and law to a question of pure effectiveness? In order to address these questions, we should first look more closely at the process of imperial constitution that we are witnessing today. We should emphasize from the start that its reality is demonstrated not only by the transformations of international law it brings about, but also by the changes it effects in the administrative law of individual societies and nation-states, or really in the administrative law of cosmopolitical society.27 Through its contemporary transformation of supranational law, the imperial process of constitution tends either directly or indirectly to penetrate and reconfigure the domestic law of the nation-states, and thus supranational law powerfully overdetermines domestic law. Perhaps the most significant symptom of this transformation is the development of the so-called right of intervention.28 This is commonly conceived as the right or duty of the dominant subjects of the world order to intervene in the territories of other subjects in the interest of preventing or resolving humanitarian problems, guaranteeing accords, and imposing peace. The right of intervention figured prominently among the panoply of instruments accorded the United Nations by its Charter for maintaining international order, but the contemporary reconfiguration of this right represents a qualitative leap. No longer, as under the old international ordering, do individual sovereign states or the supranational (U.N.) power intervene only to ensure or impose the application of voluntarily engaged international accords. Now supranational subjects that are legitimated not by right but by consensus intervene in the name of any type of emergency and superior ethical principles. What stands behind this intervention is not just a permanent state of emergency and exception, but a permanent state of emergency and exception justified by the appeal to essential values of justice. In other words, the right of the police is legitimated by universal values.29

### L – Colonial Empire

#### The structure of the Nation-state is one that is indistinguishable from the racialized legacy of coloniality. The prerogative of empire is to promote a national memory that seeks the sole preservation of biological life above all resulting in the codification of hegemonic norms and mass structural violence.

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Mapping Nation, State, and Citizen – The world in 1900 If the world at 1900 had already long been transitioning through a period of radical transformation called “modernisation” (Harvey 1990iii), an important distinction needs to be made between society, state (see Held’s “The Development of the Modern State” in Hall and Gieben 1992, also Barrow 1993), and nationiv (Foucault 2010:326-348). Pierre Clastres (1994, 1998i, 1998ii) identifies society as a broad collective of the people making up any specific community. Modern notions of “society” and “civic society”, as well as “community” and “commonwealth” continue to reflect that notion as they refer specifically to groups of people as distinguished by their collectivity. Society, according to Clastres, contrasts with the modern “Nation-State” at two levels. **The State can be said to be the set of modes, means, rules and instruments of governance that society uses to implement and maintain its internal composition, structure, organisation, and identity. The idea of the “Nation”, on the other hand, and in particular the Nation-State since the 16th century (Foucault 2010:332), is a relatively modern invention (Anderson 2016) pointing to a particular form of organisation and structure of internal components, institutions and identities and the various hegemonic orders of governance and discourse these call into being**. The emergence of the Nation-State coincides with the conglomeration of larger communities becoming totalised and imagining themselves as both collectively unique and sovereign. The Nation-State seeks to unify both larger groups of people and a variety of geophysical terrains into a singularity and which is again contrasted to the organs of State which are regarded as a body of legal as well as social codes of behaviour and the institutions that police the members of this modern Nation-State and that together order the collective actions and beliefs as well as lives of people in forming such specific modern Nation-State societies. The State’s instruments and apparati are thus essentially involved in, and promote, a particular kind of social order, and the peculiarities such as language, habits, customs, traditions, as well as myths and images that the State holds about itself and that underpin it. Needless to say, the State’s spaces overlap with other imaginary spaces created by the formation of “the Nation” as well as by “society” in order to coalesce the social imaginings of “the People” that underpins them. A first level distinction can be made with the formation of the Nation-State. Foucault (2010) charts a history of the evolution of the French Nation, analysing the process of subjectification underpinning the invention of modern citizenship (Beck 2006, Chambers 1995, Hennerz 2000, Ianelli & Mossaro 2017, Sennett 1986, Stevenson 2001, 2003).v Commencing with a series of traits and characteristics, the first object of the Nation-forming project is to subject people to certain normative forms and rationalisations. The practice of national identity starts in a series of internalised as well as external State imposed actions. To be French, an individual must not only demonstrate a “native” command of (standardised Parisian) French but also to trade in a range of currencies that distinguish and connect to myths and ideas of the French Nation. In addition to language, markers include attitudes, food, culture and dress, education, as well as subservience to the State’s legal, educational, and taxation regimes and regulatory legislative instruments. People could still consider themselves Poitier-ians, or Avignon-ese, or Strasbourg-ians, but they had first to think of themselves as French. So being “French” became synonymous for a unified world shared by those living in a specified geographical area and unified by certain beliefs and practices which became generalised by themselves and others. It is ideas of “French” and “France” that bind people together (Barthes 1981:116-117). In Imagined Communities (2006), Benedict Anderson investigates the origins and spread of nationalism and the emergence of modern Nation-States. Anderson wants to understand why individuals form a relationship of “horizontal” “comradeship” and “fraternity” so strong that it makes “possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly die for such a limited imagining” of themselves as conceived by the Nation’s apparatus. The bond that nationalism engenders is limited, as Anderson sees it, because those who mostly died in defending their nation did so even though the benefits afforded to them by their State was minimal. For Anderson, the power of the privileged classes to convince more impoverished and disadvantaged members of the broader community to not just willingly give up their pursuit of their own interests, but also their lives, to defend a system which oppresses them seems irrational. **Anderson is drawn to conclude that inventions like the “national imagination” and “national memory” (as well as a “national amnesia”) help to project generic notions and ideas on to individuals and on those around them and gain and grant a sense of singular unity, affection, and belonging (Anderson 2006: 1-7).** Anderson wants to understand how and why nationalism enables people to feel “closer” to people who, in many respects, are their oppressors while seeking to kill others who do not have any impact on their lives whatsoever. He wants to understand how nationalism bifurcates the world between those who share a sense of an inside populated by (imagined) connectivity, loyalty, relatedness, and identification from an exteriorised swathe of others (aliens, foreigners, or simply unknown strangers) but with whom – from a relative subjectivity that more closely reflects their own than that of their masters – such individuals respective everyday realities share more in common with the enemies of the Nation-State. Moving further from the “centre” of the world at 1900, Edward Said’s Orientalism (Penguin 1995) glimpses life beyond Europe and of someone living in a colonial State and the dehumanised subjectivity that creates (Fanon 2001: 13). A well-to-do, educated native of Algiers or Martinique or Vietnam may have felt French but, as Frantz Fanon himself learns while studying in Paris, being French is not the same as being a French colonial. “The first thing which the native learns” writes Fanon as a result of his learning his ‘lesson’ in Paris, “is to stay in his place, and not to go beyond certain limits. […] The settlers’ world is a hostile world, which spurns the native, but at the same time, is a world of which he is envious” (Fanon, 2001: 40-41). So Fanon describes the inner conflicts and contradictions created by colonisation in the colonised. The point I’m making is this; Be it coloniser or native, the object of the State is to control people and maintain the existing hegemonic order. From the State’s perspective, the body of a native is no less significant than the body of the coloniser, both must be disciplined as well as enabled, for social order depends on every individual playing their respective part to perpetuate the colonial world. As long as either have the capacity to threaten colonial rule, the State must discipline, reinforce and reward individual behaviour. Even in colonial States, the body of the individual is the focus of State attention. The imaginary slice of life at 1900 I am trying to portrayvi suggests that although there are clear stratifications in forms of identity and propriety attributed to individuals depending on colour, gender, race, inheritance, and social status, the individual remains the crucial pivot around which both the Nation and the State organise themselves. Individuals also retained a central role in the formation and ongoing (re)production of society. This centrality made the individual the target and the goal of society’s sometimes perfunctory moves towards community. In contrast to society, the Nation-State, on the other hand, asks more of individuals than mere participation in daily routines of social renewal. Nation-States demand the individual’s subjectification to a universal rule of law, coded rules that reinforce the Nation-State’s hegemony. The willingness of the State to resort to violence (see Agamben 2005, Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence” in Eiland and Jennings 2006, Clastres’ “Of Ethnocide” 1994, and Foucault 2010) to enforce the individual’s subjectification indicates both the seriousness of the State’s intention to unify the Nation as well as its determination to subdue threatening, oppositional, counter-hegemonic rationalities and ideologies. If the State’s role can be thought of as a servant that maintains discipline and reduce the threat of change, the Nation, in contrast to both society and the State, appears to establish and unify a singular notion of identity – the formation of “the people”. Thus while the world in 1900 subjectified individuals according to and depending on where they stood in the global stratifications of different States and Nations, the individual’s role in the formation and renewal of society and the social bonds and cultural relations to establish and maintain social order remained both central and necessary. Even marginal, insignificant individuals played a crucial role even if only as the subject of discipline, or, less commonlt, as a vehicle for social change and re/evolution. So the nature of society at the beginning of the 20th century still relied on and reflected the centrality of individuals and communities. That centrality was characteristic of both modern as well as traditional society during the first half of the 20th century and was reflected in the highest form of human organisation at the time, the Nation-State. So, it can be said, the institutions making up the Nation-State were entirely motivated by and responded to the biological imperatives that they were established to facilitate. Secondly, the Nation-State had, by 1900, become the highest singular authority that individuals and collectives could recourse to in either asserting their assumed rights or in defence against incursions upon those rights by others. Just as individuals were the focus of the NationState’s attention, so the Nation-State became the focus and at the same time most powerful arbiter and guarantor of individuals interests, welfare, safety, and what gradually became regarded as rights. **As long as the individual’s biology, that is, the quanta of sentient existence and not just the chemical and molecular processes that conventions of biology often prescribe, remained central to society, so the Nation-State directed itself at serving and responding to individuals biological essentials. Nowhere was this more evident than in production. Since time immemorial, production essentially focused on satisfying the material, psychological, environmental, cultural, and physical needs and so promote individual wellbeing and benefit society as a whole.** The welfare of specific individuals and the classes from which they came, such as slaves and colonial natives, the labouring classes, women, and children, not to mention the preservation of a hospitable environment for people to exist in, were, however, elaborated in and by the means and modes of production. **While the logics of production attributed higher and lower priorities to individuals depending on their status, the object of the Nation-State remained focused on maintaining the interests of living individual organisms.**

### L – Cybersecurity

#### Cybersecurity discourses ignore and expand the infiltration of the cybersphere by deterritorializing flows of capitalist governance constitutive of Empire

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China’s stance on cyber governance marks a different way of thinking and praxis, but it should be viewed not in a binary relationship to the Global North but as intertwined with historical, geopolitical, and epistemological power relations (Wasserman, 2018). Borrowing from postcolonial infrastructure studies, critical algorithm studies, and internet histories, we use the cybersphere—defined as a historical ensemble of material, organizational, regulatory, and socio-cultural layers of communicative relations among populations, machines, and institutions developed across scales—as a substitute for cyberspace, to challenge the digital sublime and to underscore its emergent geopolitical nature. The digital sublime, whose influence has waned but is not finished, sees cyberspace as a de-territorialized virtual global village (Johnson & Post, 1996). Its mistake lies in exaggerating the social freedom to link and to exchange by rendering cyberspace as a natural given, rather than a geopolitical sphere. Enacted as a top-down model, cyberspace has been used to smuggle in universal norms that do not recognize historical struggle. The cybersphere, however, entails both materiality and relationality (Cooren, 2018). It entails not just virtual reality but material grounding. Power bases, storage, and server locations are one thing; the interconnection of information and things added by 5 G mobile networks, quite another. Furthermore, the cybersphere shapes, and is shaped by, relational dynamics. It mediates labor relations, production chains, innovative resources, knowledge production capacities, and human relations with environment (Aouragh & Chakravartty, 2016; Murdock, 2018; Srinivasan, 2017). Extending political economies and expressing power relations, the sphere has selectively amalgamated national, material, and territorial spaces on the one hand, and virtual networks of digital data exchange on the other. It features both interdependence and discontinuity, blending functional flows, spatial fragments, and social segments (Castells, 2010). In the cybersphere, the continuity and discontinuity of political economies are named and arranged by discourse for exchange, forming disagreement spaces that “express differences, disrupt convention, and field imagined alternatives” (Jackson, 2015; Liu & Goodnight, 2016). Notably, the assemblage of policies, organizations, and material structures that underpin the socio-spatial logic of networks and networking is such a focal site of struggles over ideas, interests, and power across scales and units. If the old romantic thinking of cyberspace as a separate realm subject only to community-supported self-regulation has long lost its force (Goldsmith & Wu, 2006), the multi-stakeholder model that has ever since prevailed evokes pluralistic participation but evades national sovereignty and hierarchical power (Mueller, 2010), even implicitly extending Northern bias against redistributive and developmental deficits (Chakravartty, 2007). Such failure ignites alternative politics centered on sovereign authorities, after decades of neoliberal regulatory reforms. Instead of being a natural space of unity or inevitability, the cybersphere— which entangles political economies and disagreement spaces, national and international relations, virtual and material ties—has evolved into an expanded geopolitics. Its boundaries and sources of authority are fought over by different groups and are therefore intrinsically political (Kristof, 1960). Various spaces have already shaped but do not define the cybersphere. History shows that states and societies make their own interpretations amidst global techno-economic trends— depending on their values, interests, and capacities. The most notable is the Sino-US digital interdependence and discontinuity. The US has made foreign policy efforts to extend the liberal capitalist model to cyberspace, but China has preserved some crucial political-economic and ideational foundations for selfdetermination despite its steadfast global digital convergence (Hong, 2017; Kiggins, 2012). Still, beneath the foreground of apparent variation lies the shared background of material ties and relational dynamics that defy binary distinctions. China’s internet has been conventionally rendered in the state territorial imaginary (Shen, 2017). By portraying a contest-and-conquest relationship between the state preoccupied with regime insecurity and varying social usages, the dual foci implicitly frame the Chinese Intranet against the globalist internet (King, Pan, & Roberts, 2013; Rauchfleisch & Sch€afer, 2015). Whereas the latter associates its governance with the presumably pluralistic, fragmented, and competitive societies of Western democracy, the former illustrates the will of the state and the structures of state control. Indeed, although contested and compromised, the efficacy of state control has legitimized deploying the Great Firewall as a synecdoche for China’s internet governance (MacKinnon, 2011; Wei, 2017). Political economy frames a different cyber imaginary, one that loosens this stark dichotomy. Critical studies suggest that states co-exist with non-state agents in shaping the global internet and that the influence of ownership, policies, laws, and commercial interests renders the idea of a “singular virtual space” misleading (Graham, 2013). Cast in light of the cybersphere, China’s so-called Intranet also reveals entanglements with foreign capital, foreign technology, foreign markets, and foreign labor. Rather than hold up “highly conservative” telecoms policy or exemplify “cyber-conservatives” (Mueller, 2010; Zeng, Stevens, & Chen, 2017), the state has unleashed different sequences of liberalization, decisively exposing its share of the cybersphere to the dynamics of global digital capitalism (Hong, 2017; Schiller, 2014). Symbolic, cultural, and social dimensions are also folded into the cybersphere. From blogging to social networking to e-commerce, the platformization of cyberspace is structured by bottom-up vitalities, which sustain and derail top-down governance (Yang, 2003; Yu, 2017). Shaping and shaped by actors of the political economy, including states, markets, and societies, the cybersphere continues to extend social relations and material structures across boundaries, be they spatial, temporal, material, corporeal, or social. Its ubiquitous expansion, accelerated by the Internet of Things, the Internet of Bodies, and 5 G mobile networks, has enmeshed the state in a “variable geometry” of wills, interests, and values and even overwhelms it with torrents of capital, technology, information, and communication (Castells, 2010, p. 53). If it is true that “statism disintegrated in contact with new information technologies,” as Manuel Castells wrote in the Information Age trilogy, does the exercise of cyber sovereignty mark an orchestrated reaction of the state? What kind of state? And how? This brings back the state as a strategic actor in the generally “stateless” internet studies (Flew, 2018). Rethinking the state in transnational digital political economy China’s official vision regarding the state’s authority over internet-related public policy differs from the Western liberal model, and not only in the sense of opposing individualist democracies and authoritarian states. China’s communication policies persist as a dialectic between incumbent powers that own, regulate, and change the organizational apparatuses and material structures of communications and emergent powers that use, extend, and innovate counter-orders. Thus, the approach here is not to dissolve the state-centric framework, nor do we suggest an economic cosmopolitan account to replace the national framing. However, as an alternative to the ontological fracture between the state as a mutually exclusive territorial monopoly on the use of force, on the one hand, and market forces and individual rights that can be universally applied, on the other, we do want to deabstract the state—to see the state as mutually constituting, and frictionally meshing, with a broader network of power materialized by the cybersphere. This statement, along with the replacement of cyberspace by cybersphere, has implications for the theory of the state. A decades-long debate between liberal and Marxist strains of state theories has bearing on the state’s positioning in the cybersphere. Embedded in social science disciplines from the postwar era, the liberal theory of politics posits that power in Western democratic societies is diffused enough; the state responds to competing demands, rendering Marxist class-based notions, such as ruling class and corporate power, irrelevant (Miliband, 2009). Having rightfully constructed a liberal critique of traditional authoritarianism and even networked authoritarianism, this “class-less” thinking of pluralistic politics nevertheless leads to the obfuscation of state-society interlinks and thus unduly precluding capitalist, developmental, and legitimacy-seeking logics of the state—before and after the arrival of the networked digital age. At the international level, liberal and realist theories treat states as unitary and autonomous actors. In the case of China, national factors still offer compelling explanations for its performance—as the Chinese state rejected the outright Washington Consensus and has paced global integration. Still, this state-led global convergence created unexpected results and has fostered transnational imperatives from inside. Therefore, instead of deducing the logic of state actions from its arguably timeless essence of security and control, it is imperative to see the state’s wills, interests, values, and practices as relationally intertwined with global and marketbased structures of power and to appreciate the crosscutting of state agendas by various transnational interests across multiple scales. The neoliberal turn from the 1970s advanced the notion that it is desirable, and even feasible, to separate politics from economics, states from markets (Panitch, 2009). This fracture reflects neither the intervention-and-investment the US government makes in the internet nor the accommodations the Chinese state makes toward global techno-economic trends. Meanwhile, postwar neo-Marxist state theory has resisted reducing state interests and capacities to servitude for capital and instead notes the historical makeup of social forces and recognizes the state’s relative autonomy (Starrs, 2017). Extending this critical perspective, the political economy approach to communication examines historically specific relations between states, markets, and social actors and explores how these factors parlay into structural, institutional, and discursive transformations of international/national policy-making (Chakravartty & Sarikakis, 2006). The cybersphere adds a new twist to the dynamics of the state. To reckon the recursive relationship between the state and the cybersphere, a holistic conception and historiography of the state should be framed. The transition literature on China notes that the formerly Leninist state has internalized a liberal orientation and even moved to a globally integrated model of policy process (Fewsmith, 2010). The state-led capitalist socio-economic transition has accelerated in and through the cybersphere but spurs intensive social dissent, which invites an ever-expanding state information control regime (Zhao, 2008). Thus, after having alternately unleashed, shaped, and stalled the cybersphere that extends change and disturbance, the party state becomes a major contested site as well as a contesting subject. Notably, the party state can adapt, contract, or expand its power over the cybersphere. The state under Xi’s leadership generates sweeping transformative initiatives, holding China at an “inflection point”: the post-WWII capitalist order is mired in chronic crises; the party state-led China continues to grow stronger, after weathering market reforms; therefore, the responses to global crises must be organized to achieve the millennial mission of national rejuvenation (Economy, 2018). Pivoting to developing digital economy, digital government, and digital society, the state attempts to re-organize the symbolic protocols, social norms, or economic organizations that have hitherto defined the cybersphere, taking cyber sovereignty as a salient position. Despite the state’s transformative agency, a more fundamental dialectic between geopolitics and globalization has been at work, altering the state’s will and dispersing its capacity. As the driver of globalization, capitalist development transcends national boundaries through the cybersphere, inducing states to facilitate internet development and commercialization (Simpson, 2004). However, globalization as such, mediated by states and geopolitics, is never a completely finished set of projects. Developing states are strategic actors in contesting the global order—increasingly in and through the cybersphere (Desai, 2013). Still, states cannot afford alienating capitalist logic too much, as contemporary geopolitics is increasingly tied with inter-capitalist competition (Woodley, 2015). The cybersphere also deepens the state’s entanglement in the multilateral order of interdependence. While the state can act on its transformative initiatives, it is variably involved in ad hoc networks with subnational, national, and international actors and must “ensure the balance and power of the network state to which they belong” (Castells, 2010, p. 361). When the US government asserts unilateralism over bilateral and multilateral issues at the cost of losing global moral appeal, and when the field of internet governance features layered, diffuse, and even privatized control of power (DeNardis, 2014), China’s position is likely to oscillate between reclaiming state sovereignty and supporting shared sovereignty. Thus, the internet is a new sphere, where the state extends political authority, prioritizes certain rights, responds to capitalist cycles, and enters a multilateral interdependence. It endorses and acts on contradictory initiatives, mostly within the capitalist global order. These range from subsuming the directionless logic of capital to the territorial logic of the state to facilitating transnational capital accumulation; from strengthening the social and symbolic foundation of the party’s rule to encouraging the digital turn of globalization; and from promoting itself as a champion of globalization to sponsoring regional factions and domestic protectionism. The mixture is an empirical question, which nevertheless cannot be exhausted by the control protocols of the state—authoritarian or liberal democratic—but is conditioned by the dialectics between the intra-national needs the state prioritizes and the global legitimacy and sphere sustainability the state seeks. The following section addresses how to qualify, rather than reify, the cyber sovereignty mandate. Cyber sovereignty in historical perspectives Sovereignty, in its modern conception, “implies a theory of politics which claims that in every system of government there must be some absolute power of final decision” (Crick, 1968). Territoriality strongly defines sovereignty (Betz & Stevens, 2011), but this definition obscures the fact that sovereignty is both territorially and non-territorially circumscribed. From a standpoint of political economy of communication, the status of sovereignty works, out of and against, a disagreement space crossing boundaries and denotes the state with questions of who has standing and controls resources for decisions over senders, receivers, codes, messages, channels, audiences, and feedback. Claims to sovereignty offer an index of power relations among nations and register the spread of capitalism, as well as the geopolitical pressure and popular resistance that follows (Desai, 2013). A historical association of communication with capitalist states means that the principle of territorialized sovereignty, when put in practice, has incorporated the need to trade, to flow, and to invest. Hence, globalization from the 1990s has not linearly undermined the state but has further complicated the relationship between a bounded physical territory and the state as the presumably supreme authority therein—as sovereignty operated through multiple spatial modes, and non-state actors even shared the operation of sovereignty (Agnew, 2009). This proposition applies to China. Despite its stance to push against hegemonic intervention, sovereignty is in no way unyielding in the postMao era (Carlson, 2005). A new school of international relations, intent to qualify the diluted but still crucial role of sovereignty-based states in the age of globalization, disaggregates sovereignty into multiple components, foregrounding multiple yet inconsistent practices of redefining sovereignty (Biersteker & Weber, 1996). As the cybersphere extends globalization, how does it redefine sovereignty? Adopting Krasner’s concepts (Krasner, 1999), Betz and Stevens (2011) argued that the internet compromises the regulation of cross-border flows, or so-called “interdependence sovereignty,” which further weakens Westphalian constructs and domestic authority; yet, it does not affect the legal integrity of states in international law, which means that states persist. Still, if the cybersphere is not universally experienced, the re-configuration of sovereignty is not a homogenous process either. Two trends vie for acceptance. First, sovereign relations are being worked out with a great range of variation. The US government has supported a presumably benevolent and borderless corporate-run cyberspace. However, its security rhetoric, which transcends the distinction between inside and outside, legitimizes an empire model, wherein military capacity is kept constant and co-extensive with its global networks (Hardt & Negri, 2000; Katin-Borland, 2012). Still, even a US-based Leviathan is not immune from cyber-attacks. As fake news, internet-enabled theft and disruption, and cyber weapons have shaken the American internet, a Foreign Affairs commentary proclaimed that “state sovereignty is alive and well on the Internet” (Flournoy & Sulmeyer, 2018, para. 4). In an emergent counter-position, the EU uses privacy as a lever to rein in Silicon Valley-originated platforms (Dijck, 2013). However, this rights-based cyber sovereignty in no way negates strong strategic purpose (Pohle, 2019). If the tension between users and corporations obscures the roles of states in liberal democratic contexts, the Chinese state plays a salient role in ousting Western platforms, blocking IP addresses, silencing dissent, and orchestrating propaganda campaigns to the extent that Western security and policy studies conveniently equate a cyber-sovereignty position with coherent statist control ( Tai, 2017; See Harold, 2016 ). Yet, despite the state’s sustained efforts to control the flow of information to its people, the bigger picture is more complex. To participate in the cybersphere, the state both practices negative proscription, such as censorship, and makes proactive moves to legalize non-state forces. To the extent that states unleash the cybersphere, states and the cybersphere then become co-constituting (Kohl & Fox, 2017). A state generally deploys its sovereign power to project national interests and to bolster certain values, interests, and projects. The cybersphere modifies this equation to the extent that sovereign power is no longer a status that states can either own or not. Vulnerability and interdependence are built into a cyber-committed nation. First, as the internet’s choke points often transcend state jurisdictions, it is inconceivable to squeeze the transnational nature of technical standards, supply chains, material and virtual architectures, and multidirectional communicative activities all into traditional jurisdictions (Kohl, 2007). Second, if internet governance is mostly enacted through technical design, private corporations, and nongovernmental organizations (DeNardis, 2014), the specific governance structure in China expresses its unique global history. Still, the Chinese state must negotiate with supranational entities, corporate infrastructures, and networked publics. Third, the prosperity of a digital ecosystem driven jointly by expressive, productive, and commercial energy challenges the ability of the state to define information flows in distributed networks (Navarria, 2016). Embedded in this sphere, state policies are subjected to ideational, institutional, and material contestations—within the country and without. On what terms, then, and in what mode can states seek to redefine cyber sovereignty? Ideally, as the cybersphere has become the dominant medium of global and public communication, the deployment of cyber sovereignty as a heuristic device would reveal, and even encourage, a disagreement space for peaceful negotiation among states, whose networking, competition, and collaboration inevitably interact with the non-traditional power structures made up of private companies, expert groups, civic organizations, and institutional and individual users. As the Chinese state advocates cyber sovereignty and globalization at once, how is it expressing this set of goals through concrete constructing practices? In the following, we examine China’s institutional and normative vocabularies that organize material governance of cyber sovereignty, trace these into the international realm as a case for global connectivity and relationship development, then review domestic, negotiated policies designed to work through disagreements, leveraging domestic ends against China’s standing in a global cybersphere.

### L – Digital Economy

#### The 1AC’s sanctimonious insistence on benevolent cyber development to help the “lesser developed nations” is a Janus-faced promise that only brings these nations from the periphery to the front stage of the worldwide digital economy. Geopolitics has evolved from annihilation to assimilation where the non-western world is incorporated into the ever-expanding empire of IR.

**Lobastova 20** - Svetlana Lobastova of The University of Economics Prague, Geopolitics of Cyberspace: Virtual Power and International Development, Journal of Liberal Arts and Humanities (JLAH) Issue: Vol. 1; No. 3 March2020 (pp. 97-108), [https://jlahnet.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/13.pdf //](https://jlahnet.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/13.pdf%20//) eshaan

**The international community is currently involved in a new digital information era. The worldwide digital economy is fundamentally relied on the diverse cryptographic processes, virtuality phenomenon gains on the popularity(Chang, 2017; North & North, 2016; Lau & Lee, 2015; Nardi, 2015; Bombari, 2015). International political, economic and socio-cultural structures exist in a virtual mode (Baylis, 2011) and are socially constructed** (Wendt, 1999; Katzenstein, 1996). Development mechanisms of the international system are based on hybridity (Acharya, 2017). The dissemination of representational systems of social meanings and cultural valuesvia popular mass media resources may serve the form ofinternational cooperation (Constantinou, 2018).Advanced technological equipment that projects virtual reality spaces within global international environment is widely distributed. International markets, information infrastructures inter-unite individuals on the global international stage. Visual representations serve the means of shaping individuals` interestsin the global internationalcommunities with an emphasis on the type of technical equipment that is capable to produce virtual reality expanse in a certain area and region(Constantinou, 2018). **Artificial worlds presented in simulated virtual realm also affect digital marketing strategies (Zanni& Rios, 2018; Lin &Rauschnabel, 2015) in a global social context andconsolidate representatives of the international cyber society into discrete interest groups**. Popular online mass media platforms are persistently growing in prominence among youngpeople (Goodyear, Armour& Wood, 2018; Swist, et al., 2015). Such platforms become a feasible mediator among interest groups in the global international level(Leavey, 2013; Margetts, 2009). In this connection, it makes sense to argue, that global cyberspace and online virtual platforms serve theappropriate environment forinternational communication and cooperation. Such environment creates the appropriate platform for international cooperation and future developmentof the international system from a global perspective, as the distribution of consolidating social content may influence and shape actors` interests and integrate them and their strategies of behavior. By means of promoting consolidating social contentsadpted to thetechnological landscape incertain geographical areas may integrate individual actors on the international stage and diverse social groups. However, the promotion of certain type of virtuality content with emphasized commonalities of shared systems of meanings via global cyberspace adopted to the technical environment in a local area has not been considered the constituent part of the global internationaldevelopment according to the geopolitics of cyberspace strategyyet. The paper focuses the global virtual environment an appropriateinternational platform for geopolitics of cyberspace implementation via adopting the virtuality with its content and representation of intersubjectivity as the discrete form of internationally unitingsocial power and platform for global communication. To achieve the objective, the paper focuses on the concepts of cyberspace and cybercartography. This is followed by the proposition of transformed Wallerstein`s theory as the contemporary structure of the world-system. This is followed by consideration of a virtual poweras the means of geopolitics of cyberspace strategy, with a particular attention on developing gaming industry. 2. Cyberspace as global virtual environment The globally spread networking systems have influenced the essential processes of humanity existence on micro and macro levels. They synchronize basic human life processes across geographical boundaries, time zones and cultural prejudices. Social relations have already been hybridized into offline and online environments (Serrano-Puche, 2016). **Global cyberspace integrates people all over the world into one common cyberspace community that is comprised of information infrastructures. Interest communities are internationally interconnected within online spaces and virtual platforms. The structure of contemporary international systemis constructed by social ideas (Baylis, 2011)**.The concept may be interpreted as digital libertarianism as important characteristic of postmodern society.Many individuals spend a significant part of their conscious day in virtual reality spaces. Naím (2005) argues that essential communicative transactions today proceed among individuals in the global networking virtual space, so that an individual is considered an actor on the international stage. The Actor-Network theory focuses the exploratory consideration of social relations and various interaction modalities in global networking world. The Actor-Network theory has become increasingly prominent within the international relations discipline and political sciences (Lezaun, 2017; Bencherki, 2017). **In this connection, the global cyberspace serves a strategic platform for social integration and communication on the international stage. The definition of cyberspace initially refers to a multichannel widespread, interconnected digital technology system that creates a notional global environment in which communication over computer networks occurs. Subsequently, the virtual environment in which communication over computer networks is implemented can be understood as concept of cyberspace.** Cyberspace can also be defined as avirtual environment in which communication over computer networks occurs. The cyberspace term also refers to a virtualized computer world and electronic medium (Kneale, 1999). Cyberspace is created by a global computer networking system and serves the facilitation of interaction and transaction processes.The term is currently used by technology strategists, industrial security representatives, in formal speeches and entrepreneurs to describe the domain of the global technology environment. The term cyberspace is related to the notion of cybernetics. The notion is traditionally understood as the science of the general laws of information change within complex systems. Wiener has defined cybernetics as the science of communication, based on human-computed interaction studies (Wiener, 1948). Cybernetic studies in this connection are associated with general laws of networking processes that occur within complex dynamic transformation systems of social nature (Wiener, 1948).A number of contemporary cyberpschycological studies are devoted to the exploration of computer-mediated communication (Parker, 2007; Huber, 2006; Muhlberger, et al., 2005; Galimberti&Belloni, 2003). Cybernetics and networking information infrastructures generate global virtual cyberspace that is considered theglobal virtual field of action. Currently, the international system is partially constructed and influenced by the spread of global virtual cyberspace. It makes sense to argue that in such type of a system data visualization and digital technological equipment remain the components of information infrastructure basis and enable the cyberspace existence. In this connection, these constituents of global communication can be considered the two main strategic resources for dissemination of internationally uniting virtual social contents on global level. The increasingly significant place in the international relations discourse currently take the debates on Geocybernetics (Phillips, 2016; Paras, 2007; Reyes, Taylor & Martinez, 2006).**Cybersecurity is considered the top of international agenda (Kuranda, 2018). The geocybernetics term refers to scientific perspective of the general laws of information change within a global complex networking systems (Stangu,2010).** Geocybernetics is a scientific discipline that focuses the exploratory regulation principles of global interconnected action systems on the basis of general mathematical laws and management regulations (Stangu, 2010).Physical geography of cyberspace or geo cyber cartography (Taylor &Caquard, 2006; Reyes & Martinez, 2005; Jiang &Ormeling, 2000) deals with technological equipment of all types. This aspect can be considered to serve an appropriate platform that can enable distribution of virtualityin a certain geographical region. Visualization of cyber cartography (Hecht, et al., 2011) and geographical hypermedia (Crampton, 2009) are considered the epistemology of science. Batty (1977) and Goodchild (1990) argue that virtual geography is a field of new media convergence. CentroGeo’s Scientific Project with its cybernetic character was developed to focus the Scientific Management Model (SMM) (Jeong, &Barabasi, 1999). The SMM as a scientific strategy that constitutes of four blocks: human networking, heterarchical groups, a method to approach knowledge production and the international level (Reyes & Paras, 1999). There was produced the three-dimensional hyperbolic visualization of Internet topologies (CAIDA). The model can be considered an innovative mode of knowledge production with a cybernetic character based on the science of geocybernetics. The main focus of the developed model is on communication and cognition processes of user`s interaction strategies within the global networking system in accordance with cybernetics (Reyes & Paras, 1999). There were also invented cartographic mode maps that display information infrastructures in their global scale, and infrastructures in certain geographic areas (the Helsinki metropolitan area, the west LondonM4 corridor, Silicon Valley). Via distributing virtual representations through the multichannel expanse of global cyberspace there should be payed a particular attention on its adoption to the technical equipment availability in a certain geographic region.There were already developed cyber cartography atlases of digital ethnography that display digital logistical infrastructure and material properties of communicational environment in a certain geographic area(Grubesic & Murray, 2005a; Grubesic & Murray, 2005b). Geographic maps are developed to indicate and produce the visual map-like interfaces into online virtual spaces (Grubesic & Murray, 2005a; Grubesic & Murray, 2005b).These aspects can be utilized to enable the effective international social interaction and communication and serve the basis for developing elaboration strategies for the international future cooperation and development. In addition, the globalized networking cyberspace does not have anarchical configuration. The international cyberspace may be represented as intersubjective virtual unit constructed with certain informational zones and information infrastructures that are interconnected among one another. The developed design of the virtual world map and global cyberspace as the significant part of contemporary world division may serve the global international platform for global communication and digital cooperation, international consolidation of discrete societies. Online platforms may be considered the sustainable basis for future international cooperation and development. 3 Transformed Wallerstein`s theory There had been held several debates on world-system structure theories based on division of the global system on center-periphery relation paradigms (Mathias, Buzan &Zürn, 2013). The fundamental perspectives of a world-system division on center-periphery relation paradigms in the traditional international relations theories were presented by Onuf (2017), Galtung (1971) and Wallerstein (1974). Wallerstein (2004) presented an inter-regional world-system theory which is based on categorization of nation states as power units. The division is based on the analysis of various economic areas division. He contributes three main world categories of core, semi-periphery and periphery, according to the nation state`s relative position within the world economy. According to Wallerstein (2004) core nations are represented with more complex state institutions that provide infrastructures with economic diversification, centralized governmental structure and specialize on information industry improvement. The distinctive feature of core nation states is their financial and military dominance in the international system. Wallerstein defines Canada, Australia, the United States, England, France, Netherlands as the category of core states. The peripheral nations are presented with Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa. The distinctive feature of this category is defined as weakly functioning institutional systems, high level of social inequality and poor economic diversification. The category of Semi-peripheral nation states can be represented by nation states that cannot be classified neither as core, nor as periphery. Currently, the status of semi peripheral nation states have BRICS countries, Israel, and South Korea. Otherwise, there also should be took into consideration the availability of digital technologies, media technologies in a certain region. Information infrastructures that constructs the essential basis for global cyberspace existence as any kind of social structure also serves the catalyst for economic development in a certain region. Italso does make sense to argue that each geographic area is distinct with a special type of technical equipment, with each area having its unique technological landscape and potential for economic development in the future. Core can be considered as a geographic region with widely-spreaddeveloped technological equipment on its whole territory. The individuals dispose on such territory the latest digital technological units, have the access to the global international cyberspace and are actively involved into multiple international cooperation. Periphery should be understood as the geographical regions on the surface of the Earth that were not, or almost not, absorbed by globalization processes, individuals on these territories almost don`t dispose the technical equipment and have the lack of access to the global international community. Periphery regions are also distinct with the lack of access to the education. On the periphery territories there isa lack of access to electricity and energy. Individuals that are located on the periphery territories have small access to available mass-media resources and to the global networking cyberspace, so that they are enable to be involved into global international development processes and have difficulties with access to the educational online programs. **While considering regions of periphery it’s important to take into account the lack of electricalaccessibility in those regions, which is considered a significant constituent for geopolitics of cyberspace future development**. The absence of electricity enables the expanse of networking communications, the Internet within geographical area. This aspect also influences the type of technical equipment in the regional location. For instance, according toThe Harvard Forum I Research ICTdue to the lack of electrical power in African regions, 75% of mobile-phone users spend around 11%-27% of their household income on mobile communications (Ishkanian, 2011). Insurrectional movements in north Africa region and middle east raise up considerations on new communication technologies as sustainable development source in democratic world (Ishkanian, 2011). Each geographic area on the world map, where advanced technological equipment is spread enough to create the virtual cyberspace corresponds to the semi-periphery. Otherwise, the online activities of individuals located on the Semi-Periphery territories are not so extensive as on the core territories, so that the complete involvement into international online cooperation might be difficult. To the semi-periphery territories there may refer industrializing and developing world regions. Within these territories individuals dispose information technologies and technical equipment, although, the intense of their operations in online spaces and involvement to the global development and cooperation is not such intensive as on the territories of core. 4 Intersubjectivity intra cyberspace The basic social constructivism assumption stipulates and emphasizes the significance of intersubjectivity of social meanings. The notion stipulates a common system of social meanings that is shared among the members of a certain social group (Rogoff, 1990). The intersubjectivity, as a social constructivism concept, represented by the common system of social meanings and shared knowledge with a common social context and background (Prawat&Floden, 1994). Every system of common shared meanings is supported by a virtue of social interactions and communications among individuals also in a virtual space. As a result of social interactions and communications among the group members there occur thecommon understanding of basic principles of a discrete social reality space (Ernest, 1999). Intersubjectivity also serves the prism for new information interpretation in a particular society (Rogoff, 1990). The virtual environment faces the international relations constructivist Agent-Structure problem (Wendt, 1987), although it occurs in a cyber mode. In this connection, international virtual platforms may promote the similar systems of social meanings and consolidate the international community and discrete social groups around the world. The intersubjectivity promoted via virtual spacesis considered a vehicle for social interaction processes and information transmission among the group members in the international societies. So that, each community has the unique socio-cultural basis with promoted system of social values. The common intersubjectivity of social meaningspromoted via discrete online communities may consolidate andinterconnect discrete communities with one another via international global cyberspace.**The reflection of intersubjectivities with an emphasis of their commonalities promoted via virtual environments may consolidate and incorporate people around the world. The unification on communication platforms in the global cyberspace and promotion of common systems of social meanings and intersubjectivity, in this connection, is considered to serve the internationally consolidating aspect and the appropriate platform for international cooperation and futuredevelopment**. 5 Virtual power and cooperationvia global cyberspace Traditionally, the concept of social poweris associated with a corpus of modalities that function as a machinery for social classes` conviction (Purvis & Hunt, 1993). Social power can also be understood as the complex system of prevalent norms and social values that function as a mechanism of individuals` persuasion to a certain kind of social structure maintenance (Laclau& Chantal, 2001). Debord (1994) argues that a significant role incontemporary societies is played by promoted imagery representations. The significant attention can be payed to the roleof mass media resources in each geographic area as they serve a considerable part of social strategies (Altheide, 1984).Straubhaar (1991)determinates the concept of social power in the international relations as the interdependence relationship amongnation-state units, with each of them having its own political, economic, and cultural background and social basis. The social power concept takes its roots in Gramsci’s differentiating between concurrence as a mode of social power force in industrial societies (Gramsci, 1992). Gramsci argues that mass-media resources can influence the people`spolitical, economic preferences and their perception of discrete systems of cultural values(Lears, 1985).According to Gramsci, social strategies in a modern society maybe supported d by the means ofinformationspread(Lears, 1985). Foucault (1980) considers the Internet to be the appropriate platform for social strategiesrepresentation and support. Ifthe globalized international systemthat nowadays partially exists in a virtualized form.According to Gramscian perspective (1971), the social strategies in modern societies may be also influenced by means of promoted information. The global cyberspace can be considered the uniting international social platform for common spread of systems of social meanings and representations of intersubjectivity with focus on their commonalities.At this stagethe interpretative approach of virtual power concept may be pertinently introduced in its unique interpretation.The concept of virtual social power for individualsliein their ability to access the global cyberspace and particular type of promotedvirtuality that positively influences their perception of discrete systems of social meanings with their commonalities. Virtual power concept should be understood asconfiguredvirtuality promotion within the global virtual environmentof cyberspace with an emphasis on the popular type of technical equipment in a certain geographic region.Virtual powermay also promote and cultivate the common systems of social and cultural values via international cyberspace. Barry Buzan considers identity and culture as the social security component in terms of the international perspective (Buzan, 2008; Buzan, 1998; Buzan, 1991). Consequently, the discrete type of promoted virtuality should consider the security aspects of each discrete society, particularly, individuals` moral discourse, their ethic values, and behavioral strategies intra objective reality of a discrete space of a geographic area. Such social power modality might be supported by international actors in order to promote internationally consolidating ideas on the global level. Such modality of consolidating social power is supposed to serve the ultimate integrating international power distributed via available technological equipment in each region. The discrete laws for regional counterparts of cyberspaces should be taken into consideration and respected. The internationally uniting power can be transmitted within the global international cyberspace in accordance to already developed cyber cartography atlases in order to distribute the appropriate type of internationally consolidate ideas within each geographic region and area.**Technical equipment and digital technologies are considered the strategically important source essential for promotion of social values and cultural ideas. In this regard, virtual power serves the appropriatestrategic mechanism to unite the international community via global cyberspace globally**. The virtuality may be purposefully transmitted within the global international space via available technical equipment capable to produce virtual extent in a certain geographic area. In addition, the international system that partially nowadays exists in a cyberspace mode can serve the global platform for internationally uniting social strategies, global communication support and catalyst for international development. The virtual power can be considered a global communicationmediator between discrete nation states. This type of power is disseminated via available technological equipment in acertain region and geographic area. The appropriate type of available technical equipment within each discrete geographical territory matters and can be considered the important aspect while the geopolitics of cyberspace implementation and development. 6 Geopolitics of cyberspace as theglobally uniting strategy The international cyberspace withvirtual platformsunites the representatives of international community all over the world. The information infrastructuresenablepeoples` interactions on the global level. In this connection, it can be claimed that all the technical equipment that is able to produce intersubjective virtual online spaces can be considered the essential component for the successful geopolitics of cyberspace strategy implementation. Moreover, the number of personal computers that are able to support connection to the worldwide network of the Internet during 1994 increased to 3,217,000 of machines (InterNIC) (Nunes & College, 1995). The virtuality construction as the product may be distributed via technological equipment within a particulargeographic area with an emphasis on social commonalities. There was also an attempt to support the net politics is The Program on Liberation Technology at Stanford's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law 2009 (Diamond & Plattner, 2012).ICT development also supports the distribution of digital technologies (Bonn &Akkermans, 2015), and in this connection, may be considered the significant constituent for international development support. These aspects create the sustainable platform for the international development and future cooperation with accordance to the geopolitics of cyberspace. Geopolitics of cyberspace as the internationally uniting global strategy might be also associated with the phenomenon of virtual poverty and the immaterial labor. The concept refers to the availability of technical equipment and attributes of global wealth, such as the affordability of a personal computer and the broadband connection, which limits the admission to the upper percentiles of the population majority in the age of twenties and evenly subdivided by gender in countries of Europe, Japan, and the United States (Au 2007a, 2007b). Virtual poverty as the phenomenon can instigate ludocapitalism that reflects the interactive virtual games as actual power being the coherent apparatus with military and the market its two pillars (Burston, 2003; Dibbell, 2006). The immaterial labor invokes the information and communication diversity of procedures, being the cultural phenomenon or affective element of the commodity (Virno& Hardt, 1996; Dowling, Nunes, & Trott, 2007; Lazzarato, 1996; Virno& Hardt, 1996; Hardt &Negri, 2000). Otherwise, it should be taken into consideration that the role of a nation state is little to prevalently influence or digital libertarianism in global cyberspace. So that internationally uniting social strategies should be implemented in accordance to existing regulations on national level. The cybercartography landscape and cyberspace law acknowledgement are essential to serve the basis forimplementation of efficient strategies.

### L – Hegemony

#### Their concerns of great power competition overlook that hegemony is threatened not due to the actions of individual nations, but as an inevitable symptom of the emergence of Empire

**Hardt/Negri ’19** (Michael Hardt; professor of literature at Duke University. Antonio Negri; independent researcher and philosopher, previously a professor of political science at University of Padua. “Empire, Twenty Years On” [https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii120/articles/empire-twenty-years-on November 2019](https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii120/articles/empire-twenty-years-on%20November%202019)) // ELog

The fact that the two spheres are increasingly out of joint, however, is only part of the story. We need to look more closely at the composition of each sphere, to gauge its powers and estimate its prospects. We begin by taking a step back to register how the structures of global order have changed in the last twenty years, with an eye to how potential avenues have opened there today for the multitudes that resist and challenge them. At the beginning of the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and as economic, political and cultural relations were extending in novel ways beyond the reach of national sovereign powers, the US President proclaimed the dawn of a new world order. At the time, most supporters and critics alike took for granted that the United States, having emerged ‘victorious’ from the Cold War as sole remaining superpower, would exert its unparalleled hard and soft power, shouldering ever-more responsibility while exercising increasingly unilateral control over global affairs. A decade later, as victorious US troops rolled into Baghdad, it appeared that the new world order announced by Bush Senior was being realized in concrete form by Bush Junior. American occupations in Iraq and Afghanistan promised to ‘remake the Middle East’ while creating pure neoliberal economies from the ashes of invasion. As neoconservatives flexed their muscles, critics denounced a new US imperialism. From today’s vantage point, it is obvious that unilateralist US power was already limited, and Washington’s imperialist ambitions were in vain. US imperialism had been undermined not by the enlightened virtue of its leaders or the republican righteousness of its national spirit but simply by the insufficiencies of its economic, political and military strength. The United States could topple the Taliban and Baathist regimes (and, indeed, wreak tragic destruction), but it could not achieve the stable hegemony required of a true imperialist power. Now, after decades of failure in Afghanistan and Iraq, waging the ‘war on terror’, few can muster much faith in the benefits of a US-led global system or its ability to create a stable order.[4](https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii120/articles/empire-twenty-years-on#note-4) Since Trump’s election there has been considerable hand-wringing by commentators about whether the liberal international order can survive. In truth, the Pax Americana, and the moment when the US could unilaterally anchor a global institutional order, passed long before Trump crashed onto the scene.[5](https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii120/articles/empire-twenty-years-on#note-5) This new situation pertains not only to the United States: no nation-state today is able to organize and command the global order unilaterally. Those who diagnose the waning of US global hegemony—Giovanni Arrighi was one of the first and most insightful—generally project another state as successor in that hegemonic role: just as the mantle of the global hegemon passed in the early 20th century from Britain to the US, they reason, so too today, as the star of the US wanes, that of another state must rise, with China the prime candidate.[6](https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii120/articles/empire-twenty-years-on#note-6) In contrast, liberal institutional commentators cling to the belief that, despite the international disorder sown by Trump, the star of the United States still shines over the world, and talk of the relative decline of its military, economic and political powers is exaggerated. It remains, for them, the only contender for global hegemon.[7](https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii120/articles/empire-twenty-years-on#note-7) There is some truth in these arguments; but the more important point is that the role of the US, as well as that of rising powers like China, must be understood not in terms of unipolar hegemony but instead as part of the intense jockeying among nation-states on the rungs of Empire’s mixed constitution. The fact that no nation-state is able to fill the hegemonic role in the emerging global order is not a diagnosis of chaos and disorder, but rather reveals the emergence of a new global power structure—and, indeed, a new form of sovereignty.

### L – NATO

#### NATO action is constructive of Empire – it relies on discourses of legitimated war which lays the universal values necessary for imperial biopolitical control

**Kuus ‘7** (Merje Kuss; professor of geography at University of British Columbia. “’Love, Peace, and Nato’: Imperial-Subject Making in Central Europe” [https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1467-8330.2007.00521.x 25 April 2007](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1467-8330.2007.00521.x%2025%20April%202007)) // ELog

NATO enlargement involves a two-fold legitimation. It rests firstly on making NATO everyday and unremarkable, and secondly on making it morally good. The effect is one of simultaneous banalization and glorification of NATO. The alliance is on the one hand made so common sense as to be boring—below political debate. It is on the other hand made existential and essential—above debate. The first side of this coin of legitimation—that of banalization—is a key feature of geopolitical discourses. These discourses rely not as much on formal arguments about science and strategy as on the notion of common sense (O’Tuathail and Agnew 1992:193). Their political success stems not from their deep meaning, but from their dailiness and banality. The militarization of political debate and everyday life is made possible in significant measure by domesticating military power as everyday (Cohn 1987; Lutz 2001). The military–industrial complex, or the military–industrial–media–entertainment network in Der Derian’s (2001) more precise terminology, is made to appear both virtual and virtuous, both clean and good. Its material infrastructure and material effects are thereby erased from political debate. This is clearly the case with NATO. Military terminology is all but absent from discussions of the world’s most powerful military alliance (Sidaway 2001:602). It has thus become acceptable and indeed common to speak of war— such as the one in Kosovo in 1999—as an “operation” concerned with “building civil society” (see also Feldman 2003; Sidaway 2003). Yet as Arendt (1964:288) famously pointed out over 40 years ago, banal is not synonymous with benign. Evil can arise not from sinister intent but from unthinking adherence to the taken-for-granted (see also Billig 1995; Gregory 2004). To speak of the banality of the military–industrial complex, then, is not to imply triviality, but to specify its mechanisms of operation and legitimation. It is to underscore the “set of silent ethical assertions that pre-organize explicit ethicopolitical discourses” (Shapiro 1997:16)—in this case the assertions that enable discussions of NATO to revolve around the notions of right, peace, culture, and values. As Enloe (2004:220) points out, most of the militarization of social life, a process in which social practices gain value and legitimacy by being associated with military force, occurs in peacetime. To understand the dynamics of this process, then, we need to look at the mundane rather than the spectacular, the civilian rather than the military. The second aspect of the legitimation of NATO—the constitution of military power as good—is a key part of what Hardt and Negri (2000:9) call the new inscription of authority. Today’s global power relations, they argue, are based not on force itself, but on the capacity to present force as being in the service of right and peace. These relations rely on an “ethico-political dynamic”, which envelops the entire space of what it considers civilization—a boundless, universal space (ibid.:11). This ethico-political dynamic lays the foundation for a renewed notion of just war: no longer an activity of defense or resistance, but one that is justified in itself, by the appeal to essential values and justice. This just war combines two elements: first, the legitimacy of the military apparatus insofar as it is ethically grounded, and second, the effectiveness of military action to achieve the desired order and peace. The Empire’s powers of intervention do not begin directly with its weapons of lethal force but rather with its moral instruments (Hardt and Negri 2000:35). They are based on the production of the normative space of imperial right. Intervention becomes juridically legitimate only when it is inserted into existing international consensuses. The first task of the Empire is “to enlarge the realm of the consensuses that support its own power” (ibid.:15).2 The military complex becomes a key part of the production of moral good (see also Flint and Falah 2004 for an in-depth discussion of the concept of just war). Hardt and Negri conceptualize this new notion of right as a substantively new phenomenon. In the earlier disciplinary society, they argue, social power was effected through administrative apparatuses that produce and regulate customs and habits. In today’s society of control, in contrast, mechanisms of command become ever more “democratic”, ever more immanent in the social field. The normalizing apparatuses of disciplinary power do not simply intensify. In addition, and in contrast to disciplinary society, social control today extends well outside the structured sites of social institutions through flexible and fluctuating networks (Hardt and Negri 2000:23). Power has become biopolitical in that it extends throughout the depths of the consciousnesses and bodies of the population. The new notion of right, then, is not simply imposed on localities and subjects from the outside. It is rather part and parcel of the very production of locality and subjectivity (Hardt and Negri 2000:30). According to Hardt and Negri (2004:13), security is a form of biopower in the sense that it is aimed not only at controlling a population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life.3 It is effective if it is an integral vital function of individuals. The movement from defense to security represents a shift from a reactive and conservative attitude to an active and constructive one (Agamben 2002). The normative space of imperial right is produced by a variety of bodies in the civil society, including the news media and especially non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Because these institutions are not run by governments, they are easily presented as acting on the basis of moral or ethical imperatives (ibid.:36). This dynamic is especially visible in the current “war on terror”, which popular legitimation centers on the concepts of identity and universal moral values (Dalby 2005). It is made possible by constructing military solutions as morally just (Flint and Falah 2004). Al Quaeda’s motives are identified as cultural and moral and so are the “western” or US responses.4 As such bundling up of security, culture, and moral values has moved to the centre stage of political legitimation since the terrorist attacks of September 2001, we need to closely investigate how the process works (Agamben 2002). Hardt and Negri overemphasize the novelty of imperial subjectmaking. They downplay the much longer processes of the construction of geographical and geopolitical knowledge, in which the notion of universal values has occupied a central position at least since the Age of Exploration (see Agnew 1998; Mignolo 1995). They also under-estimate the spatiality of power by conceptualizing imperial right as essentially a non-territorial universalizing process that encompasses the whole globe regardless of the current spatial configurations.5 Their argument’s utility for the present analysis stems from its focus on a key mechanism by which hegemonic power works today: not against but through the creative efforts of individuals. NATO enlargement exemplifies this mechanism. Whereas national security discourses still invoke the negative notion of threat, however “soft” and however indirect, NATO enlargement discourse invokes only positive categories—values, democracy, openness. NATO, like Empire, is a “machine for universal integration. It does not fortify its boundaries to push others away, but rather pulls them within its pacific order” (Hardt and Negri 2000:198). NATO is central to the institutional structure through which military intervention is organized and legitimized today, and it is continually bolstering its technical capabilities to operate globally. Its enlargement discourse is moralistic, affective, and adamantly non-territorial, as it emphasizes not territories but universal values. NATO enlargement can therefore illuminate in rich empirical detail how the production of imperial right and the militarization of social life work on a daily basis.

### L – Neoliberalism

#### The convergence between the contemporary Nation-state and capitalist interests has put the interests of the common people on the backburner. Neoliberal innovations in the form of emerging technologies accelerate existential catastrophe.

Grech 19 - John Grech, [University of Malta](https://malta.academia.edu/), [Mulit-Faculty Affiliations](https://malta.academia.edu/Departments/Mulit_Faculty_Affiliations/Documents), Lecturer, Nation : State // Technology : Biology Global Relations in an Age of Emerging Algorithms and the Logic of Late Capitalism (Draft), Academia // eshaan

Evidence suggests seismic shifts may be taking place in the political as well as technological landscapes of the world today the likes of which have not been witnessed since the 17th and 18th centuries. Although it is foolish to try to predict the outcome of such changes, democratic societies founded on universal suffrage, human rights, and the rule of law definitely appear to be under threat (Levitsky & Ziblatt 2018; Rich 2017; MacLean 2017). **In the shadow of these economic, political, and technological developments, the physical environment is itself becoming less hospitable to biological life and this trend looks likely to intensify as the present millenium progresses. In the context of global climate change, it is gradually becoming accepted that the very survival of humanity may actually be at stake although most writers, scientists and activists understandably choose to focus on the prospects of retrieving the situation before it is too late (Flannery 2010; Gibson, Rose & Fincher 2015;** Kaku 2018; Akhavan 2017; Oreskes & Conway 2014).xxxvii Current debates concerning sapiens’ relationships with the natural world are many, however, and undercut many anthropocentric assumptions about the world that have consistently been pedalled by humans to justify our actions throughout history. What can definitely be agreed, at least for the moment, is that planet Earth is the only home humans – as well as every other life form that we know – have. It would be presumptuous to suggest that all life on Earth will cease as a result of human impact, but it is nevertheless reasonable to conclude that dramatic changes will significantly alter the planet’s capacity to maintain a sprawling human population of more than seven billion people as well as sustain the habitats of the vast majority of other living creatures. In the context of political and economic developments, the last century has seen the central role of the Nation-State appear to have been both reworked and eroded. For if at the end of the 19th century, the role of collectively representing individual as well as collective human interests had been assumed by the Nation-State, by the beginning of the 21st century, the interlocked relationship between State and Nation have become significantly weakened and the position of individuals and society as a whole no longer appear to be the primary focus. This is evident in war events and the rise of civilian targets as well as in the evolution of general economic, tax, social welfare, labour and corporate regulation. **The instrumental power of the State now appears to privilege the interests of global capital and the large multinational corporations that articulate it rather than “the people’s”.** In this emerging scenario, the needs and necessities of “the people”, as can be said also of the needs and necessities of the biosphere in general, are subsumed to the interests and logics of capital. This, however, is only the latest elaboration of the underlying philosophy enshrining “star” fixated economic liberalism (Das 2015:15) that Western culture has doggedly pursued throughout modernity. At national level, the “rugged individualism” of liberalism has realised enormous economic and technological development and innovation but it has come at the expense of ever greater concentrations of wealth and power, environmental and human exploitation. As well as entrenching systemic inequality, economic liberalism has maintain an outward appearance of a broad commitment to the betterment and freedom of humanity in general through the individual. Compounding this, the regulatory systems established for globalisation allows corporations to run up enormous debt in the pursuit of profit but then enables them to shed such debt onto society when the things go sour. The shedding of privately accumulated debt as collective responsibility during times of recession has become an unavoidable consequence of capitalism’s boom/bust cycles and is usually justified by statements that the consequences of allowing such large corporations to go bankrupt are worse than the cost of bailing them out. With privately oriented liberal economics adopted as social policy, communities bear the risks while profits are disbursed to corporate stakeholders, or as Veroufakis puts it, sharing the burden of venture capital at the same time as enabling “public investments” to prop up or become a part of ever growing corporate empires (Veroufakis 2017). **The healthy profits private interests accumulate then encourages further risktaking ‘innovations’ and so the cycle continues until such innovations overstep the mark and stock exchange credibility disappears thus unleashing the next crash**. Encouraging individual enterprise and greed is, according to Adam Smith and other liberal thinkers, the most efficient way to improve the economic well-being of the community. So large and very large corporations have become the beneficiaries of collective largesse as corporate welfare (though not general social security) has become more prevalent. In practice this means that average taxpayers help line the pockets of the already rich and powerful, bringing into higher relief the fact that many multinational corporations often pay no or negligible rates of tax on income. The global trend towards lower company tax contrasts with the rising tax burden ordinary individuals are being asked to bear in terms of health, education, and social welfare. This exacerbates the shift in tax regimes from income to consumption taxes which obscures how those earning on lower incomes end up paying higher proportions of their salaries on indirect consumption taxes because taxes on goods and services are charged at the same rate irrespective of how much one earns. Add to that the generous allowances and subventions National governments avail to corporations in contrast to the stringent tax enforcement regimes individuals are subjected to, and the imbalance between people and corporate’ tax burdens is even more apparent. Now lets concede that rich corporations and wealthy individuals are best positioned to take advantage of tax avoidance and minimisation accounting practices (West 2019xxxviii) and even the most partial commentator cannot avoid the honest conclusion that inequality is embedded in global regulation that promotes the growing gap between those who have and those who have not.

### L - Tech Development

\*Can maybe be read as a heg link, or the bottom part as a framework card

#### Technological development leads to blind faith in tech which obliterates subjectivity and expands social control

**JERUSALIMIEC 18** (Lucas Jerusalimiec - PhD Candidate in Political Theory and Comparative Politics at McGill University), 11-13-2018, "Technology, Hegemony, and Citizenship," https://curve.carleton.ca/f3bb23c1-4d5e-49cc-862d-d5cfabc24b83//vivi

1.7 Technology and Hegemony The philosophers of technology agree that while rigid technological thinking hides the possibility of citizenship, it encourages a vision of a totalizing state. This technological state, or condition, defines a world in which autonomous systematization no longer faces any friction or resistance. In this version of the eternal present technological progress is allowed to legislate for human affairs in addition to conditioning them. As Feenberg writes: Technology is power in modern societies, a greater power in many domains than the political system itself. . . . if this is true, technology should be considered as a new kind of legislation, not so very different from other public decisions . . . . The legislative authority of technology increases constantly as it becomes more and more pervasive. But if technology is so powerful, why don’t we apply the same democratic standards to it we apply to other political institutions? (1999, 131). Here Feenberg draws our attention to the danger that the philosophers of technology see in uncriticized hegemony. When citizens see politics as nothing more than a system of power relations, it becomes normal to equate systematizing technology and the political system. According to Feenberg, we should not think that technology’s autonomy frees it from the need to exist within society. As he puts it “[t]he technical always already incorporates the social in its structure” (1999, 210). Along with the other authors in the Heideggerian/Ellulian tradition, Feenberg is concerned with the damage that an unquestioning belief in technological autonomy will cause to political freedom. Verene explains the danger of the autonomous technological state in terms of myth. He claims that To redefine the state through the logic of mythical thought is to eliminate the possibility of moral judgment . . . . Politics becomes not a matter of ideas put into action but the purveyance of images and rites that relieve the self of individual responsibility and the state from any acts of rational justification. . . . Myth is always present in the background of social life, ready to appear as the manner of thought to grip the individual and unite the individual with the collective in times of political tension or crisis” (2016, 34). Verene explains that the technological state as a vision of public life excludes deliberation and political action. Even though, like Feenberg, he does not hold that citizens are constrained to accept this myth, he believes that it can exist as a substratum of civic consciousness. Verene is pointing to a myth that claims that society can survive without citizens. Simpson writes that when citizens choose to believe this myth, the technological state can actually become self-perpetuating and self-directing: “technology itself decides upon the best means, and, to the extent that we increasingly abdicate our power to make legitimate choices . . . . it becomes self-determinative without any decisive human intervention” (1995, 21). For the philosophers of technology, citizens may choose to believe in the full autonomy of the technological state because it seems to incarnate systematic progress. This attitude reflects a citizen belief that self-making is a feature the non-human rather than the human. Thinkers in the Heidegerrian/Ellulian tradition think that systematic and autonomous progress belong first to historical humanity, and that the technological state is merely one possible expression of this power of self-making. In Darby’s analysis of how technology combines both techne and logos he writes that Techne pertains to the universalizing and homogenizing of making (poesis). This re-presentation in the form of a thing (= object = a being that stands before us) is demarcated by clear boundaries (= completeness = wholeness). . . . Logos, in an archaic form, is a gathering together of experience that leads to perception, or, we might say, to knowledge (2004). Techne is homogenizing because the form in which a thing is made obscures our perception of its composite elements. In this interpretation, forms result from the human desire to have names for the parts of our experience. There are “objects” of experience because we have made objects that can be experienced as unities. For the philosophers of technology, technological progress reveals that the unity of experience is imposed within the human being before it is imposed on the world. Thus technological hegemony is really internal hegemony, because human beings can break and make the boundaries of their own natures by imposing unity on self-experience. When speaking about Hobbes’ technological attitude toward human nature, Darby writes that all boundaries originate with, and are shaped by, the self-made being: man. As the being who makes himself from an infinite array of possibilities, man makes his own purposes and shapes his own ends. In doing so, he becomes the spirit of modern science: technology (2016, 305). The modern belief in the power of information technology is representative of the view that human beings are self-making. Information technology is supposed to manipulate the disembodied data of experience in such a way that it can become raw material for the construction of a mind or person. In this context, to “in-form oneself” means to choose both the categories and the content of one’s own experience, and to shape the previously formless data into a personal identity. Human beings must begin as a non-persons so that they are not constrained by previous forms as they progressively bring themselves into appearance. For the philosophers of technology, the totally self-sufficient technological state presents an attractive but impartial vision of the reality of self-making. The technological state appears free to homogenize experience without the interference of social authority (Juenger 1949, 79, 99). This apparent freedom allows the modern citizen to believe in the possibility of progressive self-making, but the impersonal nature of the technological state obscures the roots of its autonomy within human existence. Technology can help lead us to adequate self-knowledge as the beings that are always becoming, but the reality of mortality causes us to retreat into the homogeneous present and away from our destinies in the past and the future (Simpson 1995, 24, Heidegger, Question 1977, 32). This is an ironic and anxious situation because there is no necessary relationship between the technology of becoming and the advent of a totally impersonal state. For Ellul, impersonal technological hegemony traps citizens into a kind of progress that is unfree and closed, rather than free and open: The rapid changing of these social relations gives an illusion of freedom. But it is not man who causes these changes. It is they, stemming from the progression of the system, that determine man, and it is their ‘pressing’ character that restrains his liberty. He is constantly more and more defined by his situation in the system (1980, 322). The hegemonic claim that technological progress will inevitably systematize human nature in a particular way destroys the possibility of deliberating about the reality or advisability of the technological state. Feenberg writes that “[I]n the technical sphere, it is commonly said, legitimacy is a function of efficiency rather than of the will of the people, or rather, efficiency is the will of the people” (1999, 131). For the philosophers of technology, the identification of politics and society with an impersonal system of causes and effects legitimizes the suppression of the particular ends and particular means of individual persons (Angus 1987, 111). Ellul puts the homogenizing effects of the technological system on human nature in terms of anxiety. He claims that the technological state produces a type incapable of reacting directly to . . . the forms of concrete things, incapable of functioning without anxiety in any domain, and even incapable of feeling alive unless authorized or commanded by a machine and with the aid of the extra-organic apparatus furnished by the machine deity (1980, 313-314). For the philosophers of technology, persons in the grip of this kind of technological thinking believe that their very existence depends on the technological state.11 Every aspect of experience is viewed as the product of impersonal mediation. Questioning the nature of things or persons becomes an insupportably anxious activity. What does this underlying anxiety tell the philosophers of technology about human nature? Heidegger writes that technology endangers our ability to see that the essence of nature is fundamentally becoming. He thinks, however, that along with this danger comes the possibility of human beings realizing that technology calls them to cooperate with it and reveal themselves as the ones who determine the direction of natural becoming: the coming to presence of technology cannot be led into the change of its destining without the cooperation of the coming to presence of man. . . . Man is indeed needed and used for the restorative surmounting of the essence of technology. . . . man’s essence must first open itself to the essence of technology. This opening is, in terms of that coming-to-pass which discloses, something quite different from the event of man’s affirming technology and its means and promoting them (Heidegger, Turning 1977, 39). For Heidegger, human beings can redirect technology away from the radical systematization of experience, but they cannot destroy technology. Technology and humanity are co-products of a world that is always changing the way it reveals itself. Technology is the means by which this change is expressed, and humanity is the means by which it is understood. Heidegger thinks that true self-knowledge will result from a successful integration of technology and human nature.12 This true self-knowledge will come into existence through a ‘turning’ that applies technological thinking to technology itself. Heidegger says that [i]n the coming to presence of the danger there conceals itself, therefore, the possibility of a turning in which the oblivion belonging to the coming to presence of Being will so turn itself that, with this turning, the truth of the coming to presence of Being will expressly turn in—turn homeward—into whatever is (Heidegger, Turning 1977, 41). Heidegger claims that Being has its home within human nature, or, that humanity is where Being can be known as Being. In this passage Heidegger shows that he is thinking of Being as an essentially empty category since oblivion is what the ‘turning’ reveals. The rescue Heidegger offers from the systematization of experience is another kind of homogenization. Rather than technology operating as an active force of historical progress toward stasis, technology is that by which humanity examines itself and finds literally nothing (Heidegger, Turning 1977, 44). Heidegger’s ‘coming to presence’ seems to come from and lead to a place without any tangibly existing things other than technological process. This ontological nowhere contains the possibility of creating a world, but this possibility exists because Being needs a way to reveal itself (Heidegger, Turning 1977, 43). In this interpretation of technological becoming, however, human individuals do not appear to have any ontological status as persons apart from their role as knowers of Being (Heidegger, Turning 1977, 42).

### L – Transparency

#### In the era of contemporary geopolitics, war and peace have become indistinguishable. The 1AC is the rhetoric of the traveling preacher shouting extinction by escalation while ignoring the inherently paradoxical nature of conflict. Secrecy cannot be remedied by “information sharing” or “security cooperation” because secrecy is a precondition to justify war absent moral responsibility. The impact is a ‘forever war’ of negative peace characterized endless militarized warfare.

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Secrecy, Escalation, and War **Secrecy regularly plagues the conduct of war (Carson 2018). Combatants and politicians have always attempted to conceal their actions, often with a view to securing tactical victories. Carson (2018) takes the argument in an innovative direction, however; enemies cooperate “backstage” during war, not so much to gain an edge in battle as to contain the destructive capacity of modern wars**. The Cold War, for example, “started hot.” Recently declassified documents disclose the direct involvement of nearly 30,000 Soviet military personnel in the Korean War (Carson 2018, 2). This would not have been a surprise to the public if most US intelligence services had publicized this information (which they held); they deemed it best not to publicize it, though.3 The question is: why? Carson (2018) develops a more general version of this question about the character of twentieth-century warfare—namely why covert operations were considered preferable and, relatedly, why enemies would cooperate in secret. To answer these questions, Carson (2018) claims that contemporary political authorities (more or less) agree that open, acknowledged combat could lead to unlimited war and, thus, to unlimited destruction. Secrecy and “non-acknowledgment” of “open secrets” therefore provide a means by which to keep armed conflict private, not least to restrict the potential for further escalation (Carson 2018, 44). To that effect, Carson draws from theater to explore how overt and covert playacting allows a suitable way to deny intervention. **Put differently, “non-acknowledgment allows a widely exposed covert intervention to still remain an ‘open secret’” (Carson 2018, 31), thereby avoiding “domestic hawks” who may otherwise be in favor of escalating the conflict. Carson (2018) subsequently applies this theory to several twentieth-century conflicts, particularly great power intervention in the Spanish Civil War, Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan**. In doing so, he reveals how technological developments have encouraged covert operations. From aerial bombardment to submarines to drone warfare, great powers now hold numerous means by which to guarantee secrecy and deniability. That, in turn, has led to countermeasures. The invention of radar, for instance, meant states could determine more accurately who had intervened and whether they ought to disclose their involvement. As such, Carson (2018) offers us much food for thought on the changing nature of armed conflict, many of which now consist of covert, non-acknowledged intervention—or an explicit reluctance to declare war. The current international order, predicated on the values of peace and IHL, has also opened the way for secret wars. While Carson (2018) does not cover this topic in detail, some passing insights explain how secrecy contradicts the United Nations’ (UN) core principles: “my theory suggests that such institutions could undermine the ability of major powers to manipulate information to control escalatory pressures and communicate their interest in limited war” (Carson 2018, 310**). Limited armed conflict, in other words, depends less on how institutions regulate conflict than on how actors deploy secrecy and non-acknowledgment to prevent escalation**. **This is a damning critique of the international order, for it challenges mainstream liberal assumptions (e.g., Bentham and Wilson) that conflict results from secrecy, and therefore that public discussion and mediation provide the antidote (Gittings 2012; Hathaway and Shapiro 2017). It also contradicts existing realist hypotheses on the need for transparency to contain the use of force (Van Evera 1999).** Carson (2018) might have expanded on these myriad ramifications. Carson (2018) also does not fully consider how secret wars unsettle the relationship between formal wartimes and peacetimes, particularly when the former ends and the latter begins. If actors supposedly do not acknowledge and barely (if at all) admit to armed conflict, when and how does one determine “peace”? Relatedly, when do societies augment or curtail executive powers? Many competing audiences surround the political leaders to which Carson refers; yet, these leaders gather enough legal and political leeway to authorize covert military action in the absence of public discussion. It remains to be seen whether leaders facing greater constraints when deploying the military (including covert operations) would be capable of overcoming public scrutiny. All the same, the extent to which secrecy challenges the principles of the global order (i.e., peace and humanitarianism) says something about how international actors seek to evade moral responsibility. Carson (2018, 94–97) alludes briefly to this issue (i.e., that denial opens the way for the extensive use of war euphemisms). Hoffman and Weiss (2017) and Fazal (2018) develop that allusion in detail. Humanitarianism and War Hoffman and Weiss (2017) thoroughly survey the origins of humanitarianism and its relation to war and politics. In so doing, the authors explore the extent to which humanitarian norms have encroached upon—if not constituted—the international order, from armed conflict to adjudication to disaster relief. Compared to the humble, nineteenth-century beginnings of humanitarianism, which sought to abolish war or (at least) contain its effects, the tasks and aims of humanitarianism have expanded considerably. As Hoffman and Weiss (2017, 3) note, humanitarian principles “have not changed much, but what has changed is greater calls within the humanitarian sector to expand its work.” Hoffman and Weiss (2017) first detail how the destruction caused by war gradually led to the rise of humanitarianism in the nineteenth century. They subsequently show how IHL—and humanitarian action in particular—shifted in the aftermath of the Cold War, becoming ever more linked to the provision of security. This new breed of interventive humanitarianism, often labeled new humanitarianism, spawned a whole array of debates about the nature of peace, and the UN’s role in providing it. That shift also instilled a sense of urgency about addressing the weak nature of international criminal adjudication, leading to the Rome Statute and, thus, to the International Criminal Court. Finally, interventive humanitarianism prompted discussions on the principle of Responsibility to Protect, the legacy of which remains under intense debate (Bellamy 2008; Chandler 2010). All in all, the expansion of humanitarianism has affected war significantly, including the practice of declaring war. Much of IHL depends on the formal acknowledgment of armed conflict. Hence, for Fazal (2018), the prominence and sheer number of regulations pertaining to IHL have “created perverse incentives for states engaged in interstate war” (Fazal 2018, 5). Any international lawyer will be aware of these developments. More disconcerting, however, is how such regulations became the grounds on which to evade political and moral responsibility. State representatives were obliged to weigh the bureaucratic, strategic, liability, and reputational disadvantages that accompany strict adherence to IHL. **Put differently, declaring war became too burdensome from a moral, political, and military point of view. As a result, leaders opted for secrecy or euphemism4**: Fazal (2018) offers an especially pertinent illustration: the 1999 Kosovo War, a conflict officially deemed less of a war than a “humanitarian intervention” (Roberts 1999; Ignatieff 2000; Booth 2001; Wheeler 2002). Euphemisms aside, had the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) acknowledged that it was conducting a war in Kosovo, its pilots would have needed to comply with IHL or be liable for violating IHL. To comply would require flying at a much lower altitude than they did, conflicting with NATO’s strategic and tactical considerations (Fazal 2018, 153). Fazal (2018) also explains the more unintended consequences. On the grounds that openly acknowledged wars are fairly accurate “predictors of peace treaties,” the decrease in formal declarations of war also lowers the likelihood that actors sign such treaties (Fazal 2018, 158). Paradoxically though, combatants in civil wars, especially secessionists, tend to pay more attention to IHL. Because many of these combatants (unlike de jure states) lack international recognition, they have traditionally abided by IHL more often, in order to obtain that recognition (Fazal 2018). Regardless of whether responsibility lies with international law, IHL, or some combination of the two, the current international norms place a heavy legal and political burden on those who recognize wartime formally. Those who use force openly, or who otherwise acknowledge armed combat, consequently face major legal and political consequences. They may also create too many duties. As a result, leaders eschew formal declarations; Schadlow (2017) addresses how that loss of responsibility leads to less unity during war efforts, thereby contributing to strategic confusion. The Consequences of Euphemism and Secrecy: Operational Confusion Schadlow (2017) argues that war is, and has always been, about re-establishing order—that is, about reinstating a workable system of governance. She therefore rejects the claim that the military ought to engage only in combat. Military personnel and strategic planners (e.g., politicians) must consider not only the tactical considerations required for a successful military operation, but also the political measures necessary for obtaining peace. Most of the study focuses on circumstances specific to North American politics; even so, this more general relationship between politics, peace, and armed conflict likely travels to other regions as well. Schadlow (2017) does not fully explore how norms (e.g., IHL or international law) came to affect American military thinking; nevertheless, she does account for how euphemistic uses of the term “war” hinder the development of an effective long-term strategy. Doing so, or narrowly focusing on the military “fighting” dimension, leads to strategic confusion (e.g., reducing “wartime” to combat). Unity of purpose and command then slips away, with many tasks increasingly delegated to nonmilitary actors. In other words, the reductive categorization of armed conflict, prompted by euphemism, conflicts with Schadlow’s (2017) general understanding of war—not least because it compromises the war effort’s chain of authority and, thus, the unity of purpose on which that authority depends. In her words, “given the centrality of politics to war, the United States must realize that unity of command is essential to operational and strategic success in war” (Schadlow 2017, 274). The war effort in Afghanistan illustrates the point. It cannot simply be coined or reduced to “counterterrorism,” as the military also needed to pursue a lasting peace there. That requires a comprehensive strategy and an all-encompassing hierarchy of command with differing levels of responsibility for distinct tasks—a comprehensive approach (to peace) unattainable if one delegates tasks to distinct, nonunified authorities (e.g., various nongovernmental organizations, or allies). Schadlow (2017) consequently speaks disparagingly of the US military’s decision to assign noncombat operations to nongovernmental organizations in Afghanistan and Iraq, without fully integrating them into its own long-term strategy. Schadlow’s (2017) discussion of the lack of strategic planning and governance complements ongoing research about the global obsession with neutralizing terrorists (Whitaker 2007; Noxolo and Husymans 2009; Piazza and Walsh 2009; Fairweather 2015). It also reveals just how much political authorities, at least in the United States, have neglected the development of feasible, long-term governance models. That neglect results partly from domestic and international pressures, as Carson (2018) implies, but also from the trend toward not taking responsibility for a general (formal) war effort. As the trend toward a division of labor in armed conflict tasks accelerates, these tasks increasingly fall to a cacophony of actors—sundry technocrats, soldiers, mercenaries, allies, and international organizations—thereby diluting any one actor’s responsibility for the task and the overall unity of command. This division of labor contributes, in other words, to the ability of leaders to avoid responsibility for the activities formally contained together within the broader wartime context. Other (Complementary) Explanations George Orwell foretold the decrease in formal declarations of war and peace as World War II ended (Orwell 1968). **In 1946, not long after the atomic explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Orwell presciently claimed that international politics would witness the rise of superstates that coexisted in a permanent state of fear. Powerful and capable of mass destruction, these superstates would no longer fight one another. That development alone would be positive; yet, the mutual mistrust that accompanied superstates’ rise would also generate significant fear, thereby precluding the possibility of peace.** “[**A] permanent state of ‘cold war’” would develop** (Orwell 1968). Orwell’s dystopian masterpiece, 1984, provides further insight into his argument. In a (not so hypothetical) future, the wartime–peacetime distinction dissolved in the face of euphemism, manipulation, and plausible deniability; the so-called Ministry of Truth would face little compunction in claiming that “war is peace” in its party slogan (Orwell 1977, 26). The books reviewed in this essay clarify why wartime and peacetime have become Orwellian in nature—that is, roughly equivalent to one another. **As legal constraints grew (Fazal 2018), politicians exercised greater caution to avoid the moral and legal responsibility attached to war.** They also moved wartime from a formal (i.e., declared) to an informal (i.e., undeclared, or covert) setting for a similar reason (and to manage escalation; Carson 2018). As the reluctance to formally declare war intensified, the need to define a clear enemy and purpose for fighting weakened; that undermined strategic thinking, threatening the efficacy of the military hierarchy and its response to armed conflict (Schadlow 2017). To be fair, alternative explanations for the evaporation of a wartime–peacetime distinction exist as well. In one of the most prominent of these, technological developments facilitate quick reprisals among powerful states—reprisals short of mobilized warfare, but that also lack any semblance of peace. Schelling (2008), for instance, acknowledges that the capacity for mass destruction encouraged leaders to question the relevance of a direct military confrontation (i.e., a battle between forces) for their strategic policies. **Warfare in the late twentieth century, especially in nuclear era, consequently became more about activities like concealed threats, diplomatic coercion, targeted assassinations, covert operations, economic sanctions, and terrorism, rather than military deployments.** The development of drone warfare likely falls here too (Kennedy and Rengger 2012; Sauer and Schörnig 2012 Boyle 2013; Chamayou 2015; Sandvik and Lohne 2015). Each of these tools allows leaders an opportunity to respond rapidly and coercively (to varying degrees) to adversaries without a declaration of war—and therefore, an extensive military mobilization. That proves particularly convenient for liberal, democratic governments, whose politicians must circumvent public opinion while simultaneously showing a strong determination to punish enemies (Sauer and Schörnig 2012). Irrespective of contemporary developments, technology is a tool. It can restrict or amplify the means at a decision-maker’s disposal, but the decision-maker ultimately creates and implements policy. **Moreover, current norms and ongoing global trends shape the policies that leaders develop. A look at these trends suggests two other alternative accounts: the growth of civil and police wars, respectively. That intrastate armed conflict (i.e., civil war) has increased as interstate armed conflicts (i.e., wars between states) have decreased offers one explanation for this trend.** Intrastate conflicts frequently avoid a formal declaration of war, since sitting governments do not wish to legitimize those challenging it. Doing otherwise would not only grant the challenger political recognition, but also admit it as an authority to whom the laws of war (or IHL) apply (Armitage 2017). Governments therefore go to great lengths to brand the challenges as anything but a combatant (e.g., an outlaw, a criminal, or a terrorist). Although promising, this explanation remains partial at best. The refusal to declare war—including to recognize a substate challenger as a lawful combatant—does not merely happen in the context discussed here. It extends to the international sphere as well. Even NATO leaders (i.e., outside Yugoslavia) refused to declare war against the Yugoslav (or Serbian) government in 1999. Alternatively, then, perhaps the growth of “police wars” accounts for the disappearance of formal war declarations (Hardt and Negri 2004; Howard 2008; Jahn 2009; Holmqvist 2014; Neocleous 2014). Tying war activities and policing together exposes how ambiguity pervades the international liberal order. Peacetime police deployments often assist with state-building activities: extending sovereign authority within and patrolling the state’s territory, protecting the state from—if not punishing—those who disavow the rules, and so on (Neocleous 2014). To that end, integrating policing with war unsettles the distinctions between war and peace, between the military and the police, and between combatant and criminal. In effect, contemporary police wars mirror erstwhile colonial wars, and rightfully so. Although European statesmen had few qualms about formally declaring wars on their sovereign counterparts, they seldom issued such declarations in wars against colonial territories (Neocleous 2014; Bartelson 2018). **Colonies, as “non-states,” did not receive the status of equal combatants; they were territorial holdings for the parent state to patrol and control, with the parent state even building the colony’s administration in line with European practices. As such, states maintained the international order with recourse to great power patrol—a traditional police function—remedied through state-building, and enforced by punishing those who reject its rules (Kaldor 1999, 2003; Mueller 2000; Howard 2008; Holmqvist 2013, 2014; Bartelson 2018**). These police wars partially unsettle the basis on which the distinction between wartime and peacetime rests, for they apply concepts and means traditionally associated with peacetime to the armed conflict setting. Although the myriad wartime activities relate to one another, a division of labor now undermines what once constituted a united and comprehensive war effort (Schadlow 2017). It is therefore unsurprising that academic observers question the UN’s practical distinctions, insofar as UN actions in some contexts resemble war more than peacekeeping or peacebuilding (Fortna 2004; Peter 2015; Hunt 2017; Karlsrud 2017, 2018). In this respect, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) illustrates the point. It carries all the features of the modern police wars. It tasks external military forces with neutralizing terrorists (i.e., peace enforcement), deploys a robust international peacekeeping force to patrol swathes of territory and to protect civilians (i.e., policing), and mobilizes UN specialists to advise and support Mali’s governing authority (i.e., state-building). As a result, MINUSMA occupies neither the wartime nor peacetime space; it is instead a sophisticated policing and state-building operation premised on a division of labor: the military, the police, and political advisors. This division of labor reflects and reinforces how the international order has developed since 1945—especially the increased desire to avoid political responsibility for war. Euphemism and the rise of new terminology not only diffuse political and legal responsibility for war, but also exemplify how the system has disassembled wartime into its component parts. War increasingly ceased to be a comprehensive political and military task, being instead divided into several specialized tasks. Nevertheless, the range of creative terminology reflects not so much an attempt to deploy euphemism as the fact that armed conflict can no longer be reduced to war. But that raises a larger question: what is the threshold that separates lower levels of combat from war?5 In the absence of such criteria, wartime is peacetime. Concluding Remarks: Where to Go from Here? Further inquiry into the relationships discussed here might continue along two major fronts. The first addresses whether the diffusion of responsibility, and the rise of police wars, reflects the demise of the international order or enhances its robustness. With regard to the latter, for example, broad agreement about the rules to armed conflict exists, even as economic quarrels continue over which state benefits the most from the current order. The UN’s twelve peacekeeping operations across Africa, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean are only possible in light of agreement among United Nations Security Council (UNSC) members (ongoing as of December 2020). This need not downplay the sundry disagreements among UNSC members, as well as among the other rising powers across the globe; rather, it reveals a measure of convergence in expectations—namely, the acceptability of pursuing police wars, of punishing the order’s enemies, and of strengthening the state wherever it seems fragile. Hence, although assessments of the liberal order’s future most often rest on economic considerations (e.g., welfare and progress), one can also evaluate it according to the standard found in the UN’s Charter: whether the order has saved “future generations from the scourge of war.” From that angle, the absence of formal war declarations—along with widespread agreement on the need to punish, police, and build the state across global armed conflicts—indicates that the UN is largely fulfilling its role. The world may not be entirely peaceful, but it is not embroiled in major warring either. It is something in between: a policing world. Further research might inquire about whether this policing consensus will be sufficient to overcome future disputes over the distribution of power, wealth, and authority that will inevitably challenge the international order. A second line of inquiry looks elsewhere—to ascertain how the end of the wartime–peacetime distinction, coupled with the division of labor that now addresses armed conflicts worldwide, compromises the international order’s longevity. Neff (2005) aptly suggests that a legal order may sit on the brink of transformation once the understanding of war and peace ceases to inform practice. After all, when politicians cease to invoke the traditional wartime–peacetime distinction, or otherwise conceal it through euphemism, then a fundamental question comes to the fore: who is responsible for declaring war and peace? Managing international security lies under the UNSC’s purview, at least in the current order; yet, quarrels over the legitimacy of great power intervention—as seen in Kosovo (1999), Georgia (2008), Libya (2011), and Syria (2011)—make one wonder whether reviving the wartime–peacetime distinction would be the best means by which to deal with armed conflict. That revival may not only lead to clearer lines of authority, but also facilitate the attainment of peace. At least, this has been the position of some who consider traditional wartime—as an all-encompassing effort, involving combat and governance from the outset—to be more effective than the present-day alternative (e.g., see Luttwak 1999; Schadlow 2017). In the end, the international order’s trajectory is an old, if not foundational, question in international relations. The tradition of formally recognizing wartime—and, therefore, peacetime—provides yet another prism through which to investigate that topic. Further inquiry might indeed question whether the international order is moving toward the consolidation of the practice of global policing, punishment, and state-building, which ultimately threaten to dilute political and moral responsibility at the state level, or alternatively, toward the reinvigoration of the state’s role in determining when wartime exists. These are all questions for and of our time.

### L – Ukraine

#### NATO intervention in Ukraine is not liberation, but new management – the guise of democratic support is a myth used to obscure the expansion of Empire, but only a class uprising which denounces Russia and NATO alike has the capacity to free Ukraine

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In this context, we have not one but two central problems that must be addressed from an independent political position: the one posed by the Russian invasion with respect to the self-determination and independence of a semicolonial country such as Ukraine; and the one posed by NATO’s interference as a continuation of its imperialist politics in Ukraine and Eastern Europe as a whole, which so far has been put into practice only through economic sanctions against Russia and the shipment of weapons, without directly involving its military forces in the war. The combination of both problems adds to the complexity of the war in Ukraine. For several decades now, especially since the First Gulf War (1990–91), we have seen wars of imperialist aggression prevail under U.S. hegemony — so much so that some people (one of the most popular being Tony Negri2) mistook this for the end of imperialism and its replacement by an empire whose military actions were directed by a global police power. In the first war against Iraq, under the guise of “protecting” Kuwait from an invasion, the United States enlisted the imperialist powers and many other countries behind its military action, including Russia. This also occurred with the coalition created to invade Afghanistan in 2001, which was supported by Russia and resulted in its rapprochement with NATO. The first cracks in the U.S.-led war bloc became evident in the Second Gulf War of 2003, which both France and Germany opposed. Russia aligned itself with their position, but made sure not to get in the way of the U.S. offensive. These are three clear examples, though certainly not the only ones, in which the struggle to defeat an imperialist attack and the victory of the oppressed country were the basis of any independent and anti-imperialist position. This meant supporting the military camp of the Afghan and Iraqi people, while rejecting any sort of political support for their reactionary governments. A similar analysis can be made in the case of the Malvinas War. This was an adventurist undertaking launched by the genocidal Argentine dictatorship to help overcome its internal crisis. However, it pitted a semicolonial country against the United Kingdom, an imperialist power supported by the United States and other great powers — despite the illusions that the United States would defend Argentina held by Leopold Galtieri, the president and leader of the military, and his henchmen. Argentina’s defeat reinforced the imperialist chains that bound the semicolonial country and determined the character of the transition up to the 1983 elections as the product of an agreement between the military junta and the country’s main political parties. It was also key to strengthening Margaret Thatcher’s position in her bid to defeat the British working class and launch the neoliberal offensive on a global scale. [Trotsky explained](https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1938/09/liberation.htm) this type of position in an interview with Mateo Fossa, using the following example: In Brazil there now reigns a semifascist regime that every revolutionary can only view with hatred. Let us assume, however, that on the morrow England enters into a military conflict with Brazil. I ask you on whose side of the conflict will the working class be? I will answer for myself personally — in this case I will be on the side of “fascist” Brazil against “democratic” Great Britain. Why? Because in the conflict between them it will not be a question of democracy or fascism. If England should be victorious, she will put another fascist in Rio de Janeiro and will place double chains on Brazil. If Brazil on the contrary should be victorious, it will give a mighty impulse to the national and democratic consciousness of the country and will lead to the overthrow of the Vargas dictatorship. The defeat of England will at the same time deliver a blow to British imperialism and will give an impulse to the revolutionary movement of the British proletariat. Since then, imperialism’s politics have become more sophisticated. It no longer exchanges one fascist for another, but pushes for “democratic transitions” designed to protect imperialist interests by reinforcing the chains of national oppression. I return to this point below. During World War I, Lenin analyzed a very different scenario than the one discussed by Trotsky in terms of the relationship between an oppressed nation and an imperialist offensive, namely, the case of Polish independence. In that instance, the country’s independence was opportunistically supported by the czarist regime after Poland had been taken from it by Germany. [Lenin asked](https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/feb/29.htm), “How can we help liberate Poland from Germany!” Is it not our duty to help in this?” And he answered, Of course it is, but not by supporting the imperialist war of tsarist, or of bourgeois, or even of bourgeois republican Russia, but by supporting the revolutionary proletariat of Germany … All those who want to stand for the freedom of nations, for the right of nations to self-determination, not hypocritically … but sincerely, must be opposed to the war because of the oppression of Poland … Those who do not wish to be social-chauvinists in deeds must support only those elements in the Socialist Parties of all countries which are frankly, directly and immediately working for the proletarian revolution in their own countries. Lenin thus rejected the demagoguery over Poland’s independence expressed by czarism, which oppressed peoples like the Ukrainians, the Finns, and so on. An undeniably staunch defender of Polish self-determination, he was opposed to this slogan in the hands of the czarist regime. And in response to the question of how to help Poland liberate itself, he called for support for the German revolutionaries, while in Russia he called for the independence of all nations oppressed by czarism. It was undoubtedly a more complex question than the mere determination of where to shoot. Now, the conditions of the ongoing war in Ukraine do not fully coincide with those of either of these two “typical” cases and, in my opinion, to attempt to reduce it to them would be a mistake. It is not a war in which all of imperialism is on one side, with the oppressed nation on the other (as in the examples discussed above of the two Gulf Wars, which have some differences between them, as well as Afghanistan and the Malvinas War). On the one hand, there is Putin’s reactionary invasion, with Russia acting as a kind of “military imperialism” (although it does not qualify as an imperialist country in the precise sense of the term, given the low level of expansion of its monopolies and capital exports on a global scale; it essentially exports gas, oil, and commodities, etc.). On the other hand, we have the semicolonial nation of Ukraine, which is being used as a proxy by the biggest imperialist powers of the West in their confrontation with Russia. But it is also not an open interimperialist war, as in the Polish case analyzed by Lenin. So far, Western powers have been intervening essentially through economic sanctions and the supply of weapons, trying to avoid becoming fully involved. The effort to portray this confrontation as the product of an internal division of the Ukrainian people themselves, a third of whom have strong linguistic and cultural ties with Russia, is another aspect that must be added. Hence, an independent political position, in my opinion, should also seek a coherent combination of the elements discussed in the examples analyzed by Trotsky and Lenin. To oppose the Russian invasion from such a political position means not only “denouncing” NATO, but also including it as an active factor in the conflict itself against the self-determination of the Ukrainian people. And in this respect, as in Lenin’s analysis, it means calling for international mobilization, both in the “West” and in Russia, is crucial to supporting the struggle for Ukraine’s independence. The development of an anti-war movement that does not succumb to NATO militarism is essential. Having a consistent political position regarding the national question in Ukraine also means supporting the right to self-determination of Donetsk and Lugansk and of the Russian-speaking population. At the same time, it means fighting against the occupation of pro-Russian regions, whose population has the ability to undermine all of Putin’s demagoguery. No matter how many weapons are circulating, only the unity of the Ukrainian working people, overcoming the divisions promoted by the oligarchies on both sides of the rift, can defeat Putin’s invasion without trading one set of chains for another and continuing the pendular trajectory (between Russia and NATO) that has characterized the country’s politics during the past few decades. The Goals of an Independent Political Position Of course, the degree to which an independent political position is needed depends on the goals pursued by whoever establishes that position. For example, the United Secretariat concludes its declaration, “Only the international working class, fighting together with all oppressed and exploited people, for peace and against imperialism, capitalism and war, can create a better world.” From this point of view, its defense of the sanctions against Russia and the shipment of weapons in general could be more or less contradictory depending on what is meant by a “better world.” From a socialist and revolutionary internationalist perspective, things are clearly different. And this is also important in terms of the debate on the question of national self-determination and anti-imperialist struggle with those who, like the UIT, the LIT, and the LIS,3 aspire to a particular type of revolution called a “democratic revolution.” In relation to the perspective I have spelled out here, Mercedes Petit writes: This approach [of the PTS and the FT] is directly defeatist and, if applied, would simply and immediately favor Putin’s invasion. It is no coincidence that the FT-CI’s declaration refers to the 2011–16 struggle against Assad. At that time, they also adopted a nefarious position. As they themselves now point out, they claimed that there was “a reactionary war with no progressive camps” in Syria and rejected any military support for the massive mobilization and military struggle against Assad. They were thus complicit, along with the majority of the left worldwide, with dictator Assad and mass murderer Putin, by whom the mobilization was brutally crushed. Although it cannot be likened to the current war in Ukraine, there are some points of convergence with the Syrian conflict, if we consider the entire process from the “orange revolution” of 2004 to the Maidan uprising in 2014 and the subsequent confrontations. The origins of the war in Syria date back to the 2011 revolt, which was an expression of the people’s outrage against Bashar al-Assad’s Bonapartist regime and part of the Arab Spring. The government resorted to fierce repression and incited an interreligious confrontation. At first, the army was divided horizontally between sectors of the troops and the officers. However, this would soon turn into a vertical division in which the elements of self-defense of the “citizenry” and the “people” (though not a class-based self-defense) were relegated to a secondary position and regimented and subordinated to the structure of the Free Syrian Army. This army was sponsored from the outset by Turkey and later supported by U.S., British, and French imperialism, although with some distrust due to its links with the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi movement. The conflict passed through different phases, leading to a reactionary civil war. A progressive element of this war was the development of the [struggle of the Kurdish people](https://www.leftvoice.org/for-the-defense-of-rojava-against-the-turkish-invasion-imperialism-out-of-the-region/). Their independence, however, subsequently became diluted in the context of military alliances with the United States and later with Assad against Turkish attacks. A significant part of the Left, inspired by the theory of democratic revolution, viewed the Syrian civil war as a revolutionary war, more or less overlooking the complexity of the process, which included imperialist interference and inter-religious divisions. In doing so, it adopted in its own way the positions of Nahuel Moreno,4 [who argued](https://www.marxists.org/archive/moreno/1986/r20c.pdf) that to confront fascism and “counterrevolutionary regimes,” it is necessary to “make a revolution in the political regime: to destroy fascism to regain the freedoms of bourgeois democracy, even if in the arena of the political regimes of the bourgeoisie, the bourgeois state.” In the same way, they viewed the 2013–14 Maidan uprising as a “victorious democratic revolution.” In the [Izquierda Socialista’s own words](https://www.izquierdasocialista.org.ar/2020/index.php/82-periodico/el-socialista-n-263/620-ucrania-un-triunfo-revolucionario-de-las-masas) at the time: “We are witnessing the triumph of a revolution similar to the revolutionary uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East that led to enormous revolutions overthrowing their oppressive governments. In Ukraine, a democratic revolution has also taken place, resulting in the fall of the reactionary and pro-Russian Yanukovych.” Although the uprising took place against the backdrop of the hardships faced by the Ukrainian people and their outrage against Yanukovych’s repressive and corrupt government, the IS characterization overlooked the actual development of the process itself. It disregarded the movement’s program (with its core demand that Ukraine join the imperialist European Union) and its leadership, consisting of a front ranging from pro-Western liberal opposition parties to the extreme Right, including neo-Nazi groups. In line with their shared views, one of the first measures this front enacted when it came to power was to repeal the law that protected non-Ukrainian minority languages. Izquierda Socialista thus took to the extreme the theory of “democratic revolution,” [according to which](https://www.marxists.org/archive/moreno/1984/Party%20Cadres%20School%20Argentina%201984.pdf) “it isn’t necessary for the working class and for a revolutionary Marxist party with mass influence to direct the process of democratic revolution to socialist revolution” given that, according to Moreno, every revolution (resulting from the catastrophic state of capitalism) is in itself “unconsciously socialist.” It is difficult to develop independent politics on the basis of such a theory. The fact is that since Moreno’s original formulation, inspired by the processes sparked by the mass uprisings in the 1970s known as the “transitions to democracy” (in Portugal, the Spanish State, and Greece, and then later spreading to the semicolonial world), none of these processes of so-called “regime revolutions” followed a trajectory like the one he predicted. On the contrary, they resulted in reconfigurations that allowed the bourgeoisie to regain its hegemony. Thus, under the banners of an idyllic bourgeois democracy, of the supposed defense of human rights and “freedom,” the neoliberal offensive spread across the globe. Today we see the remnants of those politics in the decline of U.S. hegemony. Evidence of this was the “orange revolution” in Ukraine and the course of the Maidan uprising in 2014 that led to the rise of the pro-Western oligarch Piotr Poroshenko. The outbreak of a reactionary civil war in Syria is another example. What has become increasingly clear in these processes is the profound connection between the realization of democratic demands and a consistent anti-imperialist struggle. From his first formulations of the theory of permanent revolution, Trotsky maintained that even in a country where the proletariat was a minority, as in Russia, its hegemony was a condition for the “[complete and genuine solution of their tasks of achieving democracy](https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1931/tpr/pr10.htm),” which is necessarily linked to structural (and in many cases anti-capitalist) transformations. The developments of the last decades expanded the meaning of that thesis. Imperialist oppression increased spectacularly during the neoliberal offensive, rendering inconceivable any fundamental and lasting democratic conquests in semicolonies without their emancipation from imperialism. In Ukraine, amid the complexity of the war, this is also an essential question. The interests of the Ukrainian workers and poor are diametrically opposed to those of the different sectors of the local oligarchy linked to Putin and Western imperialism. In the fight against the Russian invasion, no true independence can be won under the influence of NATO, which is why this fight is inseparable from the most resolute anti-imperialist struggle. [As Trotsky pointed out in his time](https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1939/04/ukraine.html), the prospect of Ukraine’s independence is inextricably linked to the fight for workers’ power. This conclusion is undeniably relevant today, in the difficult conditions created by the Russian occupation, and is intertwined with the struggle for a socialist Ukraine run by its working class. When we discuss the need to adopt an independent political position, we do so from the perspective of these objectives.

# IMPACTS

### ! – Algorithmic Governance

#### The impact is an all-encompassing algorithmic schema that reduces human life to units of calculability. Everyday interactions in a social arena are transformed into covert warfare waged against people.

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In August 2004, the US Department for Homeland Security (DHS) announced the testing of a new tracking technology at five US land border ports of entry. The trial—conducted by consultants Accenture and Deloitte in collaboration with Philips Semiconductors—embedded radio frequency identification (RFID) tags into paper I-94 customs and border protection forms.4 The RFID tags contain a “passive” chip and antenna, capable of transmitting a unique numeric identifier to a remote reader. By October 2006, though rejected for US passports, the same RFID technology became a US entry requirement for visa waiver programme passports. Later the same year, the UK’s Transport for London announced that its RFID-enabled Oyster travel payment card was to integrate with a Visa credit card, allowing the tracking and tracing of all small transactions, actions and movements on the London Underground system. How might we understand what is at work here? A virtually invisible technology, concealed within a paper document or “smart” card, is deployed with the precise purpose of rendering a person visible, identifiable and locatable. As architect Dana Cuff has noted, “there is an irony here”, it is “invisible, miniaturized sensors that are making formerly inaccessible realms visible” (2003:45). In part, of course, the apparent invisibility of the techniques for making visible is assured because of their already existing ubiquity in everyday commercial transactions. As the Vice President of Philips Semiconductors had testified to the US Congress Committee on Energy and Commerce in 2004, “consumers are already likely to encounter RF-enabled personal identification devices in their daily lives, such as secure access cards for building entry, speedy gasoline purchasing such as the Exxon Speedpass, vehicle anti-theft systems, and in transportation systems all over the world” (US House of Representatives 2004:3). **What is taking place, then, is the redeployment of sensor technologies used in the commercial tracking of mobile things, objects, animals and vehicles into the domain of the tracking of mobile people. As a technology of location, tracking is central to the processes and practices of militarization**. As performance artist and social theorist Jordan Crandall has argued, “militarization and movement intersect through the activity of tracking” (2005:19). **The domains of geopolitics and geoeconomics cross over here (see Cowen and Smith, this issue) as the governing of the global economy draws into common assemblage with a state that is concerned to make visible the minutiae of daily life, to seek security in the transactions, journeys and movements that are the norm and those that are suspicious. Put simply, algorithmic war requires a target for its calculations, preferably a moving target. The practice of tracking, then, seeks to “detect, process and strategically codify a moving phenomenon in a competitive theatre”, whether this space is a “battlefield, the social arena, or the marketplace**” (Crandall 2006:4). In this sense, tracking technologies enable the identification and location of moving targets. In the war on terror, the specific form has become what Samuel Weber calls a “target of opportunity”, a competitive “seizing” of “targets that were not foreseen or planned” (2005:4). The targets of opportunity in the war on terror, then, involve the depiction of mobile enemies: However different the war on terror was going to be from traditional wars, with their relatively well-defined enemies, it would still involve one of the basic mechanisms of traditional hunting and combat, in however modified and modernized a form: namely “targeting”. The enemy would have to be identified and localized, named and depicted, in order to be made into an accessible target ... None of this was, per se, entirely new. What was, however, was the mobility, indeterminate structure, and unpredictability of the spatio-temporal medium in which such targets had to be sited ... In theatres of conflict that had become highly mobile and changeable, “targets” and “opportunity” were linked as never before (Weber 2005:3–4, emphasis in original). Samuel Weber’s key point of discussion is the theatre of war, though his argument sheds significant light on the algorithmic wars on terror that I depict here. The identification, localization, naming and depiction of mobile targets is, in this war by other means, conducted in and through daily life, in advance of any possible future strike or intervention. The targeting of mobile bodies, things, objects or monies is becoming a matter of locating—positioning in the sights, if you like—so that the opportunities of a mobile global economy might be seized, while the capability to take out the target remains. “Freedom is nothing but the correlative of the deployment of apparatuses of security”, states Foucault, “the very possibility of movement, change of place, and processes of circulation of both people and things” (2007 [1977]:49). For this reason, the geography of algorithmic war is a spatiality of locatability in movement, with origins in the interplay between military logistics and the commercial logistics of tracking objects through a supply chain. As consultants Accenture, Deloitte, IBM and PricewaterhouseCoopers lead the drive for multiple networked public and private applications of technologies of location such as RFID, the commercial “targets of opportunity” that allowed the production of goods to become dispersed and diffuse are clearing space for more diffuse modes of sovereign power. The technologies that have made possible a global supply chain of export processing zones and offshore sites are simultaneously being embedded into border crossing cards, visas, passports and immigrant ID cards that include mobile people within governable space by means of their targeted exclusion. How has locatability emerged as a key means of tracking mobile targets? The emergence of knowledges of location, what Nigel Thrift has called “our conventions of address”, follows a tacit and often unacknowledged sense that we somehow know “what will show up where and what will show up next” (2004:176). In other words, a system of address has been central to our ability to spatially and temporally locate events, objects, people and so on. The history of addressability displays a significant playing back and forth of military logistical knowledges and commercial supply and transportation knowledges. Thus, for example, the origins of 1940s bar code technologies lie in the communication techniques of Morse code. Historical records of early bar code techniques describe a graduate student, Joseph Woodland, marking the dots and dashes of Morse code into the sand on a beach as he thought through a research problem of how to identify a product at a check-out. Extending the dots and dashes to two-dimensional wide and narrow lines in the sand, Woodland later successfully patented the first binary barcode system. As computing technologies began to enable the electronic reading and recognition of patterns, new relationships between the identifier (postal code, ZIP, barcode, personal identifiers such as date of birth) and the identified (people, places, parcels, vehicles) become possible. Consider, for example, IBM’s “punch cards” of the 1950s, patterns of punched holes in a card to be fed into the pattern recognition programmes of IBM machines.5 The “patterns of data on the IBM cards”, writes architect Reinhold Martin, “made visible what was invisible” (2003:158). The machine’s ability to “read” the cards extended beyond the mere processing of data and into the almost magical realm of animating a life unseen. In a 1955 publicity brochure, IBM reminded the American public of how their lives were locatable in the traces of actions and transactions left in the card and “read” by the machine: IBM first came into your life when your birth was recorded on a punched card. From then on many such cards have been compiled, giving a lifetime of history of your important decisions and actions. If you went to school, entered a hospital, bought a home, paid income tax, got married or purchased an automobile, the chances are that permanent records were made of these and other personal stories (cited in Martin 2003:159). What we begin to see with the intersection of systems of address with systems of recognition, or the marrying of addressability and readability, if you like, is a computer-enabled system of locatability. While even rudimentary systems of address involve recognizing identifying markings, whether these are numbers, features of the natural landscape, or codes, the computer reading of markings and the recognition of patterns makes possible novel forms of location. Here, the emphasis is on a more mobile and agile mode of address that does not “stop at the door” of delivery, but instead dwells inside, making visible, readable and locatable the traces of daily life. With the rise of what Jerry Kang and Dana Cuff call “computer addressability”, the fixed location of the address is loosened via “unique identification codes” (2005:94). Because the codes dwell inside a body or object in the physical environment, they do, at least in theory, make it locatable in movement. In this shift from addressability to locatability, the ability to track and trace mobility is achieved by animating the physical environment so that it is able to “respond directly to what it sees” (Kang and Cuff 2005:94). Thus, the “reader” of traces, markings or transactions, established via the early technologies of punch cards and barcodes, becomes ever more important to the system of location as “addresses move with human and non-human actants” (Thrift 2004:183). Rather as IBM’s early computers inferred people’s life histories from the patterns punched into the cards, and from the intervals between them, contemporary readers of location, as a group of researchers at Intel have put it: “infer people’s actions from their effect on the environment, especially on the objects with which they interact” (Smith et al 2005:39). The embedding of RFID tags into objects, as Smith and his colleagues have shown at Intel, can be understood as one means to achieve a novel and mobile form of targeting. The origins of contemporary RFID technology, perhaps unsurprisingly, also find some roots in military communications and logistics, with the earliest writings on the problem to be found in research by radio engineers seeking more efficient readability of signals (Stockman 1948). It should be clear, then, that we cannot say that contemporary security applications of RFID are simply drawing on commercial knowledges of location. The 1940s research was, in many ways, the precedent for contemporary RFID technologies that deploy miniature tags, emitting a radio signal with a unique numeric identifier that can be received by a reader up to 25 ft away (Borriello 2005). Composed of a silicon chip and coiled antenna, usually sandwiched inside a plastic tag, so called “passive” RFIDs use the power supply from the reader to send their signal and are, therefore, smaller and require closer proximity to the reader than “active” tags that carry their own power supply. For example, a passive RFID application such as a supermarket loyalty card that is read at the till is, in effect, inert until it is in range of the reader that activates it. Once in range of the reader, the RFID’s numeric identifier allows the reader to locate the tag and to associate data on past readings of transactions. For a supermarket shopper’s “loyalty card” this might include patterns of past purchases, coupons or vouchers for savings and such like. For a US–Mexico border crossing card holder, the passive tag signals an identifier that can be mapped across past patterns of travel, criminal convictions or terrorist watch lists. In this way, the RFID identifies the target for algorithmic calculation, at the border, at the supermarket checkout, at the entrance to the sports stadium, in the subway ticket hall. “Through RFID tags”, as Jerry Kang and Dana Cuff have it, address is specified “to a fine level of granularity, much finer than a zip code”, so that we “will likely authenticate our identity to multiple queries of ‘who are you’ made by the enacted environment” (2005:106). What are the implications of mobile forms of locatability for algorithmic war and, in particular, for the exercise of sovereign power? As RFID stands on the brink of replacing bar code and paper-based markers of location (I 94 forms, passports, train tickets, paper money at toll booths, tickets for sports events),6 how does the war on terror become enmeshed with the geographies of everyday life? To be clear here, the seizing of targets of opportunity by commercial players can in no sense be interpreted as transcending the nation-state or outsourcing state security decisions to the market. **Rather, a logic of outsourcing and targeting that exceeds any specific public or private domain—that is, as Samuel Weber suggests, a “militarization of thinking”—works to sustain the “hyphen” in the imagination of nation-state differently** (Sparke 2005:48). It does so, I will argue here, via a spatial and temporal deferral of security decision that follows the dispersed geography of the commercial supply chain. The state’s ability to track and trace people or objects in movement, across or beyond its borders, is increasingly bound up with commercial techniques for tracking and tracing objects through the supply chain. The paradox of security and mobility—the problematic of the moving target—is given the appearance of being fixed by technologies of locatability. As David Campbell writes, “were it possible to bring about the absence of movement”, that would represent “pure security”, yet it would be at that moment that “the state would wither away” (1992:12). The question is not one of how to arrest mobility, then, but how to govern mobility in such a way as to allow circulation and to sustain the impression of securability. Put simply, to secure the sovereign power of the state in a global economy of mobile things and people precisely by means of targeting bodies in movement. The contemporary decentred state shares much of its spatial character with the diffuse and dispersed capillaries of global capital. If William Connolly (2005:148) is correct and sovereignty is “migrating to a layered global assemblage”, then one aspect of this layering is the profusion of ambiguous locations of many kinds, where the distinctions between legality and illegality, work and violence, onshore and offshore are increasingly blurred. Just as the dispersal of a global supply chain into offshore sites and export processing zones permits the deferral of many kinds of commercial decision—at least in terms of Jacques Derrida’s sense of decision as responsibility (1999:25)—so the diffusion of state authority into ambiguous locations of many kinds appears to institute the deferral of decision on behalf of the state. In the marketplace that is the test laboratory for RFID applications, for example, the tagging at item level by Wal-Mart, M&S and Gillette has allowed these commercial players to seek efficient locations in distant places, and yet to sustain the ability to control with precision (Eckfeldt 2005). The very idea of an animated supply chain, making its own algorithmic calculations and judgements—from “smart refrigerators” to smart supermarket shelving and tracked shipments (Gunther and Spiekerman 2005)—incorporates ¨ the bodies and objects of production and consumption, from the growers, pickers and producers of raw materials, through manufacturing, supply and retail workers. In the most vulnerable offshore spaces of the global economy, where commercial firms seek only the most fleeting of finger holds in a specific territorial space, we begin to see how the commercial targeting of things and objects plays into and through the targeting of people. Thailand’s export processing zones—or “free zones”—for example, have become “e-free-zones”, using RFID to track the movement of imported materials, deliveries, exported goods and, significantly, the bodies of workers, as they traverse the boundaries of the zone. The fortified security fences associated with export processing zones, then, are augmented by equally carceral, but less obviously visible, lines that track and trace the movements of workers via “contactless” smart cards, and the mobility of objects via RF-enabled smart labels. Similarly, the extension of RFID into border crossing cards and immigration documents allows the feigned impression of an open world, while it institutes new lines and boundaries. There is a growing resonance, then, between apparently geo-economic systems of locatability (of course always also political) that target the bodies of workers and the movement of the objects with which they interact, and the algorithmic security practices of the state: It plays out in new systems of production that aim to narrow the intervals between conception, manufacturing, distribution and consumption—shrinking the delays between detecting an audience pattern and formatting a new enticement that can address it. It plays out in pre-emptive policing and warfare systems that aim to close the gap between sensing and shooting (Crandall 2006:13). As Jordan Crandall depicts the geographies of tracking and targeting, they play in and out of the plural spaces of our world. As the commercial tracking technologies enter the sphere of security—RFID passports, “smart” national ID cards, RF-enabled immigration and visa documents, the tagging of detained asylum seekers, employee “contactless” buildings access cards—they defer security decisions into algorithmic calculation. The participation of RFID in violent geographies is thus often obscured. When global consultants Accenture made their successful bid for the USVISIT “Smart Borders” contract, for example, they simulated the ability of RFID to target from a distance: Using a nearby facility belonging to Raytheon, a subcontractor on its team, the Accenture team constructed a mock border point kiosk at which the government team had an RFID tag attached to their passports. They also constructed a mock land border crossing where a scanner read the RFID passport tags of the government officials inside the car. Even though the car became momentarily airborne after hitting a speed bump—the scanner read the digital information contained on the RFID chips of all four government officials in the vehicle, displaying their pictures on an electronic billboard as they passed by (Accenture 2005:242, emphasis added). Accenture’s business partner Raytheon, the world’s largest manufacturer of so-called “smart weapons”, produces the cluster bombs widely reported to be responsible for the violent deaths of civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan. Here we see the targeting of markets and neighbourhoods by military hardware segueing into the targeting of people at border crossings and in the spaces of the airport. Indeed, it is Raytheon that, in November 2007, was awarded the £650 million UK e-borders contract as the leading contractor of the Trusted Borders consortium, with Accenture the IT systems subcontractor. **Where RFID appears to render movement around the subways, highways and superstores of the global economy as a smooth and seamless experience, it does so by aligning the security practices of the state with the mobilities of the consumer. In this sense, our everyday geographies do spiral into and across the daily violences of the algorithmic targeting of “others” and the visceral military violence of bombing campaigns. It is important to recognise at this point that we can only gain a limited understanding of the technologies of algorithmic war by seeing them as explainable by the post-9/11 deepening of political economies of surveillance (Lyon 2003).** The capacity of RFID to make us locatable is actually acutely ambivalent: we feel its potential to watch and to incarcerate just as we simultaneously feel it fulfil some of our desires and pleasures. As Matt Sparke has illustrated in his study of the biometric proximity cards used in the US–Canadian border NEXUS programme, the appeal is made to “the fast lane, where you want to be” (2006:167). Similarly, RFID is offered as a means of expediting mobility in the UK’s Heathrow airport “MiSense” programme, promising to “simplify your journey through the airport while maintaining security”.7 The MiSense programme, by incorporating smart sensors into the possession of the subject—“my sense”—invites an almost playful encounter with RFID sensors. This stitching together of playful leisurely RFID encounters with security practice asks the subject to voluntarily offer themselves up to tracking technologies in return for expedited movement. In some of the most playful forms of RFID use in the leisure industry— subcutaneous chips inserted into the arms of customers at a Glasgow nightclub so that they may pay for their drinks without the hindrance of cash or cards; RFID golf balls that communicate their location to a remote reader—we can see security dreams fulfilled. Night club patrons secure their pre-cleared identity and financial details beneath their skin, and golfers seek out a means of securely locating distant objects. Where RFID “pleasures and anxieties cohabit”, the targeted line of sight sorts and segregates finite degrees of visibility so that, for some, “the edges are smoothed” as they “blend seamlessly into the crowd” (Crandall 2006:12). For others, of course, the line of sight targets for heightened exposure to visibility—to stop and search, to continually verify identity, to have movement in public space checked and intercepted.

### ! – Bare Life

#### The affirmative is complicit in the politicization of “bare-life” – Western Modernity is too far entrenched within its own political existence --

**AGAMBEN 98** 9Agamben, Giorgio) “Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life”, Stanford, Calif. :Stanford University Press, 1998.//vivi

Yet the point at which these two faces of power converge remains strangely unclear in Foucault’s work, so much so that it has even been claimed that Foucault would have consistently refused to elaborate a unitary theory of power. If Foucault contests the traditional approach to the problem of power, which is exclusively based on juridical models (“What legitimates power?”) or on institutional models (“What is the State?”), and if he calls for a “liberation from the theoretical privilege of sovereignty” in order to construct an analytic of power that would, not take law as its model and code, then where, in the body of power, is the zone of indistinction (or, at least, the point of intersection) at which techniques of individualization and totalizing procedures converge? And, more generally, is there a unitary center in which the political “double bind” finds its raison d’être? That there is a subjective aspect in the genesis of power was already implicit in the concept of servitude volontaire in Etienne de La Boétie. But what is the point at which the voluntary servitude of individuals comes into contact with objective power? Can one be content, in such a delicate area, with psychological explanations such as the suggestive notion of a parallelism between external and internal neuroses? Confronted with phenomena such as the power of the society of the spectacle that is everywhere transforming the political realm today, is it legitimate or even possible to hold subjective technologies and political techniques apart? Although the existence of such a line of thinking seems to be logically implicit in Foucault’s work, it remains a blind spot to the eye of the researcher, or rather something like a vanishing point that the different perspectival lines of Foucault’s inquiry (and, more generally, of the entire Western reflection on power) converge toward without reaching. The present inquiry concerns precisely this hidden point of intersection between the juridico- institutional and the biopolitical models of power. What this work has had to record among its likely conclusions is precisely that the two analyses cannot be separated, and that the inclusion of bare life in the political realm constitutes the original – if concealed – nucleus of sovereign power. It can even be said that the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power. In this sense, biopolitics is at least as old as the sovereign exception. Placing biological life at the center of its calculations, the modern State therefore does nothing other than bring to light the secret tie uniting power and bare life, thereby reaffirming the bond (derived from a tenacious correspondence between the modern and the archaic which one encounters in the most diverse spheres) berween modern power and the most immemorial of the arcana imperii. If this is true, it will be necessary to reconsider the sense of the Aristotelian definition of the polis as the opposition between life (zēn) and good life (eu zēn). The opposition is, in fact, at the same time an implication of the first in the second, of bare life in politically qualified life. What remains to be interrogated in the Aristotelian definition is not merely – as has been assumed until now – the sense, the modes, and the possible articulations of the “good life” as the telos of the political. We must instead ask why Western politics first constitutes itself through an exclusion (which is simultaneously an inclusion) of bare life. What is the relation between politics and life, if life presents itself as what is included by means of an exclusion? The structure of the exception delineated in the first part of this book appears from this perspective to be consubstantial with Western politics. In Foucault’s statement according to which man was, for Aristotle, a “living animal with the additional capacity for political existence,” it is therefore precisely the meaning of this “additional capacity” that must be understood as problematic. The peculiar phrase “born with regard to life, but existing essentially with regard to the good life” can be read not only as an implication of being born (ginomenē) in being (ousa) but also as an inclusive exclusion (an exceptio) of zoē in the polis, almost as if politics were the place in which life had to transform itself into good life and in which what had to be politicized were always already bare life. In Western politics, bare life has the peculiar privilege of being that whose exclusion founds the city of men. It is not by chance, then, that a passage of the Politics situates the proper place of the polis in the transition from voice to language. The link between bare life and politics is the same link that the metaphysical definition of man as “the living being who has language” seeks in the relation between phonē and logos: Among living beings, only man has language. The voice is the sign of pain and pleasure, and this is why it belongs to other living beings (since their nature has developed to the point of having the sensations of pain and pleasure and of signifying the two). But language is for manifesting the fitting and the unfitting and the just and the unjust. To have the sensation of the good and the bad and of the just and the unjust is what is proper to men as opposed to other living beings, and the community of these things makes dwelling and the city. (1253a, 10-18) The question “In what way does the living being have language?” corresponds exactly to the question “In what way does bare life dwell in the polis?” The living being has logos by taking away and conserving its own voice in it, even as it dwells in the polis by letting its own bare life be excluded, as an exception, within it. Politics therefore appears as the truly fundamental structure of Western metaphysics insofar as it occupies the threshold on which the relation between the living being and the logos is realized. In the “politicization” of bare life – the metaphysical task par excellence – the humanity of living man is decided. In assuming this task, modernity does nothing other than declare its own faithfulness to the essential structure of the metaphysical tradition. The fundamental categorial pair of Western politics is not that of friend/enemy but that of bare life/political existence, zoē/bios, exclusion/inclusion. There is politics because man is the living being who, in language, separates and opposes himself to his own bare life and, at the same time, maintains himself in relation to that bare life in an inclusive exclusion. The protagonist of this book is bare life, that is, the life of homo sacer (sacred man), who may be killed and yet not sacrificed, and whose essential function in modern politics we intend to assert. An obscure figure of archaic Roman law, in which human life is included in the juridical order [ordinamento]1 solely in the form of its exclusion (that is, of its capacity to be killed), has thus offered the key by which not only the sacred tests of sovereignty but also the very codes of political power will unveil their mysteries. At the same time, however, this ancient meaning of the term sacer presents us with the enigma of a figure of the sacred that, before or beyond the religious, constitutes the first paradigm of the political realm of the West. The Foucauldian thesis will then have to be corrected or, at least, completed, in the sense that what characterizes modern politics is not so much the inclusion of zoē in the polis – which is, in itself, absolutely ancient – nor simply the fact that life as such becomes a principal object of the projections and calculations of State power. Instead the decisive fact is that, together with the process by which the exception everywhere becomes the rule, the realm of bare life – which is originally situated at the margins of the political order – gradually begins to coincide with the political realm, and exclusion and inclusion, outside and inside, bios and zoē, right and fact, enter into a zone of irreducible indistinction. At once excluding bare life from and capturing it within the political order, the state of exception actually constituted, in its very separateness, the hidden foundation on which the entire political system rested. When its borders begin to be blurred, the bare life that dwelt there frees itself in the city and becomes both subject and object of the conflicts of the political order, the one place for both the organization of State power and emancipation from it. Everything happens as if, along with the disciplinary process by which State power makes man as a living being into its own specific object, another process is set in motion that in large measure corresponds to the birth of modern democracy, in which man as a living being presents himself no longer as an object but as the subject of political power. These processes – which in many ways oppose and (at least apparently) bitterly conflict with each other – nevertheless converge insofar as both concern the bare life of the citizen, the new biopolitical body of humanity. If anything characterizes modern democracy as opposed to classical democracy, then, it is that modern democracy presents itself from the beginning as a vindication and liberation of zoē, and that it is constantly trying to transform its own bare life into a way of life and to find, so to speak, the bios of zoē. Hence, too, modern democracy’s specific aporia: it wants to put the freedom and happiness of men into play in the very place – “bare life” – that marked their subjection. Behind the long, strife-ridden process that leads to the recognition of rights and formal liberties stands once again the body of the sacred man with his double sovereign, his life that cannot be sacrificed yet may, nevertheless, be killed. To become conscious of this aporia is not to belittle the conquests and accomplishments of democracy. It is, rather, to try to understand once and for all why democracy, at the very moment in which it seemed to have finally triumphed over its adversaries and reached its greatest height, proved itself incapable of saving zoē, to whose happiness it had dedicated all its efforts, from unprecedented ruin. Modern democracy’s decadence and gradual convergence with totalitarian states in post-democratic spectacular societies (which begins to become evident with Alexis de Tocqueville and finds its final sanction in the analyses of Guy Debord) may well be rooted in this aporia, which marks the beginning of modern democracy and forces it into complicity with its most implacable enemy. Today politics knows no value (and, consequently, no nonvalue) other than life, and until the contradictions that this fact implies are dissolved, Nazism and fascism – which transformed the decision on bare life into the supreme political principle – will remain stubbornly with us. According to the testimony of Robert Antelme, in fact, what the camps taught those who lived there was precisely that “calling into question the quality of man provokes an almost biological assertion of belonging to the human race” (L’espèce humaine, p. II).

### ! – Bare Life – Root Cause – Patriarchy

#### Patriarchal violence is built on the dichotomy of zoe and bios – we control the root cause

**EDKINS 00** (Jenny Edkins - political scientist, Professor of Politics at the University of Manchester) “Sovereign Power, Zones of Indistinction, and the Camp.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, vol. 25, no. 1, 2000, pp. 3–25. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40644981. Accessed 14 Jul. 2022.//vivi

As feminist political theorists have long argued, from the Greeks onward the political has operated through the inclusion by exclusion of the female.lo Women are invisible in international politics, too.11 Crucial to both exclusions is the way the domestic is excluded from the po- litical and/or the international. There is disagreement on the im- plications. Jean Elshtain wants us to resist the extension of the po- litical to the domestic or family realm since she regards that realm as emblematic of values more conducive to the feminine. Cynthia Enloe argues that we should regard the personal as international. Indeed, Enloe stresses the impossibility of making the distinction. However, both agree on the importance to Western sovereign order of the dichotomies of female and male, the oikos and the polis, domestic politics and the international, inside and outside.12 Like the feminists, Agamben argues that the separation of zoe and bios is a practice of inclusion by exclusion that is constitutive of sovereignty in the modern Western sense from the beginning.l3 In other words, the exclusion of zoe from the polis is at the same time an inclusion. It is not just with the rise of the modern state, as Michel Foucault would have us believe, that zoe is included in state power. Foucault argues that at the beginning of the modern era, natural life comes to be included more and more in the mechanisms and calculations of state power. At this point, politics becomes biopolitics, and whereas for Aristotle man was a living an- imal with a capacity for political existence, modern man becomes “an animal whose politics calls his existence as a living being into question.”14 Modernity for Foucault is the point at which the species and the individual as a simple living body become what is at stake in a society’spolitical strategies. At one and the same time it becomes possible both to protect life and to organize a holo- caust. However, according to Agamben this picture needs to be corrected and Foucault’s analysis of power in modernity com- pleted. Sovereign power in the West is constituted from the start by the very inclusion by exclusion of natural life: sovereignty is the originary structure in which law refers to life. More than this inclusion by exclusion, sovereign power in the West is constituted by its ability to suspend itself in a state of ex- ception, or ban: “The originary relation of law to life is not appli- cation but abandonment.”15The paradox of sovereignty is that the sovereign is at the same time inside and outside the sovereign order: the sovereign can suspend the law. What defines the rule of law is the state of exception when law is suspended. The very space in which juridical order can have validity is created and de- fined through the sovereign exception. However, the exception that defines the structure of sovereignty is more complex than the inclusion of what is outside by means of an interdiction.16 It is not just a question of creating a distinction between inside and out- side: it is the tracing of a threshold between the two, a location where inside and outside enter into a zone of indistinction. It is this state of exception, or the zone of indistinction between inside and outside, that makes the modern juridical order of the West possible. The camp is exemplary as a location of a zone of indistinction. Although in general the camp is set up precisely as part of a state of emergency or martial law, under Nazi rule this becomes not so much a state of exception in the sense of an external and provi- sional state of danger as a means of establishing the Nazi state it- self. The camp is “the space opened up when the state of excep- tion begins to become the rule.”17 In the camp, the distinction between the rule of law and chaos disappears: decisions about life and death are entirely arbitrary, and everything is possible. A zone of indistinction appears between outside and inside, exception and rule, licit and illicit. What happened in the twentieth century in the West, and paradigmatically since the advent of the camp, was that the space of the state of exception transgressed its bound- aries and started to coincide with the normal order. The zone of indistinction expanded from a space of exclusion within the nor- mal order to take over that order entirely.

### ! – Commons

\*Can also be a framework argument for emancipatory education with rehighlighting

#### Empire’s biopolitical control produces subjects oriented towards production – that cascades into resource privatization, biodiversity loss, environmental destruction, and social inequality

**Bazzul/Tolbert ’17** (Jesse Bazzul; professor of science and environmental education at University of Regina. Sara Tolbert; professor of science education University of Arizona. “Reassembling the Natural and Social Commons” [https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/978-1-137-58641-4\_4 28 February 2017](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/978-1-137-58641-4_4%2028%20February%202017)) // ELog

Creating and preserving a ‘common world for all’ is not so much a call, as it is a chorus. The need to continually make the commons grow exceeds the grossly uneven distribution of natural resources and wealth between the global elite and the impoverished majority.1 Witness the scientific designation of our current geological moment, the Anthropocene, a moment in Earth’s history so marked by the activity of one primate species that geologists have proposed an entirely new unit of geological time, where human destructiveness will remain biologically and geologically evident for tens of millions of years on planet Earth (Lewis and Maslin, 2015). The Anthropocene’s extinction rate is ‘100 to 1,000 times higher than normal background rates, and probably constitutes the beginning of the sixth mass extinction in Earth’s history’ (p.  172). In the last 40 years, Earth has lost half its wildlife diversity (Carrington, 2014). While we use the term Anthropocene for the sake of its increasingly widespread recognition, we want to highlight some of its limitations: 1. It renders less visible the populations of humans who have lived for thousands of years and maintained a more productive symbiotic relationship within their material/ecological communities and 2. It disguises the central role of patriarchy capitalism in the rapid (and recent) environmental destruction that distinguishes the Anthropocene from other epochs (see Moore, 2016). However, we argue that educational communities should be fixed on the predicament of rapid environmental destruction within the more recent history of the Anthropocene, along with the widening social inequality that is inseparable from it. Instead, current education reforms position schooling as an apparatus of social control and human capital (re)production. Resistance to these reforms involves preserving and producing a shared world in-common, for example through the free sharing of intellectual labor, protesting the inaccessibility of higher education (e.g. in Canada, Chile), high stakes testing opt-outs in the United States, massive demonstrations and strikes against neoliberal education reforms among teachers, youth, and families (e.g. in Detroit, Chicago, Mexico City), eco-justice educational movements that re-appropriate land for food access, and indigenous education movements that center collective priorities and communal politics (see Barronet and Ortega Brena, 2008). This chapter argues for educational practices that (re)engage the commons (Means, 2013; Mueller, 2008). We outline a theoretical context for the natural and social commons as pedagogical concepts, synthesizing the two in Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) concept of assemblages in order to highlight political possibilities of the commons for critical education. In modernity, knowledge of the natural world has been shielded from proper political reckoning, and the importance of protecting and producing a shared commons obscured. As an ethico-political concept, we can view the commons as the natural and social worlds, or wealth, to which ‘we’ have shared, equal access. This definition is difficult to apply today, nor does it reflect the relational ethic of many indigenous communities in which humans are understood as part of, not separate from, the natural world (e.g. the Lakota mitakuye oyasin, or ‘all my relations’ and the Maori kaitiakanga or ‘guardianship, protection’ as in of/for the natural world). Though we often view parks, conservation areas, and nature reserves as common spaces, they are seldom accessible to all humans, nor to the biota that are ‘pushed out’ to make way for ornamental plants, animals, and other microscopic ‘critters’. To afford nature a ‘political imagination’, and politics the materiality it needs for enactment, ‘social’ and ‘natural’ distinctions must be blurred, while recognizing that traditional linguistic, scientific, and cultural constraints will resist such blurrings. According to philosopher Bruno Latour (2009) one reason for our current environmental mess and growing social inequality is because Eurocentric notions of politics and nature have historically been kept separate; the former confined to what ‘should be’ while the later ‘what is’. This fundamental schism has successfully functioned to keep politics out of the ‘study’ of nature, and ‘nature’ out of the practice of politics, moral philosophy, and ethics. From the onset of the Anthropocene, humans are themselves a geologic force. In a provocative way, educators must recognize allusions to ‘nature’, all that is non-human or non-artificial, as ideological. The ideological character of nature as static other can be seen not only by continued disregard for ecological realities, but also from the ‘voice of warning’ when scientific breakthroughs reposition our place within an unquestioned conceptualization of ‘nature’. Rejecting nature as unquestionable backdrop to which we must always ‘return’, is essential to asking big questions that link the ‘social and the natural’. For example, Slavoj Žižek (2011) stresses that considerations of capital cannot be divorced from questions of nature and puts it this way: ‘how are we going to think the link between the social history of Capital and the much larger geological changes of the conditions of life on Earth’?2 One important lesson of structuralism is precisely that the taken-for-granted should be refused. When Roland Barthes writes, ‘the “natural” is in short, the ultimate outrage’ (Barthes, 1977, p. 85), we should understand a fuller ontological meaning to natural—the outrage comes not just from rendering the historical and political as natural, but the ‘natural as natural’! If humans are inseparable from nature, then nature itself is always already ideological. This undoing of the modern culture–nature divide is a necessary part of what Hardt and Negri (2009) call altermodernity. That is, shedding the controlling aspects of modernity, colonialism and private property, and grasping modernity’s creative, immanent powers needed for creative labor and new political and educational practices that promote a multiplicity of differences and production of the commons (Hardt and Negri, 2000; Hardt & Negri, 2013). Combining the natural and social commons requires a creative refocus on virtual/actual ontological frameworks that allow their interplay. As Vine Deloria and Daniel Wildcat (2001) point out, Indigenous thought and practices have long fused the ‘natural’ and the political and promoted communal living between humans and non-humans. Modern ecology and indigenous models of politics and ethics have much in common: they are both about complex relationships between living organisms and their environments. Indigenous thought has, in my mind, one key advantage: it sees the ecosystem as the appropriate site for the study of politics and ethics. (Deloria and Wildcat, 2001, p. 139) If the commons serve as the grounds for education for emancipation, how do we envision its immanent potential in classrooms and movements for social and ecological justice? We argue here that assemblage theory, in short, the fusing of material and discursive parts in social analyses, adds a much needed ontological dimension to education research and critical pedagogy. Clayton Pierce (2015) cautions that the neoliberal restructuring of schools does not allow teachers and students to take the view that both humans and non-humans have agency, precisely because agency is geared toward (bio) capitalist ends through entrepreneurship and commodification. The prefix ‘bio’ describes our current political reality where forms of life, including educational life, have become the focus of modern governance and control. Pierce stresses the double meaning of ‘bio’ in biocapitalism. In one sense, a new form of modern governance, and capitalism, that reaches into every corner of human social life to reproduce the subjectivities and modes of living needed to reproduce the social order. However, ‘bio’ also means the harnessing of all powers of life—literally the commodification or mobilization of DNA, cells, genes, etc. for the purposes of capital. Education must not only produce and nurture a world-in-common, but also challenge the enclosure of the commons—that is, exploitation of what is common (forests, groundwater, and ideas) for private interests and the production of capital. Neoliberal, global capitalist enclosure of the commons is perhaps the key political battle for education for the twentyfirst century (see Means, 2014; Slater, 2014). Hendersen and Hursh (2014) outline the biopolitical nature of our current moment—resistance to neoliberal reforms will come from below through production of the commons. Part 1: The Commons as an Emancipatory Pedagogical Concept As stated above, privatization (or enclosure) of the commons is dangerous because it values biotic and abiotic entities as private commodities for certain individuals, not communities or the commons. The private commodification of water in California by Nestle™ is a good example of profit accumulation destroying the commons. Yet, resistance to privatization is growing. Urban populations are consistently creating the commons through shared struggles of collective existence, and the creation of ‘ecological space’ (Hardt and Negri, 2004). Indigenous peoples’ ecologically and community-oriented sense of place is highly threatening to the goals of capital because indigenous ways of being often do not rely on products from global capitalist commodity chains (Peña, 2014; Wildcat, 2009). However, the struggle to produce and preserve the commons is not just about commodities, but the (re)production of subjectivities needed to produce the commons (Hardt and Negri, 2009). Graham Slater (2014) encourages educators to move beyond an exclusively anthropocentric notion of the commons as shared human language, communication, and by extension, culture. Although this is an invaluable aspect of the common, it is limited insofar as it asserts the primacy of verbal communication in social production and centers an anthropocentric vision of communicative relationships in which meaningful and responsive relationships with nonhuman animals and environments are subordinated to intraspecies dialogue … This shortcoming is not a fatal flaw in Hardt and Negri’s conceptualization of the common, rather, it indicates the need to embrace this antagonism as the grounds for elaborating a more fully ecological theorization of the common. (p. 547) Slater emphasizes an antagonistic version of the commons, for example one that does not let settler colonists feel comfortable with a social commons that forgets destructive colonial realities. Indeed, the commons has a history—a social, colonial, ecological, geological, mythological, philosophical, and theological past. While there is some recognition that we share ecological habitats, with the rise of immaterial labor and its cultural, cognitive, artistic, intellectual and affective products that can be shared in common, our current notion of the commons needs to expand. The (bio)political potential of immaterial labor is that the ideas, signs, and affects required for (bio)capitalist growth, rely on interconnectivity and free sharing—paradoxically, what global (bio) capitalism needs to grow is anti-thetical to the rule of private property. A recent article in The Guardian on the ‘end of capitalism’ articulates this well: By building business models and share valuations based on the capture privatisation of all socially produced information, such firms are constructing a fragile corporate edifice at odds with the most basic need of humanity, which is to use ideas freely. (Mason, 2015) The old ‘logic of scarcity’ rule that is widely seen to drive economies and resource development also needs to be rethought. The logic of scarcity sees ‘natural resources’ as something to be consumed. However, according to Hardt and Negri (2009), a key aspect of the commons is that it puts the bios to work for the commons, involving not a logic of consumption but of growth. Resources of the commons, such as free education, are continually renewable. If we read a text, offer an interpretation, discern a new truth in science, this by no means limits anyone else in doing the same. On the contrary, interpretations and new science proliferate when people are encouraged to build off the exchange of ideas, affects and interpretations. This on its own should be a justification for offering free K–12 and higher education! The logic of consumption distorts our view of the commons. For example, we are not running out of fossil fuels, in fact, there are too many deposits, and they should be left in the ground. Education should promote a fundamental shift in the logic of production from utter consumption of the commons to the proliferation of the commons (p. 300). In Canada, Latin America, and New Zealand indigenous curricula and pedagogies that promote non-exploitative relationships and communal living are gaining ground thanks to community and indigenous activism. In Chiapas, Mexico, the Zapatista movement led to the establishment of autonomous education for indigenous Tzetsal youth in which children learn, alongside literacy and numeracy, skills for political resistance, collective democratic engagement, caring for land, gender equality and the revolutionary role of women, etc. (Barronet and Ortega Brena, 2008). In Canada, aboriginal communities have engaged in democratic politics through dissensus in the name of equality (Rancière and Corcoran, 2010; Bazzul, 2015). Indigenous political actions break down artificial dichotomies between natural and social commons. The Idle No More movement advocates a view of rivers, lakes, and non-humans, as part of the same commons and deserving of equal consideration—something unthinkable to a modern juridical mindset. Such activist movements are alter-futures (much like Hardt and Negri’s concept of altermodernity), a combination of democratic thinking and communal forms of life. Idle No More employed social media to (re)produce commons resources, understandings, and labor needed to fight for just futures. Educators whose aim is to produce a common livable world must challenge colonial discourses and ontologies, where land is viewed only as a ‘natural resource’ for human consumption rather than that which we are ecologically embedded within and part of (Barad, 2007; Watts, 2013). As we shall see in the next section assemblage thinking can help educators and students envision something new. Education for the commons recognizes that the long-term project is one of (re)production, something continually (re)made: The common is thus in a paradoxical position as being a ground or a presupposition that is also the result of the process. Our analysis, then, from this point on in our research should be aimed not at ‘being common’ but ‘making the common.’ (Hardt and Negri, p. 123) Emancipatory education and social struggles have their basis in the common, not simply as a ‘resource’, but ‘an inexhaustible source of innovation and creativity’ (Hardt and Negri, 2009, pp.  111–112). The commons consists of a multitude of singularities, subjectivities formed along the lines of sex/gender, race, culture, class, spirituality and beyond.3 Engagement with the commons is therefore an engagement with alterity, as the commons sets the stage for interactions with singularities and becoming. Encountering alterity begins a critique of what we have taken for granted as other or self, as well as processes of becoming autonomous that arise from the production of a shared commons (Hardt and Negri, 2009, p. 122; Slater and Griggs, 2015). A pedagogy of the commons employs (bio)political reason to intervene in the controlling forces of biopower that employ education as a way to maintain a White/Eurocentric/global capitalist/neocolonial vision of the world (Bazzul, 2014; Tolbert and Schindel Dimick, in press). Engaging biopolitically means (re)working forces of biopower from below toward different forms of eco-social relations—life in the service of the commons (Hardt and Negri, 2009, p. 125). Whereas the traditional notion poses the common as a natural world outside of society, the biopolitical conception of the common permeates equally all spheres of life …. We might call this an ‘ecology of the common—an ecology focused equally on nature and society, on humans and the non-human world in a dynamic of interdependence, care, and mutual transformation.’ (Hardt and Negri, 2009, p. 171) The struggle over subjectivity is integral to the commons, and therefore biopolitical in that forms of life (subjectivities) come together in cooperation to (re)produce the commons. The Metropolis is an extremely important site for (bio)political struggle and producing the commons today, as cities are ideal locations for interactions of the multitude and immaterial labor. Facing down neoliberal restructuring of public schooling through coalitions of teachers, students, and parents is also a form of building the commons. Such coalitions create spaces where common interests, knowledges, relationships, and forms of life grow. At the same time the commons are a creative entity always in danger of enclosure—sometimes for purported social or ecological good. Figure 4.1 diagrams some enclosures of the commons through the privatization of life (e.g. genetic, educational). Biopolitical struggle is inherent to all fields of education including science education, where the (re)production of biotechnological labor is often in conflict with science for the common good (Bazzul, 2012; Bencze and Carter, 2011; Pierce, 2013). If scientific knowledge is produced in-common and belongs to all, why should it be appropriated, enclosed by companies such as Novartis™ and Monsanto™, and not just along global capital lines, but along those of nationality, gender, and race (Shiva, 2000). Developing education for the commons, may involve developing more qualitative indicators of both growth (and corruption) of the commons, since it exceeds the use of metrics (Hardt and Negri, 2004). Education for the commons must move away from reproducing what Hardt and Negri (2009, p. 159) identify as corrupt forms of the common—systems of organization geared to the needs of certain individuals and not what is common to all. Some examples of this corruption are nepotistic practices, the chauvinist (nationalist) nation state and its blind adherence to mythic natural origins, the rule of private property, ethnocentrisms, racisms, heteronormativity, and the corporation—a parasite of the commons for the accumulation of (bio)capital. The following educational goals are relevant for fostering the biopolitical production of the commons: [figure omitted for formatting] Maximizing Free Accessibility of Knowledge—Education must facilitate access to knowledge and give all students the competencies and tools to access this knowledge. • Flattening Hierarchies—Education for the commons involves tearing down structural and pedagogical hierarchies (see Freire, 1972; hooks, 1994; Hardt, 2011). • Preservation of the ‘Natural’ Commons—Education must employ rationalities toward the service of life, ecology and relations between humans and non-humans. • Trouble the ‘Expert’—Educational communities must de-privilege the voices of experts who tell us we have no alternative (like the ‘TINA’ rhetoric of neoliberalism). • Inclusiveness—Radical inclusion should engage subjectivities at the precarious edges of politics as they have the greatest knowledge of, and ability to challenge, practices of biopower.

### ! – Democracy

#### Venezuela is a nation that resists US hegemony and imperialist ideas, and so the US decides to try and invoke a coup and neutralize an enemy to the US, dictating that the US does not care about democracy, it cares about its agenda

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**Obama's charge that Venezuela represents a threat to US foreign policy was an accusation directed at all governments that have freely chosen to abandon US-centered organizations and reject US hegemony.** In other words, **what aroused Obama's ire and motivates his aggressive threats toward Venezuela was Caracas's political leadership in challenging US's imperialist foreign policy.** Venezuela does not have military bases in other parts of Latin America nor has it invaded, occupied or sponsored military coups in other Latin American countries like Obama and his predecessors. Venezuela condemned the US invasion of Haiti, the US-supported military coups in Honduras (2009), Venezuela (2002, 2014, 2015), Bolivia (2008) and Ecuador (2010). Evidently, **Obama's "emergency' decree and sanctions against Venezuela were directed at maintaining unchallenged US imperial supremacy in Latin America and degrading Venezuela's independent, democratic foreign policy.** So, to understand Obama's policy toward Venezuela we have to analyze why he chose overt, unilateral bellicose threats at this time.

### ! – Hegemony

#### As the US became the only global superpower at the turn of the 1990’s it began enforcing ITS global agenda and rule upon every global nation, dominating institutions in civil society, while isolating those that disagree, meaning that a large part of global affairs are controlled by the US

**Diaconescu and Mazilu 21**, Doctoral School of Sciences, University of Craiova, Field of Geography, Craiova, Romania <https://www.sciencepublishinggroup.com/journal/index?journalid=635> “USA, Europe’s Geopolitical Moon: World Domination by the European population, Located on both sides of the North and South”

**The US adopted a series of rules, models and restrictions, values and customs that were first implemented by Western European states, this step giving the impression of unanimous global will.** Thus: Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Israel or South Africa further took over the new models to follow and from here the whole planet. **In this way, the US dollar, the UN institution, the rules of the WHO, UNESCO, UNICEF, FAO and so on, the decisions of the courts and centers of justice and responsibility, human rights or the seas, with headquarters, were put in value in The Hague, San Francisco, Paris or Hamburg, the decision to increase GDP, centers, institutions, NGOs or all sorts of scales that said what is beautiful and ugly, trendy or disgusting, which occupies the first or last places, everything being evaluated by the USA or its dominated institutions.** In the same way, the news was written, the public perception was shaped, and the instigation of hatred or praise of a leader or a country left the USA, while the economic restrictions adopted by the USA to the states it considered "bad" were followed by similar measures in the states of Western Europe and from here on in the other countries, leading to the **isolation of the state that does not respect American values.** The numerous state organizations culminating in a globalization at the global level, was also adopted from here, and the value of the forms listed on American exchanges or in the centers dominated by it, made **everyone have a behavior, manifestation and trust after the dictation started by Americans, the USA becoming especially after 1990, the only world superpower.** Just as a man who tries to impose his will and way of thinking, finds much more success if he holds the first position in an institution or the place of president in a country or a company, after him the first row of people, parties, specialists taking over the intention and further promoting it in a continuous branch to the base, **so the US sat at the top of a pyramid created by it, in which Europe occupies the next step followed by the main US allies, held somewhat in this state and their attachment to Europe, from here descending in steps to less and less obedient states but also with low decision-making power.** But the basis of this pyramid is made up of less perceptible states such as those in Africa, or those who tend to seek external alliances such as Latin America, those who want to cut off the top that submits them as the European Union does,, cultural model, army or euro, no longer wants submission to the US, but also the rapid rise of the Asian economy with the end of the population explosion here, makes the US no longer be placed as a pinnacle on the pyramid and will rather a peak in unstable and centrifugal circles trying to carve its own geopolitical path.

### ! – Middle East Hegemony

#### Due to the Unites State’s imperialist agenda, it allied and now supports Israel as a tool to help control the Middle East, has created a Zionist nation intertwined in US society, which by trying to feed this groing regional hegemon, destroyed countless markets in the name of “Imperialism”

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**US empire builder have constructed three regional axes of power in the Middle East.** In order of importance, they are: the US-Israel axis of power the US-Saudi axis and the US-Turkey axis of power**. The US-Israel axis of power is based on a longstanding agreement. The US militarily and financially supports Israel's colonial expansion into Palestine and Syria, while Israel backs US projections of military and political power throughout the region. Thanks to US military and financial aid, Israel has become the dominant military power in the Middle East and the only nuclear power in the region. The US has used Israel's wars and invasions of its neighbors to secure several Arab collaborator client states (notably Jordan and Egypt).** More recently the US-Israeli power axis has been expanded to include the client regime in Kurdistan (northen Iraq). In addition, the US-Israeli axis has been deeply involved in financing and promoting collaborators' opposition forces in Lebanon (currently the Hariri political formation), sectors of the armed mercenaries in Syria, Kurdish Peshmerga militias in Iraq and the so- called 'Mujahedeen al Khalq' terrorists in Iran**. The US CIA and Israel's Mossad engage in clandestine violent operations, directly intervening to destabilize secular and Islamic nationalist regimes like Iran by for example, disrupting their communications and assassinating their scientists and leaders.** Israel has secured political and intelligence agreements with Egypt and Jordan to isolate and dispossess the Palestinians. The US has secured military bases and operational platforms in Egypt and Jordan to attack Hezbollah in Lebanon, President Bashar al Assad in Syria and the Iranian government. However, while in the past each country benefited from the US-Israel axis of power, recently it has turned into a costly, asymmetrical relation, a zero-sum game, where Israel's regional power increases as the US empire deteriorates. This turn of events is costly understood if one Middle East policy is formulated in the examines the way in which US. **Over the past three decades Israel has constructed the most formidable organized power configuration in loyalties and blind obedience, over a half-million Jewish Zionists have embraced Israel’s interests and pursued them with a zeal and single-mindedness that is unmatched by any other foreign-based lobby. Prominent Zionists have permeated key state institutions, from the US Treasury, Department of Commerce and Pentagon to the White House and National Security Council. They dominate the US Congress and the Twi-party system, especially the nomination and electoral process, ensuring that only candidates who sweat allegiance to Israel are allowed to run and be elected. That way no political debate regarding Israel’s subversive influence is permitted. They dominate the mass media, ensuring that all news and commentary is favorable to Israel and all criticism of the Jewish State is excluded**. Here we have the paradox of an imperial ally: Israel colonizing an imperial power and exacting tribute, with foreign aid to Tel Aviv exceeding 3.6$ billion. More Importantly, the Zionist Power configuration plays a key role in waging wars against Israel’s designated enemies and providing diplomatic cover for the Jewish state’s ethnic slaughter of the people of Palestine. The Israel-US Alliance has been set up wholly on Israel’s terms. Even **as Israel rains thousands of tons of bombs on the captive people of Gaza, to the horror of the world public opinion, the White House applauds and the US Congress unanimously approves resolutions supporting Israel’s war crimes at the behest of the powerful Zionists ensconced in Washington**. **Whatever the US empire has gained from Israel in the way of intimidating and humiliating Arab leaders it has lsot economic terms. Major oil companies have lost hundreds of billions of dollars in trade and investment from the wars in Iraq, Syria and Libya and from sanctions against Iran. The US domestic economy has lost hundreds of billions of dollars in income and investment as a result of the high cost of oil imports resulting from the wars**. Strategically, the asymmetrical US-Israeli alliance has turned the US into an empire dominated by militarists, and one exclusively focused on the Middle East. This transformation into a military-driven empire has resulted in neglect, decline and displacement of the imperial influence in the most dynamic growth sectors of the world economy: Asia, Latin America and Russia. It is a paradox that the lopsided strength of the US-Israeli axis in the Middle East has profoundly undermined the US global economic and domestic foundations of empire**. Moreover, the brutal colonial-style wars in the Middle East promoted by US Zionist strategists in Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan have destroyed any possibility of reconstructing viable client states and markets out of these conquered nations**. Israeli military strategists have long wanted these regimes destroyed, their state institutions dismantled and their societies embroiled in sectarian, tribal strife. As a result, the US wars have not produced a single functioning client state: the US military invaded, occupied and destroyed Iraq and Afghanistan while losing the wars in political terns. This came at no cost to Israel, the unchallenged regional hegemon, while the US Treasury will struggle with a trillion-dollar price tag and the US public will experience economic decline for generations.

### ! – Militarism

#### US Imperialism has shifted at the turn of the century as it first looked to imperialize regions and nations for economic gain before shifting its narrative to a “Global war on Terror” militarization

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Over the past half century, the political leadership and strategies of the imperial state have changed dramatically**. During the period 1975-1990, the MNCs played a central role in defining the direction of imperial state policy: leveraging markets in Asia; negotiating market openings with China; promoting and backing neoliberal military and civilian regimes in Latin America; installing and financing pro-capitalist regimes in Russia, Eastern Europe; the Baltic and Balkan states. Even in cases where the imperial state resorted to military intervention. Yugoslavia and Iraq, the bombings led to favorable economic opportunities for the US-based MNCs. The Bush Sr. regime promoted US oil interests via an oil-for-food exchange agreement with Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Clinton promoted free market regimes in the mini- states resulting from the break-up of socialist Yugoslavia. "** Towever, the imperial state's leadership and policies shifted dramatically during the late 1990s onward. President Clinton's imperial state was com- posed of long-standing MNC representatives, Wall Street bankers and newly ascending militarist Zionist officials. **The result was a hybrid policy in which the imperial state actively promoted MC opportunities under neoliberal regimes in the ex-communist countries of Europe and Latin America and expanded MNC ties with China and Vietnam while launching destructive military interventions in Somalia, Yugoslavia and Iraq.** **The correlation and balance of force within the imperialist state shifted dramatically in favour the militarist-Zionist faction with 9/11: the terrorist attack of dubious origins and false flag demolitions in New York and Washington served to entrench the militarists in control of a vastly expan- ded imperial state apparatus.** As a consequence of 9/11, the militarist-Zio- nist faction of the imperial state subordinated the interests of the MC to its strategy of total war. **This in turn led to the invasion, occupation and destruction of civilian infrastructure in Iraq and Afghanistan (instead of harnessing it to MNC expansion). The US colonial regime dismantled the Iraqi state (instead of re-ordering it to serve the MNC). The assassination and forced out-migration of millions of skilled professionals, administrators, police and military officials (rather than their incorporation as servants of the colonial state and MNCs) crippled any economic recovery.** The militarist-Zionist ascendancy in the imperial state introduced major changes in the policy, orientation, priorities and modus operandi of US imperialism. **The ideology of the 'global war on terror' replaced the MNC doctrine of 'economic globalization.**

### ! – Military Industrial Complex

#### The biggest beneficiary of US imperialism is also the ones that convince the US to continue its imperial agenda, the Military Industrial Complex, which see top companies growing in wealth at the expense of veteran and welfare services, indicating that the US imperial agenda DESTROYS social institutions and structure, enabling more structural violence

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**The power and influence of the military industrial complex in promoting serial wars has resulted in extraordinary rates of profit.** According to a recent study by Morgan Stanley (cited in Baron's, 6/9/14, P. 19), **shares in the major US arms manufacturers have risen 27,699 percent over the past five years, in contrast to 6,777 percent for the broader market. In the past three years alone Raytheon has returned 124 percent, Northrup Grumman 14 percent and Lockheed Martin 149 percent to their investors and masters.** The **Obama regime made a grand public show of reducing the military budget via the annual appropriation bill, and then turned around and announced emergency supplemental funds to cover the costs of these wars ... thereby actually increasing military spending,** all the while waving the banner of cost cutting'. **Obama's theatrics fattened the profits for the US military-industrial complex. War profits have soared with the series of military interventions in the Middle East, Africa and South Asia. Arms industry lobbyists pressure Congressional and Pentagon decision-makers to link up with the pro-Israel lobby as it promotes even deeper direct US military involvement in Syria, Iraq and Iran.** The growing ties between Israeli and US military industries reinforce their political leverage in Washington by working with liberal interventionists and neo-conservatives. They attacked Obama for not bombing Syria and for his withdrawal of troops from Iraq and Afghanistan. They then clamored to send US troops back to Iraq and called for intervention in Ukraine. Obama argued that proxy wars without direct US troop involvement do not require the heavy Pentagon expenditures demanded by the arms industry. The Obama regime presented the withdrawal from rag and Afghanistan as a necessary step to reduce US financial and military losses. This was in response to Wall Street's pressure to cut the budget deficit. Obama's attempt to meet the demands of the US financial sector came at the price of cutting potential profit for the military industrial complex as well as infuriating Israel and its fanatical supporters in Congress. **In the face of rising domestic pressure to reduce the budget deficit and cut military spending, the US military-industrial complex and its Zionist accomplices are fighting to retain their share by eliminating programs designed to serve the health needs of active and retired soldiers. Soaring disability costs related to the recent wars will continue for decades. Veteran healthcare costs are expected to double to 15 percent of the defense budget in the next five years.** The **huge public cost of caring for soldiers and veterans means "bad news for defense stocks',** according to financial analysts (Baron's, 6/9/14, p. 19). **This is why the arms industries promote the closure of scores of Veterans Health Administration hospitals and a reduction in retiree benefits,** using the pretexts of fighting fraud and incompetence and poor quality service compared with the private sector. **The same corporate warlords and lobbyists who clamor to send US troops back to Iraq and to new wars in Syria and Ukraine, where young lives, limbs and sanity are at great risk, are also in the forefront of a fight to slash funding for the veterans' medical care.** Economists have long noted **that the more dollars spent on veterans' and military retirees' healthcare, the less is allocated for war materials, ships and aircraft. Today it is estimated that over $900 billion dollars will have been spent on long-term VHA medical and disability services for veterans of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.** That number is clearly set to rise with each new intervention. The corporate warlords are urging Congress to increase co-pays, enrollment fees and deductibles for veterans, retirees and active duty personnel enrolled in military health insurance plans such as Tricare, as well as limiting access to VHA services. **The fight over Pentagon expenditures is a struggle over war or social justice: health services for troops and veterans versus weapons programs that fatten corporate profits for the arms industry.**

### ! – Nation Collapse

#### The imperialist adgendas have plundered developing nations and enabled the corruption and stashing of funds for private corporations, which are protected and ENABLED by imperialist nations

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**The movement of profits 'overseas' takes multiple forms (transfer pricing, phony invoices, etc.) and they are primarily converted into private wealth.** These **'international movements' of profits are largely composed of mega- thievery or plunder by political and business leaders from 'developing' countries.** **According to the Financial Time**s (17/11/14, p. 2**), 'Up to $1 trillion is being taken out of developing countries every year through a web of corrupt activities involving anonymous shell companies that typically hide the identity of their true owners. The one trillion dollars of stolen profits and revenues from the developing countries (Africa, Asia, South America) are part of a corruption chain that is organized, managed and facilitated by the major financial institutions in the US and UK. According to a World Bank report in 2011, '70 percent of the biggest corruption cases between 1980 and 2010 involved anonymous shell companies. The US and the UK were among the jurisdictions most frequently used to incorporate legal entities that held proceeds of corruption'** (Financial Times, 17/11/14, p. 2). This **process of plunder or pillage of developing countries feeds into rent seeking**, conspicuous consumption and other non-productive activity in "developed' countries or**, more accurately, the imperialist states.** The principal beneficiaries of the pillage of developing countries by the local elites are their counterparts in the top 1 percent of the imperial countries, who control, direct and manage the financial, real estate and luxury sectors of their economies? The very same financial institutions in the imperial countries (and their related accountancy, legal and consultancy arms) facilitate the pillage of trillions from the developed countries to offshore sites, via massive tax evasion operations, hoarding wealth instead of investing profits or paying taxes to the public treasury. Large-scale pillage and tax evasion depend on the central role of the financial sector at both ends of the world economy. This results in an 'imbalance of the economy' the predominance of finance capital as the final arbiter on how profits are disposed. The extremely narrow membership.

#### The US became the global leader in terms of economy, and their new globalization ruins and plunders developing nations, harming that nation, and benefitting only the US capitalists and the US

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"The Second World War secured the economic recovery for capital and subordinated through a federally mandated no strike production agreement. There were a few notable exceptions: the coal miners union organized strikes in strategic sectors and some leftist leaders and organizers encouraged slow-downs, work to rule and other in-plant actions when employers ran roughshod over the workers with particular brutality. The recovery of capital was the prelude to a post-war offensive against independently based political organizations. The quality of organization declined even as the quantity of trade union membership increased. **Union officials consolidated internal control in collaboration with the capitalist elite. Capitalist-class official collaboration was extended overseas, with strategic consequences**. **The post-war corporate alliance between the state and capital led to a global offensive-** the replacement of European-Japanese colonial control and exploitation by US business and bankers**. Imperialism was later re- branded as globalization'. It pried open markets, secured cheap, docile labor and pillaged resources for US manufacturers and importers. US unions played a major role by sabotaging militant unions abroad in cooperation with the US security apparatus: they worked to co-opt and bribe nationalist and leftist leaders and supported police-state regime repression and the assassination of recalcitrant militants.** Hand in bloody glove' ' with the US empire, the American trade unions planted the seeds of their own destruction at home. **The local capitalists in lowly emerging independent nations established industries and supply, dais in cooperation with US manufacturers. Attracted to these sources of low wage, violently repressed workers, US capitalists relocated their factories overseas and turned their backs on those at home.**

### ! – Nuclear War

#### The US imperialist state is highly militarized and engages in confrontations that it constantly loses, yet still engages in to enforce US imperialsm can lead to the escalation into nuclear war

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**Because the miliarial imperialized state prioritizes conflict and sanctions with Russia, Iran, and Syria it has failed to deepen and expand its economic ties with Asia, Latin America, and Africa.** The political and economic conquest of East Europe and parts of the USSR has lost significance. The perpetual lost wars in the Middle East, North Africa and the Caucasus have weakened the imperial state’s capacity for empire building in Asia and Latin America.

**The outflow of wealth and domestic cost of perpetual wars have eroded the electoral foundations of empire building.** Only a fundamental change in composition of the imperial state and a re-orientation priorities toward economic expansion can alter the current decline empire. **The danger that as the militarist-Zionist imperialist state pursues losing wars it may escalate and raise the ante and move toward a major confrontation: an empire amidst nuclear ashes!**

### ! – Subjectivity

#### Empire’s deterritorializing and biopolitical nature results in a collapse of autonomy replaced by a constant conditioning of imperial subjectivity

**Hardt/Negri ‘2K** (Michael Hardt; professor of literature at Duke University. Antonio Negri; independent researcher and philosopher, previously a professor of political science at University of Padua. “Empire” pg 195-198 2000) // ELog

The progressive lack of distinction between inside and outside has important implications for the social production of subjectivity. One of the central and most common theses of the institutional analyses proposed by modern social theory is that subjectivity is not pre-given and original but at least to some degree formed in the field of social forces. In this sense, modern social theory progressively emptied out any notion of a presocial subjectivity and instead grounded the production of subjectivity in the functioning of major social institutions, such as the prison, the family, the factory, and the school. Two aspects of this production process should be highlighted. First, subjectivity is a constant social process of generation. When the boss hails you on the shop floor, or the high school principal hails you in the school corridor, a subjectivity is formed. The material practices set out for the subject in the context of the institution (be they kneeling down to pray or changing hundreds of diapers) are the production processes of subjectivity. In a reflexive way, then, through its own actions, the subject is acted on, generated. Second, the institutions provide above all a discrete place (the home, the chapel, the classroom, the shop floor) where the production of subjectivity is enacted. The various institutions of modern society should be viewed as an archipelago of factories of subjectivity. In the course of a life, an individual passes linearly into and out of these various institutions (from the school to the barracks to the factory) and is formed by them. The relation between inside and outside is fundamental. Each institution has its own rules and logics of subjectivation: ‘‘School tells us, ‘You’re not at home anymore’; the army tells us, ‘You’re not in school anymore.’ ’’ 18 Nevertheless, within the walls of each institution the individual is at least partially shielded from the forces of the other institutions; in the convent one is normally safe from the apparatus of the family, at home one is normally out of reach of factory discipline. This clearly delimited place of the institutions is reflected in the regular and fixed form of the subjectivities produced. In the passage to imperial society, the first aspect of the modern condition is certainly still the case, that is, subjectivities are still produced in the social factory. In fact, the social institutions produce subjectivity in an ever more intense way. We might say that postmodernism is what you have when the modern theory of social constructivism is taken to its extreme and all subjectivity is recognized as artificial. How is this possible, however, when today, as nearly everyone says, the institutions in question are everywhere in crisis and continually breaking down? This general crisis does not necessarily mean that the institutions no longer produce subjectivity. What has changed, rather, is the second condition: that is, the place of the production of subjectivity is no longer defined in this same way. The crisis means, in other words, that today the enclosures that used to define the limited space of the institutions have broken down so that the logic that once functioned primarily within the institutional walls now spreads across the entire social terrain. Inside and outside are becoming indistinguishable. This omni-crisis of the institutions looks very different in different cases. For example, continually decreasing proportions of the U.S. population are involved in the nuclear family, while steadily increasing proportions are confined to prisons. Both institutions, however, the nuclear family and the prison, are equally in crisis, in the sense that the place of their effectivity is increasingly indeterminate. One should not think that the crisis of the nuclear family has brought a decline in the forces of patriarchy. On the contrary, discourses and practices of ‘‘family values’’ seem to be everywhere across the social field. The old feminist slogan ‘‘The personal is the political’’ has been reversed in such a way that the boundaries between public and private have fractured, unleashing circuits of control throughout the ‘‘intimate public sphere.’’ 19 In a similar way the crisis of the prison means that carceral logics and techniques have increasingly spread to other domains of society. The production of subjectivity in imperial society tends not to be limited to any specific places. One is always still in the family, always still in school, always still in prison, and so forth. In the general breakdown, then, the functioning of the institutions is both more intensive and more extensive. The institutions work even though they are breaking down—and perhaps they work all the better the more they break down. The indefiniteness of the place of the production corresponds to the indeterminacy of the form of the subjectivities produced. The imperial social institutions might be seen, then, in a fluid process of the generation and corruption of subjectivity. This passage is not isolated to the dominant countries and regions, but tends to be generalized to different degrees across the world. The apologia of colonial administration always celebrated its establishment of social and political institutions in the colonies, institutions that would constitute the backbone of a new civil society. Whereas in the process of modernization the most powerful countries export institutional forms to the subordinated ones, in the present process of postmodernization, what is exported is the general crisis of the institutions. The Empire’s institutional structure is like a software program that carries a virus along with it, so that it is continually modulating and corrupting the institutional forms around it. The imperial society of control is tendentially everywhere the order of the day.

### ! – Root Cause – Capitalism

#### We control the I/L to cap – capitalism is sustained through the creation of “bare-life”

OLIVER 22 – (Bert Olivier - Department of Philosophy, University of the Free State, research in Psychoanalysis, poststructuralism, ecological philosophy and the philosophy of technology, Literature, cinema, architecture and Aesthetics), 2022 "Beyond Agamben’s ‘Homo Sacer’ – the ‘pandemic’ as final reduction of humanity to ‘bare life", https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Bert-Olivier/publication/361054041\_Beyond\_Agamben's\_'Homo\_Sacer'\_-the\_'pandemic'\_as\_final\_reduction\_of\_humanity\_to\_'bare\_life'/links/6299eb3a55273755ebcf2bc9/Beyond-Agambens-Homo-Sacer-the-pandemic-as-final-reduction-of-humanity-to-bare-life.pdf//vivi

Engineered economic collapse The deliberate destruction of the world economy, with the purpose of ushering in a new, digital banking system, which is already underway (see, e.g. Owen 2021) – the ultimate goal of the people driving the ‘pandemic’ and everything associated with it – is a difficult topic to research, given the scarcity of direct evidence in a univocal manner. That is, one is faced with a set of conditions that is open to different interpretations. This projected new financial system, where all ‘programmable money’ – actually, ‘vouchers’ disguised as money – will be centrally controlled and used to control people, by disallowing the purchase of certain items and allowing the purchase of others (Wallace 2021), is a more difficult topic to write about compared to the lethal vaccines, given the abundantly available, incontrovertible evidence concerning the latter. Nevertheless, some such evidence, in the form of the assessments of the current situation by authorities in the fields of finance and economics, is available. A summary of their findings is encountered in the video-interview conducted by Maria Zeee (2022: 33 min. 22 secs) with Dr Reiner Fuellmich, the lawyer leading wide-ranging investigations into different aspects of the ‘pandemic’, where he remarks that, “…whatever we’re seeing, it is two things: deliberate destruction of our economies; deliberate destruction of our health”. As the rest of the video-interview sets out, these things are being engineered by the global elites known variously as the globalist cabal, the Davos clique or the billionaire elites, and in the process people are treated as ‘bare life’. Starting on 5 February 2022 Dr Fuellmich and his team commenced what they called GRAND JURY – The Court of Public Opinion (2022), where panels of authorities in relevant fields addressed ‘pandemic’-related topics at length, including PCR-tests, Injections, Eugenics and Financial Destruction, on different days. The latter topic was dealt with by, among others, Patrick Wood (editor and producer of Technocracy.News), who – having reconstructed the historical events leading up to and preparing for, the corona virus ‘pandemic’ – listed the following nine “Ways to destroy capitalism” (GRAND JURY 2022; 23 min. 18 sec), that is, the current hegemonic global economic system, to prepare for a fully digital economy: “Withdraw energy…; Withdraw resources…; Corrupt the supply chain…; Withdraw labour…; Withdraw financing, capital…; Limit consumption…; Limit

### ! – Root Cause – War

#### This new 21st Century Imperialism with the Unites State’s wars both minor or major have been associated with the elements of ‘capital dis-accumulation’ then shifted to two direct forms, military occupation or economic expansion that invoke US imperialism

#### Petras 20 James Petras is a retired Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University in Binghamton, New York and adjunct professor at Saint Mary's University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada who has published on political issues with particular focus on Latin America and the Middle East, imperialism, globalization, and leftist social movements *US Imperialism: The Changing Dynamics of Global Power*

Despite vast amounts of imperial data to the contrary, the great majority of writers on imperialism continue to describe and analyze US imperialism strictly in economic terms that is, as an expansion of capital accumulation, accumulation on a world scale. In fact**, the major and minor US imperial wars have more to do with capital dis-accumulation, in the sense that trillion-dollar flows have gone out from the US, hundreds of billions of dollars in profits from resource sites and exploitable productive industry has been uprooted. At the same time that the US imperialist state dis-accumulates capital, multinational corpora- tions, especially in the extractive sector, are expanding, accumulating capital throughout Latin America and other areas of the world system. This new configuration of power, the conflicting and complementary nature of 21st-century US imperialism,** requires that we anchor our analysis in the real, existing behaviour of imperial state and extractive capitalist pol- icymakers. The basic premise informing this essay is that there are **two increasingly divergent forms of imperialism: military-driven intervention, occupation, and domination; and economic expansion and exploitation of resources and markets by invitation of the host country**. We will proceed by examining, in a historical-comparative framework, the choices of imperial strategy and the alternatives that were selected or rejected. **Through an analysis of the practical decisions taken regarding 'imperial expansion' we can obtain insights into the real nature of US imperialism. The study of imperial strategic choices, past and present, state and corporate, requires three levels of analysis: global, national, and sectoral.**

### ! – AT: AFF Outweighs

#### Lesser evil calculations allow for a continuing justification of unethical acts in the name of the greater good. Their approach to politics creates a constant state of exception which is counterproductive and justifies torture and necropolitics

Weizman, 2011. (Eyal, professor of spatial and visual cultures at Goldsmiths University of London, founder of the collective Decolonizing Architecture Art Residency in Bethleham. *The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza*. Verso Publishers, Print copy, page 6-10)

If, as a friend recently suggested, we ought to construct a monument to our present political culture as a homage to the principle of the 'lesser evil', it should be made in the form of the digits 6-6-5 built of concrete blocks, and installed like the Hollywood sign on hillsides or other high points overlooking city centres. This number, one less than the number of the beast -that of the devil and of total evil- might capture the essence of our humanitarian present obsessed -with the calculations and calibrations that seek to moderate, ever so slightly, the evils that it has largely caused itself. The principle of the lesser evil is often presented as a dilemma between two or more bad choices in situations where available options are, or seem to be, limited. The choice made justifies the pursuit of harmful actions that would be otherwise deemed unacceptable in the hope of averting even greater suffering. Sometimes the principle is presented as the optimal result of a general field of calculations that seeks to compare, measure and evaluate different bad consequences in relation to necessary acts, and then to minimize those consequences. Both aspects of the principle are understood as taking place within a dosed system in which those posing the dilemma, the options available for choice, the factors to be calculated and the very parameters of calculation are unchallenged. Each calculation is undertaken anew, as if the previous accumulation of events has not taken place, and the future implications are out of bounds. Those who seek to justify necessary evils as 'lesser' ones, especially when searching for a rationale to explain recent wars and military expeditions, like to appeal to the work of the fourth-century North African philosopher-theologian St Augustine. Augustine's rejection of the principle of Manichaeism- a world divided into equally powerful good and evil - meant that he no longer saw evil as the perfect mirror image of the good; rather, in platonic terms, as a measure of its absence. Since evil, unlike good, is not perfect and absolute, it is forever measured and calibrated on a differential scale of more and less, greater and lesser. Augustine taught that it is not permissible to practise lesser evils, because to do so violates the Pauline principle 'do no evil that good may come'. But- and here lies its appeal -lesser evils might be tolerated when they are deemed necessary and unavoidable, or when perpetrating an evil results in the reduction of the overall amount of evil in the world. One of the examples Augustine gives for such an economy of lesser and greater evils is a robbery on a crossroads. It is to this crossroads that other theologists, philosophers and political theorists will return, to this day, when discussing the dilemma. In Augustine's logic of pre-emption, it is better to kill the would-be assailant before he kills an innocent traveler. A millennium later and the armies of Western Christendom passed through this ethicotheological needle-eye-sized loophole on their way to the catalogue of pillage and destruction that constituted the crusades. More recently, Pope Benedict has appealed to the lesser evil principle in a decree permitting the use of condoms in places inflicted -with high rates of HIV. Similar to the latter logic of contraception, some in the Vatican thought that implicit support of the government of Silvio Berlusconi, albeit plagued by sin, ridicule and corruption, might after all be considered as the lesser evil in protecting Christian values. In cases such as these, the economy of the lesser ev-il is always cited as a justification for breaching rigid rules and entrenched dogma; indeed, it is often used by those in power as the primary justification for the very notion of 'exception'. In fact, Augustine's discourse of the lesser evil developed at a time when the church had started to participate in the political government of its subjects and had acquired considerable financial and military power. Through the ages, the Christian church increasingly saw its task as keeping human evil to its minimum level. It pastorally ruled over a vast and complex intrapersonal economy of merits and faults -of sin, vice and virtue- operating according to specific rules of circulation and transfer, with procedures, analyzes, calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of a specific interplay between conflicting goods and degrees of evil. In his lectures on the origins of governmentality, Michel Foucault argued that, on the basis of this 'economical theology', the modern, secular form of governmental power has itself taken on the form of an economy.10 Lesser Evildoers The theological origins of the lesser evil argument still cast a long shadow on the present. In fact the idiom has become so deeply ingrained, and is invoked in such a staggeringly diverse set of contexts - from individual situational ethics and international relations, to attempts to govern the economics of violence in the context of the 'war on terror' and the efforts of human rights and humanitarian activists to manoeuvre through the paradoxes of aid- that it seems to have altogether taken the place previously reserved for the term 'good'. Moreover, the very evocation of the 'good' seems to everywhere invoke the utopian tragedies of modernity, in which evil seemed lurking in a horrible manichaeistic inversion. If no hope is offered in the future, all that remains is to insure ourselves against the risks that it poses, to moderate and lessen the collateral effects of necessary acts, and tend to those who have suffered as a result. In relation to the 'war on terror', the terms of the lesser evil were most clearly and prominently articulated by former human rights scholar and leader of Canada's Liberal Party Michael lgnatieff. In his book The Lesser Evil, Ignatieff suggested that in 'balancing liberty against security' liberal states establish mechanisms to regulate the breach of some human rights and legal norms, and allow their security services to engage in forms of extrajuridical violence - which he saw as lesser evils - in order to fend off or minimize potential greater evils, such as terror attacks on civilians of western states. If governments need to violate rights in a terrorist emergency, this should be done, he thought, only as an exception and according to a process of adversarial scrutiny. 'Exceptions', Ignatieff states, 'do not destroy the rule but save it, provided that they are temporary, publicly justified, and deployed as a last resort. '12 The lesser evil emerges here as a pragmatic compromise, a 'tolerated sin' that functions as the very justification for the notion of exception. State violence in this model takes part in a necro-economy in which various types of destructive measure are weighed in a utilitarian fashion, not only in relation to the damage they produce, but to the harm they purportedly prevent and even in relation to the more brutal measures they may help restrain. In this logic, the problem of contemporary state violence resembles indeed an all-too-human version of the mathematical minimum problem of the divine calculations previously mentioned, one tasked with determining the smallest level of violence necessary to avert the greatest harm. For the architects of contemporary war this balance is trapped between two poles: keeping violence at a low enough level to limit civilian suffering, and at a level high enough to bring a decisive end to the war and bring peace. Niore recent works by legal scholars and legal advisers to states and militaries have sought to extend the inherent elasticity of the system of legal exception proposed by lgnatieff into ways of rewriting the laws of armed conflict themselves. Lesser evil arguments are now used to defend anything from targeted assassinations and mercy killings, house demolitions, deportation, torture, to the use of (sometimes) non-lethal chemical weapons, the use of human shields, and even 'the intentional targeting of some civilians if it could save more innocent lives than they cost’. In one of its more macabre moments it was suggested that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima might also be tolerated under the defence of the lesser evil. Faced with a humanitarian A-bomb, one might wonder what, in fact, might come under the definition of a greater evil. Perhaps it is time for the differential accounting of the lesser evil to replace the mechanical bureaucy of the 'banality of evil' as the idiom to describe the most extreme manifestations of violence. Indeed, it is through this use of the lesser evil that societies that see themselves as democratic can maintain regimes of occupation and neo-colonization. Beyond state agents, those practitioners of lesser evils, as this book claims, must also include the members of independent nongovernmental organizations that make up the ecology of contemporary war and crisis zones. The lesser evil is the argument of the humanitarian agent that seeks military permission to provide medicines and aid in places where it is in fact the duty of the occupying military power to do so, thus saving the military limited resources. The lesser evil is often the justification of the military officer who attempts to administer life (and death) in an 'enlightened' manner; it is sometimes, too, the brief of the security contractor who introduces new and more efficient weapons and spatia-technological means of domination, and advertises them as 'humanitarian technology'. In these cases the logic of the lesser evil opens up a thick political field of participation bringing together otherwise opposing fields of action, to the extent that it might obscure the fundamental moral differences between these various groups. But, even according to the terms of an economy of losses and gains, the concept of the lesser evil risks becoming counterproductive: less brutal measures are also those that may be more easily naturalized, accepted and tolerated - and hence more frequently used, with the result that a greater evil may be reached cumulatively.

#### Aff’s arbitration and moderation of violence actually perpetuates the logic of violence, which is the root of the aff’s impacts

Weizman, 2011. (Eyal, professor of spatial and visual cultures at Goldsmiths University of London, founder of the collective Decolonizing Architecture Art Residency in Bethleham. *The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza*. Verso Publishers, Print copy, page 2-4)

Divine examination, evaluation, calculation and choice operate thus within a complex economy in which good and bad could be transferred and exchanged. Because in this economy all bad things necessarily appear at their minimum possible level, the world as lived is always necessarily the best of all possible worlds. 'If a lesser evil is relatively good,' Leibniz reasoned, 'so a lesser good is relatively evil ... to show that an architect could have done better is to find faults in his work. ' If this description of the economy of divine government is already reminiscent of the logic of contemporary wars, with its own scales of risk and proportionality used to evaluate the desired and undesired consequences of military acts, it is hardly surprising to find in it an early reflection on the concept of 'collateral damage'. Earlier Christian theology has indeed already described all bad things that take place as 'the collateral effects of the good'. In this immanent order of human and divine life, the destructive result of floods are nothing but the collateral effect of necessary rain. In both their theological and military contexts, as Giorgio Agamben observed, the collateral effects are structural rather than accidental. It is through the collateral - flood or blood - that a government -divine or human- can demonstrate, indeed exercise, its power. Unlike the calculations of a God, seen by the philosophers and the theologians of the eighteenth century as a perfect mathematician who could undertake instantaneous calculations and immediately arrive at a precise result, mere humans must of course guess, speculate and hedge their risks as they proceed towards the future as the blind leading the blind. It is for this reason that they ceaselessly seek to develop and perfect all sorts of technologies and techniques that might allow them to calculate the effects of violence and might harness its consequences. It is these techniques and technologies, apparatuses and spatial arrangements, that are at the heart of this book. Through them, Pangloss's Leibnizian scheme- or is it Leibniz's Panglossian scheme?-of the 'best of all possible worlds' re-emerges in the progressive tradition of liberalism. Here, in its secularized form, political rather than metaphysical, a similar structure of the argument sets up the sphere of morality as a set of calculations aimed to approximate the optimum proportion between common goods and necessary evils? But as the general outlook of liberalism shifted from Voltaire's and indeed Jeremy Bentham's later focus on the 'greater good' and the responsibility of government to increase happiness to the greatest number of people, to the liberal canards of 'just wars', and their increasingly sophisticated technologies for minimizing the number of 'necessary' corpses, the search for 'the best of all possible worlds' started giving ground to the present neo-Panglossian pessimism of the 'least of all possible evils'. This book engages with the problem of violence in its moderation and minimization, mostly with state violence that is managed according to a similar economy of calculations and justified as the least possible means. **The fundamental point** of this book **is that the moderation of violence is part of the very logic of violence.** Humanitarianism, human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL), when abused by state, supra-state and military action, have become the crucial means by which the economy of violence is calculated and managed. A dose reading of a series of case studies will show how, at present, spatial organizations and physical instruments, technical standards, procedures and systems of monitoring - the complex humanitarian assemblage that philosopher Adi Ophir called ‘moral technologies' - have become the means for exercising contemporary violence and for governing the displaced, the enemy and the unwanted. The condition of collusion of these technologies of humanitarianism, human rights and humanitarian law with military and political powers is referred to in this book as 'the humanitarian present'. Within this present condition, all political oppositions are replaced by the elasticity of degrees, negotiations, proportions and balances.

### ! – AT: Extinction Outweighs

#### The affs try-or-die mindset facilitates mass psychosis – their framing is over coded by mass psychosis, means that they can never prioritize ethical subjectivities – results in menticide

**OLIVER 22** (Bert Olivier - Department of Philosophy, University of the Free State, research in Psychoanalysis, poststructuralism, ecological philosophy and the philosophy of technology, Literature, cinema, architecture and Aesthetics), 2022 "(PDF) PEER-REVIEWED ARTICLE Therapeutic reflections on the 'pandemic'," ResearchGate, <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/361165410_PEER-REVIEWED_ARTICLE_Therapeutic_reflections_on_the_%27pandemic%27//vivi>

MASS PSYCHOSIS A concise and perspicacious account of the phenomenon of mass psychosis is encountered in a 20-minute video titled ‘MASS PSYCHOSIS — How an Entire Population Becomes MENTALLY ILL’, produced by After Skool and Academy of Ideas (2021; see also Neil Oliver, 2021). Confirming what was argued at the outset in this article about the parallel between the current state of affairs and the European ‘witch craze’ of the 16th and 17th centuries, the makers of this video actually note the same resemblance, also adding the other parallel, namely the rise of totalitarianism in the 20th century (think of the persecution of the Jews in Nazi Germany). They characterise ‘mass psychosis’ as an ‘epidemic of madness’ that emerges when a large percentage of a society somehow ‘loses touch with reality’ and develops a delusional outlook. They also note the moral and spiritual degeneration on the part of people who are drawn into the vortex of such a mass psychosis, which is accompanied by increasing unreasonableness, irresponsibility, emotional instability, and unreliability. Echoing the views of Le Bon and Freud on group behaviour (discussed earlier), it is pointed out that a psychotic group is likely to commit atrocities that individuals would normally refrain from. (This resonates with some of the video material circulating globally, not on mainstream media, but on social platforms like WhatsApp and Telegram, of unbelievable, quasi-psychotic—and morally speaking, unforgivable—behaviour of Australian police officers towards ‘unvaccinated’ people.) The video voiceover also discusses the psychogenesis of the collective craze in question, noting the ‘panic phase’ on the part of individuals that are scared by inexplicable events. This is a clear reference to the quick succession of events that followed the outbreak of a virus epidemic in Wuhan, China, towards the end of 2019. In the wake of this, the ‘novel coronavirus’ rapidly spread around the world, accompanied by what was fear-inspiring pronouncements by the World Health Organization (WHO) and other health organisations, as well as governments, which resulted in national lockdowns of different degrees of severity (Olivier, 2021). Understandably this gave rise to what quickly became endemic fear of contagion and panic in the face of a deadly pathogen. Moreover, in the development of mass psychosis, the video informs one, the initial panic typically makes way for a stage of ‘psychotic insight’, where fear-inducing experience is alleviated by the invention of an illogical, (quasi-)magical, and reassuring explanation of the (frightening) state of affairs. Under present ‘pandemic’ conditions this seems to apply to at least two things: the initial account of a natural, zoonotic origin of the virus, and the later, competing account of an accidental (but possibly deliberate), leak of a genetically engineered coronavirus, and secondly (more significantly), the present tendency, globally (on the part of PSYCHOTHERAPY AND POLITICS INTERNATIONAL 13 OLIVIER PEER-REVIEWED ARTICLE: THERAPEUTIC REFLECTIONS ON THE ‘PANDEMIC’ government representatives and the mainstream media), to play the ‘vaccinated’ off against the ‘unvaccinated’ with statements such as that we are witnessing ‘a pandemic of the unvaccinated’ (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC] Director Rochelle Walensky on NBC News, 2021). Someone who makes such statements ignores those virologists who point out that the ‘unvaccinated’ are not the ones who are causally responsible for the emerging so-called ‘variants’, but that these are attributable to the fact that the virus mutates in ‘vaccinated’ people, in response to the ‘vaccines’. As stated by well-known virologist Geert Vanden Bossche (2021), ‘Mass vaccination with imperfect vaccines is prone to promoting propagation of naturally selected, spike(S)-directed immune escape variants in the population, and ongoing campaigns are causing the population to place even more pressure on viral infectiousness.’ (para. 5). Nevertheless, to those who have fallen prey to the mass psychosis in question, putting the blame on the ‘unvaccinated’ seems like a stroke of genius that explains the fear-inducing situation. Addressing this situation by attempting to force the ‘unvaccinated’ to ‘take the shot’ seems to be a magical antidote to their own fears, but does not alleviate the mass psychosis; in fact, it exacerbates this condition In the video under consideration the concept of ‘menticide’—the killing of the mind—is introduced to explain how large numbers of people are subjected to control. In the discussion it becomes clear that menticide amounts to the systematic destruction of the human spirit and of free, uncensored thought. The prior stage of fearmongering and social division or isolation prepares the way for menticide. This enables the ruling elite to impose its own (delusional) ideology on society, which functions to exacerbate the mass psychosis in question in so far as it offers a (misleading) framework for understanding the dystopian events that are occurring. It comes as no surprise, therefore, to find that, where menticide happens, totalitarianism is easily established; in fact, menticide is a constituent of totalitarian rule, in so far as a society constructed on delusions lends itself to totalitarianism. The creators of the ‘Mass Psychosis’ video further discuss the highly relevant work of Joost Meerloo, who wrote The Rape of the Mind (2009). The pertinence of his work becomes apparent where they note that: ‘Confusion heightens the susceptibility of a descent into the delusions of totalitarianism’ (After Skool and Academy of Ideas, 2021, 11:53). Referring to the historical example of Adolf Hitler, Meerloo states that: There is another important weapon the totalitarians use in their campaign to frighten the world into submission. This is the weapon of psychological shock. Hitler kept his enemies in a state of constant confusion and diplomatic upheaval...Hitler was never logical, because he knew that that was what he was expected to be. Logic can be met with logic, while illogic cannot – it confuses those who think straight. The Big Lie and monotonously repeated nonsense have more emotional appeal in a cold war than logic and reason. While the enemy is still searching for a reasonable counter-argument to the first lie, the totalitarians can assault him with another. (2009, p. 70)

### ! – AT: Hegemony Solves War

#### US hegemony facilitates a new age cold war – only a multilateral world order can stop the self-fulfilling narratives of the affirmative

**KOTZ & YANG 22** (David M. Kotz - Professor Emeritus of Economics and Senior Research Fellow in the Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts Amherst. Qingmei Yang - PhD candidate at the School of Marxism, Tsinghua University.) (2022): On the New Cold War Promoted by the US Government Against China—Interview with Professor David M. Kotz, International Critical Thought, DOI: 10.1080/21598282.2022.2093052//vivi

I already mentioned some things that are relevant to this question. The global economy has benefited from the international exchange between China and the rest of the world. American working people have gotten access to high quality products at lower prices made in China. Initially this consisted of more low-tech products like clothing and toys, and more recently computers and cell phones. I’m doing this interview right now on a made-in-China Lenovo computer, which works very well. Also, as I already mentioned, many American capitalists have benefited. On the other hand, some American workers have lost jobs when production of the products of their workplace moved from the US to China. However, the right way to deal with that is not to promote hostility to a developing country, but to enact government policies that provide good jobs for people who lose their jobs through no fault of their own but because of being displaced by imports in the US. The government could follow such policies to ensure workers against being harmed by the way global capitalist competition operates. Capitalism always tends to put working people in conflict with each other and countries in conflict with each other. It’s one of its many problems. But a worse threat of a new cold war is it tends not only to worsen global economic performance and global economic advance, but it undermines global cooperation between the US and China that is very necessary to confront such challenges as climate change and pandemics. That is a very big cost. And even more serious is the danger of war. The US leadership doesn’t want war with China, but it could happen as a result of the US cold war policy due to miscalculation. Specialists who study the US-China military interactions argue that there is a dangerously high chance of an accidental armed conflict starting between the US and China. I’ve read that it is particularly dangerous because China has a significant advantage in conven- tional weaponry in the area around its borders, which are very far from US borders. And China has more ships, etc. So, if an armed conflict began, the US side might be faced with the choice between losing the conflict or initiating a nuclear strike. So, it would be a very dangerous situation. There is an organization in the US that formed about six months ago called the Committee for a SANE U.S.-China Policy. The name is modeled after a famous organization from the days of the nuclear arms race in the 1950s and 1960s called the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy that in the end was very influential in getting nuclear bomb testing halted and arms control agreements signed between the US and the Soviet Union. The Committee for a SANE U.S.-China Policy is run by progressive activists who are concerned about world peace. It focuses on demanding that the US change its policy toward China. It has been doing very good work in exposing the dangers of this new cold war. It has been warning that it may lead to a hot war and the US has to change its policies as soon as possible. QY: What could be done by both governments in order to avoid harmful consequences? DK: Let me start with the US side. In my view, the US government should turn away from promoting a new cold war. The US government should accept China and all other states as equal partners in the world, giving up the drive to dominate the world. The US government should adopt some of the practices China has followed such as industrial policy, big investments in science and technology, infrastructure investment, and even some state-owned enterprises, particularly in the financial sector. These would be very helpful for stabilizing the US economy and assuring that credit flows to productive pur- poses rather than speculation. But such policies should be undertaken not to target another country, not to defeat another country, not to keep the US dominant as is the case with the USICA I mentioned before, but to strengthen and improve the US econ- omy. Such an approach would benefit the American people and people in other countries who buy US products.

### ! – AT: World Getting Better

#### No link – we agree Empire is an improvement, but it still brings unique forms of violence that demand the alternative

**Hardt/Negri ‘2K** (Michael Hardt; professor of literature at Duke University. Antonio Negri; independent researcher and philosopher, previously a professor of political science at University of Padua. “Empire” pg 43-44 2000) // ELog

Saying that Empire is good in itself, however, does not mean that it is good for itself. Although Empire may have played a role in putting an end to colonialism and imperialism, it nonetheless constructs its own relationships of power based on exploitation that are in many respects more brutal than those it destroyed. The end of the dialectic of modernity has not resulted in the end of the dialectic of exploitation. Today nearly all of humanity is to some degree absorbed within or subordinated to the networks of capitalist exploitation. We see now an ever more extreme separation of a small minority that controls enormous wealth from multitudes that live in poverty at the limit of powerlessness. The geographical and racial lines of oppression and exploitation that were established during the era of colonialism and imperialism have in many respects not declined but instead increased exponentially. Despite recognizing all this, we insist on asserting that the construction of Empire is a step forward in order to do away with any nostalgia for the power structures that preceded it and refuse any political strategy that involves returning to that old arrangement, such as trying to resurrect the nation-state to protect against global capital. We claim that Empire is better in the same way that Marx insists that capitalism is better than the forms of society and modes of production that came before it. Marx’s view is grounded on a healthy and lucid disgust for the parochial and rigid hierarchies that preceded capitalist society as well as on a recognition that the potential for liberation is increased in the new situation. In the same way today we can see that Empire does away with the cruel regimes of modern power and also increases the potential for liberation.

# ALTERNATIVE

### Alt – Class Prime

\*This card has useful indicts of both insistence on organizing and on separate struggles – with rehighlighting and spin it could be used as an indict against Escalante or maybe a one card K against identity AFFs (probably needs a more terminal impact though) – there’s also articulations towards the bottom that security harms anti-globalization struggles aka perm answers - basically this card is super versatile and can be repurposed

#### The alternative is class prime – the unified notion of class has dissolved into an intersectional multitude, yet effective change requires organization – class prime is a class of the multitude built on internal and interlocking bonds of solidarity that enables the deconstruction of Empire

**Hardt/Negri ’19** (Michael Hardt; professor of literature at Duke University. Antonio Negri; independent researcher and philosopher, previously a professor of political science at University of Padua. “Empire, Twenty Years On” [https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii120/articles/empire-twenty-years-on November 2019](https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii120/articles/empire-twenty-years-on%20November%202019)) // ELog

Multiplicity is becoming the exclusive horizon of our political imagination. The most inspiring movements of the past decades, from Cochabamba to Standing Rock, Ferguson to Cape Town, Cairo to Madrid, have been animated by multitudes. Leaderlessness is the label often given to these uprisings, especially by the media: and indeed, they reject traditional forms of centralized leadership, attempting to create new democratic forms of expression. But rather than describing them as leaderless, it is more useful to understand them as multitude struggles—useful, in part, because it allows us to grasp both their virtues and the challenges they face. These movements have achieved important results; they have often alluded to an alternative, better world. But they have generally been short-lived and many have suffered defeat, with some witnessing their gains brutally reversed. Something more is needed; and, as militants of various stripes will tell you, creative and original thinking about political organization is urgently required. We have no interest in lecturing these movements about the need to abandon their multiplicity and construct a unified political subject, be it a centralized leadership council, an electoral party or ‘a people’. A return to traditional forms of organization is not likely to result in more lasting or effective movements; in any case, they have been explicitly repudiated by the democratic sensibilities of the activists themselves. Furthermore, we do not believe, to put it in abstract terms, that only ‘the one’ can decide. The most important question for us is: how can a multiplicity act politically, with the sustained power to bring about real social transformation? It may be helpful here to step back twenty years and approach our contemporary situation from that vantage point. To explore the potential of today’s movements, we trace two historical and theoretical passages: from class to multitude and from multitude to class. This may at first appear as a pendulum action, a simple round trip; but we intend it to mark a theoretical and political advance, since the ‘class’ at the departure is not the same as that at arrival: the passage through multitude transforms its meaning. The general formula of organization we propose, then, is C–M–C', class–multitude–class prime.[31](https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii120/articles/empire-twenty-years-on#note-31) As in Marx’s formula, the importance rests on the transformation undergone at the centre of the process. Class prime must be a multitudinous class, an intersectional class. From class to multitude The movement from class to multitude names, in part, the general recognition over the last several decades that the working class must be understood in terms of multiplicity, both within and outside its domain—a shift that corresponds to the emptying-out of claims to represent the working class by traditional parties and syndicalist institutions. As an empirical formation, of course, the working class has never ceased to exist. But since its internal composition has changed—with novel forms of work, new labouring conditions and wage relations—new investigations of class composition are required. In particular, these should explore the powers of social cooperation and the common. In addition, the differences among labouring populations, which have always existed, now increasingly refuse unitary representation. Differences among sectors of labour—for instance, between waged and unwaged work, stable and precarious employment, documented and undocumented workers—along with differences of gender, race and nationality, which to some extent map on to those differences of work status, all demand expression. Any investigation of class composition at this point—and any proposition of class-political projects—has to be embedded in intersectional analysis. This is not a class, one might say, if by class one understands a subject that is internally unified, or can be represented as a unified whole; it is a multitude, an irreducible multiplicity. At the same time, the passage from class to multitude means that the struggles of the working class, and anticapitalist struggles in general, must be cast together and on an equal basis with struggles against other axes of domination: feminist, antiracist, decolonial, queer, anti-ablist and others (theorists of multiplicity are not troubled by open sets and unending lists). In this sense, the concept of the multitude is closely allied with—and, indeed, profoundly indebted to—intersectional analysis and practice, which emerges from the theoretical practice of us black feminism. Intersectionality, at the most basic level, is a political theory of multiplicity. It aims to counter traditional single-axis frameworks of political analysis by recognizing the interlocking nature of race, class, sex, gender and national hierarchies. This means, first, that no one structure of domination is primary to (or reducible to) the others. Instead, they are relatively autonomous, have equal significance and are mutually constitutive. Second, just as structures of domination are characterized by multiplicity, so too are the subjectivities that stand in relation to them. This does not imply either a rejection of identity or a cumulative, additive conception of many identities; rather, it requires a rethinking of subjectivity in the key of multiplicity.[32](https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii120/articles/empire-twenty-years-on#note-32) The call for intersectional multitudes is not merely an appeal for greater inclusion but rather, as Jennifer Nash says, ‘an antisubordination project’—that is, a combative, revolutionary strategy on multiple fronts simultaneously.[33](https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii120/articles/empire-twenty-years-on#note-33) It may be helpful at this point to consider the passage from class to multitude through the concept of precarity, in two senses. The first sense of precarity, mainly developed among European theorists and activists, is conceived primarily in terms of wage and labour relations.[34](https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii120/articles/empire-twenty-years-on#note-34) Precarity in this sense marks a contrast to the stable employment contracts that served as a regulative ideal in the Fordist economy of the mid-20th century—a regulative ideal that existed as a reality only for a limited number of (generally male) industrial workers in the dominant countries. Guaranteed labour contracts and laws that protect workers’ rights have been progressively eroded, and workers have been forced to accept informal, short-term labour contracts. These labour arrangements have always been raced and gendered, of course; but all sectors of the workforce are being affected by this trend, albeit in different ways and measures. This precaritization of labour is a powerful weapon in the grand arsenal of neoliberalism. Another sense of precarity, more developed by us writers, provides a useful complement, and again serves as part of an interpretation of—and challenge to—neoliberalism, but from a much broader perspective. Precarity, writes Judith Butler, ‘designates that politically induced condition in which certain populations suffer from failing social and economic networks of support more than others, and become differentially exposed to injury, violence and death.’[35](https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii120/articles/empire-twenty-years-on#note-35) Labour precarity is certainly part of the mix, but the notion of precarious life aims to grasp how legal, economic and governmental changes have increased the insecurity of a wide range of already subordinated populations—women, trans people, gay and lesbian populations, people of colour, migrants, the disabled and others. There is thus one notion of precarity that speaks the language of the working class and another that promotes an intersectional vision. Put them together and you have a good foundation for theorizing the multitude. We do not pose this movement from class to multitude (or from the people to the multitude) as a political mandate. That is not necessary, because it is already an accomplished fact that has manifested itself over the past twenty years in different countries and social contexts. We understand that many regard the historical shift from class to multitude as a decline and a loss, beginning with the diminished power and membership of institutional trade unions and working-class parties (and, indeed, not every multiplicity is politically progressive; crowds and mobs are just as likely to be reactionary). But we should also recognize all that has been gained in the process. At the level of analysis, it should be obvious that the multiplicity of mutually constituting structures of domination offers a superior lens for grasping our social reality, and this requires supplementing our brief investigation of capitalist rule with equal analyses of the institutional structures of race, gender and sexual hierarchies. But it is most crucial at the level of practice: there will be no successful and sustained project of class politics today that is not also feminist, antiracist and queer. Rethinking class Yet to theorize multiplicity, or even to recognize existing multiplicities, is not enough—especially if by multiplicity one means simply fracturing and separation. To be politically effective, organization is required. And when dealing with multiplicities, that pressure is even more intense. To respond to our initial question—how can a multiplicity decide and act politically?—simply by saying that it needs to organize, is not yet very helpful. The next step, then, requires a return to the concept of class—but class conceived differently now—in order to explore more fully what a multitude can become and how it can act politically. One obvious objection to the proposal of this second movement, from multitude to class, is that it unravels all the advantages achieved in the previous movement, from a unified political conception based on a single axis of domination, that determined by capital, to a multiplicity, which also engages patriarchy, white supremacy and other axes. Our intention, however, is to develop a conception of class that refers not only to the working class but is itself a multiplicity, a political formation that makes good on the gains of the multitude. It may be helpful, first of all, simply to note authors who use the concept of class beyond reference to the working class, in order to address race, gender domination and struggle. Achille Mbembe, for instance, analyses the contemporary modes of control deployed against Africans migrating to Europe in terms of a ‘racial class’: Europe has decided not only to militarize its frontiers but to extend them into the far distance . . . [its borders] are now located all along the shifting routes and torturous paths trodden by the candidates for migration, relocating to keep on top of their trajectories . . . In reality, it is the body of the African, of every African taken individually, and of all Africans as a racial class that constitutes today the borders of Europe. This new type of human body is not only the skin-body and the abject body of epidermal racism, that of segregation. It is also the border-body, which traces the limit between those who are ‘us’ and those who are not, and whom one can maltreat with impunity.[36](https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii120/articles/empire-twenty-years-on#note-36) In the new global regime of mobility, Mbembe claims, Africans will be transformed into ‘a stigmatized racial class’. For him, the concept of class here is not, or not only, a socio-economic category. It serves instead as a means to think collective racial difference that is not merely based on skin colour; this racial class is born in the racist structures and institutions of Europe. Mbembe’s references here echo 1970s feminists like Christine Delphy, who employed the concept ‘sex class’ to understand patriarchal domination and to designate a basis of feminist struggle. To other feminists who challenged her usage, Delphy responded that the concept of class could grasp better than any other how subordinate social subjects are created by relations of domination. From this perspective, Delphy writes, ‘one cannot consider each group separate from the other because they are united by a relation of domination . . . The groups are not . . . constituted before they are put in relation. On the contrary, their relation is what constitutes them as such.’[37](https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii120/articles/empire-twenty-years-on#note-37) Here, then, relations of domination are prior to and constitutive of social subjects. In Delphy’s usage, again, class refers not exclusively to economic status, but instead involves an analytical procedure that can be deployed with respect to any axis of domination. Our interest in these analyses of Mbembe and Delphy is, first, to highlight this point—that the concept of class can be used to grasp the effects of subjection created by relations of domination, not only with respect to capital but also with respect to white supremacy and patriarchy, in the interests of not only the working class but also the racial class, the sex class and others. Second, it is important to stress that the concept of class is employed here not only as a descriptive claim but as a political call to those subjected to patriarchal or racial hierarchies to struggle together, as a class.[38](https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii120/articles/empire-twenty-years-on#note-38) Finally, and this is the point most difficult to confront: to recognize a plurality of classes dominated and struggling in parallel fashion is a step forward, but is not enough. The notion of ‘multitudinous class’ or ‘intersectional class’ that we seek requires a further step: an internal articulation of these different subjectivities—working class, racial class, sex class—in struggle. Intersectional analyses commonly address the need for articulation between the subordinated subjectivities in terms of solidarity and coalition. Often this repeats an additive strategy: working-class plus feminist plus antiracist plus lgbtq struggle, plus . . . In other words, even when intersectional analysis refuses additive notions of identity, an additive logic can still govern activist imaginaries. One weakness of this approach is that the bonds of solidarity are external. What is needed are internal bonds of solidarity—that is, a different mode of articulation, going beyond standard conceptions of coalition. Let us illustrate this key condition—the internal relations of solidarity in this multitudinous class—with three theoretical examples. First, Rosa Luxemburg: after the failed 1905 insurrection in Russia, Luxemburg criticized the German proletariat and its party for their expressions of sympathy and support for their Russian cousins, whether tinged with condescension or admiration. Luxemburg was not, of course, advocating that German workers disengage from, or pay less attention to, the Russian struggles—exactly the opposite. The problem for her was that such expressions of ‘international class solidarity’ posed merely an external relation: German revolutionaries needed to recognize instead that the Russian events were their own affair and internal to their struggle, ‘a chapter of their own social and political history’.[39](https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii120/articles/empire-twenty-years-on#note-39) A second theoretical example: Iris Young in the early 1980s challenged male socialists who profess solidarity with the feminist movement. ‘By and large’, she writes, ‘socialists do not consider fighting women’s oppression as a central aspect of the struggle against capitalism itself.’[40](https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii120/articles/empire-twenty-years-on#note-40) Note that Young is not addressing the misogynist and anti-feminist male socialists, of whom there were many, but instead the supportive male comrades who offer solidarity to feminists, or who see feminist struggle as allied with but separate from their own. Like Luxemburg, Young charges that such solidarity is not enough. She exhorts male socialists, in effect, to recognize feminist struggle against patriarchy as a chapter of their own social and political history. You cannot really be anticapitalist without also being feminist because, since they are mutually constitutive, capital cannot be defeated without also defeating patriarchy. A third example: Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor makes a parallel argument addressing antiracist activists in the us who do not also focus on class domination. Too often, she maintains, there is a kind of segregation of struggles, such that anticapitalist struggles are assumed to be the task of white people, while people of colour must conduct antiracist struggles. ‘No serious socialist current in the last hundred years’, Taylor writes, ‘has ever demanded that Black or Latino/a workers put their struggles on the back burner while some other class struggle is waged first. This assumption rests on the mistaken idea that the working class is white and male, and therefore incapable of taking up issues of race, class and gender. In fact, the American working class is female, immigrant, Black, white, Latino/a and more. Immigrant issues, gender issues and antiracisms are working-class issues.’[41](https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii120/articles/empire-twenty-years-on#note-41) This is not a matter of accepting the participation of allies or expressing solidarity; the struggle against white supremacy and that against capital must be understood as internal to one another. The objection at this point might be: yes, they all need to struggle together because they are all precarious in the two senses discussed earlier; but such a projection of sameness is not helpful, because the modes of precarity and domination are different. We need to maintain the conception of multiplicity—capitalist domination is not the same as gender or race domination, and one cannot be subsumed under another. Instead of a reduction to sameness, this argument requires an articulation among the subjectivities in struggle. This is why class—a multitudinous class—rather than coalition seems to us the appropriate concept. But this is a notion of class that is not only composed of a multiplicity, and grounded in forms of social cooperation and the common, but also articulated by internal bonds of solidarity and intersection among struggles, each recognizing that the others are ‘a chapter of their own social and political history’. That is its mode of articulation, its mode of assembly. This is why we call this transformed notion ‘class prime’, so that instead of class–multitude–class, the entire movement we are trying to sketch is class–multitude–class prime: C–M–C'. This serves at least as an initial theoretical response to our earlier question: can a multiplicity act politically? Yes, it can do so as class prime, as an internally articulated multiplicity oriented equally in struggle against capital, patriarchy, white supremacy and other axes of domination. Granted, it is merely a formal, conceptual response, but perhaps it can offer a framework for thinking and pursuing that political project. 6. in praise of alterglobalization On 1 January 1994, the day that nafta went into effect, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation launched an insurrection in Chiapas, Mexico; on 30 November 1999, protesters in Seattle blocked the meetings of the World Trade Organization; on 25 January 2001, the World Social Forum was inaugurated in Porto Alegre, Brazil, counterposing itself to the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland; and on 21 July 2001, multitudes flooded the streets of Genoa to protest the G8 summit. The international cycle of alterglobalization struggles that developed in the Americas and Europe had numerous defects: their nomadic nature and the practices of ‘summit-hopping’ in many cases eclipsed engagement with local, sustained organizing; they were frequently criticized, most strongly by activists within the movements themselves, for failing to develop sufficiently the intersectional characteristics we have just outlined; and the season of struggles proved relatively short, due in part to their own organizational weaknesses. One should keep in mind, of course, that the movements were also closed down by the severe security regimes installed after September 11th; activists had to shift their focus from alterglobalization to anti-war movements. The extraordinary virtue of these protests was their theoretical practice. They constructed a global critical vision and were able, through their orchestrated events, to render legible the political significance of the relatively obscure realm of the global economic institutions. Rather than a movement, then, they might be better understood as a vast collective co-research investigation into the nature of the emerging global order. Activists knew that the major corporations and dominant nation-states, the United States first among them, had enormous power; but they also had the intuition that the global order was something more—and that it was here, at the global level, that the contemporary structures of domination must be understood. Each event illuminated another node of the emerging network of the global power structure: the wto, World Bank, imf, G8, trade agreements and so forth. The cycle of alterglobalization movements was thus a massive pedagogical project for those who participated in them—and for anyone else who was willing to learn. Since then, although the relative positions of the various powers within its mixed constitution have risen and fallen, the forces of domination and control of the global order have by no means lessened, despite the braying of the ideologues of national sovereignty. They have instead merely receded from view and become less legible, as if they had discovered an invisibility potion. We need today an international cycle of struggles with the intelligence to investigate the structures of the ruling global order. Sometimes, after all, the theoretical work done in social movements teaches us more than that written in libraries. Reversing their invisibility is the first step toward being able to challenge and eventually overthrow the structures of Empire.

### Alt – Class Prime – Solves Empire

#### The movement of the multitude is constitutive of Empire, which serves as a mere apparatus of capture – the productive movement of the alt solves

**Hardt/Negri ‘2K** (Michael Hardt; professor of literature at Duke University. Antonio Negri; independent researcher and philosopher, previously a professor of political science at University of Padua. “Empire” pg 60-63 2000) // ELog

The other head of the imperial eagle is the plural multitude of productive, creative subjectivities of globalization that have learned to sail on this enormous sea. They are in perpetual motion and they form constellations of singularities and events that impose continual global reconfigurations on the system. This perpetual motion can be geographical, but it can refer also to modulations of form and processes of mixture and hybridization. The relationship between ‘‘system’’ and ‘‘asystemic movements’’ cannot be flattened onto any logic of correspondence in this perpetually modulating atopia.21 Even the asystemic elements produced by the new multitude are in fact global forces that cannot have a commensurate relationship, even an inverted one, with the system. Every insurrectional event that erupts within the order of the imperial system provokes a shock to the system in its entirety. From this perspective, the institutional frame in which we live is characterized by its radical contingency and precariousness, or really by the unforeseeability of the sequences of events—sequences that are always more brief or more compact temporally and thus ever less controllable.22 It becomes ever more difficult for Empire to intervene in the unforeseeable temporal sequences of events when they accelerate their temporality. The most relevant aspect that the struggles have demonstrated may be sudden accelerations, often cumulative, that can become virtually simultaneous, explosions that reveal a properly ontological power and unforeseeable attack on the most central equilibria of Empire. Just as Empire in the spectacle of its force continually determines systemic recompositions, so too new figures of resistance are composed through the sequences of the events of struggle. This is another fundamental characteristic of the existence of the multitude today, within Empire and against Empire. New figures of struggle and new subjectivities are produced in the conjuncture of events, in the universal nomadism, in the general mixture and miscegenation of individuals and populations, and in the technological metamorphoses of the imperial biopolitical machine. These new figures and subjectivities are produced because, although the struggles are indeed antisystemic, they are not posed merely against the imperial system—they are not simply negative forces. They also express, nourish, and develop positively their own constituent projects; they work toward the liberation of living labor, creating constellations of powerful singularities. This constituent aspect of the movement of the multitude, in its myriad faces, is really the positive terrain of the historical construction of Empire. This is not a historicist positivity but, on the contrary, a positivity of the res gestae of the multitude, an antagonistic and creative positivity. The deterritorializing power of the multitude is the productive force that sustains Empire and at the same time the force that calls for and makes necessary its destruction. At this point, however, we should recognize that our metaphor breaks down and that the two-headed eagle is not really an adequate representation of the relationship between Empire and the multitude, because it poses the two on the same level and thus does not recognize the real hierarchies and discontinuities that define their relationship. From one perspective Empire stands clearly over the multitude and subjects it to the rule of its overarching machine, as a new Leviathan. At the same time, however, from the perspective of social productivity and creativity, from what we have been calling the ontological perspective, the hierarchy is reversed. The multitude is the real productive force of our social world, whereas Empire is a mere apparatus of capture that lives only off the vitality of the multitude—as Marx would say, a vampire regime of accumulated dead labor that survives only by sucking off the blood of the living. Once we adopt this ontological standpoint, we can return to the juridical framework we investigated earlier and recognize the reasons for the real deficit that plagues the transition from international public law to the new public law of Empire, that is, the new conception of right that defines Empire. In other words, the frustration and the continual instability suffered by imperial right as it attempts to destroy the old values that served as reference points for international public law (the nation-states, the international order of Westphalia, the United Nations, and so forth) along with the so-called turbulence that accompanies this process are all symptoms of a properly ontological lack. As it constructs its supranational figure, power seems to be deprived of any real ground beneath it, or rather, it is lacking the motor that propels its movement. The rule of the biopolitical imperial context should thus be seen in the first instance as an empty machine, a spectacular machine, a parasitical machine. A new sense of being is imposed on the constitution of Empire by the creative movement of the multitude, or really it is continually present in this process as an alternative paradigm. It is internal to Empire and pushes forward its constitution, not as a negative that constructs a positive or any such dialectical resolution. Rather it acts as an absolutely positive force that pushes the dominating power toward an abstract and empty unification, to which it appears as the distinct alternative. From this perspective, when the constituted power of Empire appears merely as privation of being and produc-tion, as a simple abstract and empty trace of the constituent power ofthe multitude, then we will be able to recognize the real standpoint of our analysis. It is a standpoint that is both strategic and tactical, when the two are no longer different.

### Alt – Disruption

#### Debate as a game is one that operates under a systemic approach that allows us to conceive of alternative futures. The role of debate should be to conceptualize the best schema for disrupting systems of Empire and the colonialist legacy that structures modern IR. This allows us to imagine worlds outside the confines of western sociality.

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This article revisits the intellectual history behind Nick Dyer-Witheford and Greig de Peuter’s Games of Empire (2009) and builds on their work to think further about how we might politically analyse games, especially in relationship to new forms of social organisation in the future. **The worlds of games are important places for us to think about time, as demonstrated by historical game studies in evaluating the past, but there is a role for games to help us consider the future as well. Because games are, to some extent, systems, they facilitate a systems thinking approach that connects the material to the immaterial.** Because games also tend to be action-based, they allow thinking through of acts as well as representations. Games allow us to think about a time and place that is different from the present and how it might operate as a system that we could live in. Our speculation on the future can make use of games that both do and do not align with our individual politics. We do not need to see games as representing only the world we want to live in but also to think about worlds to avoid, as both utopian and dystopian projections of the future can shape our acts in the present. The role that Games of Empire (2009) plays in this picture is to expose the alignments and disjunctures between the ideologies that a game presents and the means by which games are produced. The possible futures offered by different games can be critiqued in relationship to their conditions of production. Games of Empire emerges out of games studies, but perhaps, it owes a greater intellectual debt to the history of post-autonomist Marxist scholarship. Dyer-Witheford was among the first anglophone interlocutors of autonomism in media studies with his work Cyber-Marx (1999), and this trajectory continues into Games of Empire with de Peuter. Unlike Cyber-Marx, which draws a great deal on the Italian autonomia movements of Italy in the 1960s and 1970s, Games of Empire takes the post-autonomist work of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s Empire trilogy (2000, 2004, 2009) as its reference point. The question raised is simply worded but impossibly complex: what is the future we are after? In this article, I argue that the historical game studies framework of experimenting with history through games can also be used to open up politically useful gaming experiments for the future. Indeed, as I will show, the post-autonomist lineage that Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter draw upon is predicated on theories of political resistance that are developed through experimentation in new social forms. I argue that games can be a component for thinking about the possibilities that the future might hold, both for understanding how we might organise economically but also for thinking about what problems we might face. Like video games, post-autonomism concerns itself with a practical focus on the future. I argue that a post-autonomist method of games analysis requires an explicitly political interpretation that is focused on trying to imagine a political future through experiments in gaming. Marxist Theoretical Lineages for Games of Empire Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter draw primarily on the work of Hardt and Negri’s Empire trilogy (2000, 2004, 2009) as their core theoretical background and also make use of key works by other Italian Marxists such as Virno (2004), Lazzarato (1996) and Tronti (1966/2019). These scholars can be broadly categorised as post-autonomists, as they are inheritors of the autonomia movement of the 1970s, itself largely drawing on prior Italian Marxists such as Antonio Gramsci (see also Dyer-Witheford, 1999; Wright, 2002). Autonomia formed in response to the roboticisation of Italian automobile factories; this reduced wages and the need for specialised labour, while also undermining the union movement’s bargaining power. Traditional forms of factory-based strikes were no longer sufficient as mass skilled workers were replaced by machines. Instead work was reframed around informational, affective and intellectual forms of labour and the creation of social or cultural commodities, accordingly new forms of social resistance became necessary. Autonomia experimented with new forms of social organisation both inside and outside the factory walls. The autonomia movement was defined by a core Gramscian framework and the significant influence of feminist scholarship from Lotta Feminista. These approaches drew attention to how labour was arranged outside the space of the factory through a particular attention to social reproduction, that is the focus on the creation of social subjects within capitalism, especially in gendered forms of labour. This is accounted for in works by Dalla Costa and James (1971), Federici (1984/2004), Fortunati (1996) and more recently Terranova (2000). A wide array of unique theoretical positions and crises emerged over this time within Italian Marxism that led to numerous splits and divisions (see Bologna, 1980; Tronti, 2012; Wright, 2002, p. 11–21). From this period, Italian Marxism was defined by an interest in networked, affective, militant and collaborative approaches that tended to reject institutions, including unions and political parties (see Lotringer & Marazzi, 2007). Autonomia was defined by a new community of activism that – however incomplete or partial – included a diverse collection of identities recognising a common problem. Hardt and Negri’s Empire trilogy responds to this period and is post-autonomist insofar as the autonomist tendency significantly shifted in terms of its idea of the subject and in terms of its idea of the factory. Not least of which is the fact that the autonomist focuses on the changes in the workplace due to robotics, computers and a shift towards valorising intellectual work over manual labour has found a great deal of purchase in explaining contemporary trends in technology and work. **Their thesis is that the world had been organised by a political rationality that had reorganised nation states into a single system that facilitated these changes, a world order they call ‘Empire’**. Empire was to politics what capitalism was to the economy, and they worked hand in glove to expand and accumulate. **Empire is not found in a single source but is present in a diverse array of state bodies and international treaties and fostered through practices such as trade liberalisation and expansion of property systems**. Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter thoroughly demonstrate the value of postautonomist language in unpacking the multilayered, intertwined cultural, ideological and political economic components in digital video games. They have drawn on the autonomist and post-autonomist histories of language and globalisation, material and immaterial labour, and imperialist expansion and ideology. Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter see gaming as having a potential role in an emancipatory praxis; video gaming’s status as exemplary media of Empire (2009, p. xxix) means that it is ideal for representing imperial systems and also for submitting them to critique. **My contribution to this discussion is to note that games provide an important form of critique: alternatives to Empire. Experimentation and imagination about the future are political necessities within post-autonomist scholarship. In their critique of Empire, Hardt and Negri (2009) note that while it is all well and good to critique what we have, there needs to be some sort of orienting positive force that allows us to create the world after Empire**. The problem with the present moment is that it not only suffuses material politics but has also infected our imagination of the future. **We need to develop new ideas about how we might live and think together and to identify new social and economic systems for living.** Problem of Imagining a Future In each of their books, Hardt and Negri ask ‘what is to be done’ to move past Empire. This recalls the post-autonomist theory of exodus: the idea of transiting from a present crisis into a new, real space that may provide us with better conditions of existence (see Virno, 1996). If we are to move past the space of Empire, then we must have a model or idea of what we are going to build. The problem of imagining the future of the world past capitalism has been articulated in academic contexts at least since the 1970s by Franklin (1979) in an evaluation of Ballard. Franklin critiques Ballard’s ‘The Subliminal Man’ (1963) as misapprehending the end of capitalism as the end of the world itself that Ballard himself could not think of a world past capitalism and that capitalism’s absence could only be accepted if it also meant the end of everything. Later interlocutors such as Jameson (1994) and Zi ˇ zek (1994) ˇ generalised the problem from an individual pathology to a social one: the population at large struggles to conceive of a world past capitalism, where capitalism cannot be seen to thrive, hence the quote that it is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism. **The ideological nature of the problem is posed by Fisher (2009) who notes that capitalism, like all ideological systems, contains within it an assertion of its own natural continuation. This problem – the inability to think of a future that is substantively different – is difficult to resolve. For Hardt and Negri, Empire infects everything so profoundly that we cannot think of its responses. This does not mean that games naturally produce a new political horizon**. As Hutchins (2008) has noted, the goal of a politics built from play cannot be left to ideas of fraternity or camaraderie naturally emerging out of an ‘Olympism’, where controlled competition would necessarily lead to a form of community. Hutchins critiques the idea that a natural liberal politics might harmoniously emerge from institutional play, even when such institutions have strongly didactic positions on what should emerge from play; something new emerges but not necessarily in a predictable way. We cannot leave our analysis of games to only address the apparent, didactic and marketised presentation of what the future might look like. What is necessary are forms of experimentation that allow us to think beyond the present moment. The post autonomist theory provides the concept of the laboratory (Hardt, 1996) as a way of thinking on the new forms of social organisation that might help us move into the future. This is a task that, by its nature as an evaluation of a situation that does not yet exist, is accomplished through speculation, the application of theory and the inspirations of fiction. Other scholars, such as Jameson (1984) and Hage (2012), note the centrality of the imagination of the future as a core issue for political action. Hage states that a mental projection of the future is necessary in order to take political action in the present: ideas of the future are ‘not just a conception of the world but an investment in it’ (2012, p. 291). Games can productively contribute, as ‘laboratories’, to the experimentation for the future by allowing us to think about other times and places so that we might think politically about the present. Games can contribute to this by allowing us to think, experiment and reflect of different social orders that we might bring to light. Games are not the only way that this could happen, and building from Games of Empire, they have a unique capacity to help think about life beyond Empire. Imagining Gaming in the Present Games of Empire adds to the political analysis of gaming by establishing connections between the internal narrative, subjective, aesthetic, affective and ludic elements of a particular game with the conditions of production, especially with regard to the labour of those who make the game possible. The way that these conditions make games possible also shapes what kind of possibilities we can imagine for the future. Within this paradigm, Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter align individual video games against two primary categories: games of multitude and games of empire, with these terms drawn from the Empire trilogy. The two categories are determined by what kind of future they permit, either a self-determining alter-globalisation or a continuation of military imperialism. This is the frame that Games of Empire takes: to understand how to locate games within post-autonomist discourse. Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter fold the questions of content and form together under a rubric of consumption and production that pulls in the whole of the imperialist system. They note how the conditions of game development are not separated from the narratives, stories and futures that they produce: these very concerns are built into and are expressed within production and consumption in reciprocal ways. The conditions of these forms of labour are present in the case study of ‘EA Spouse’ (2009, p. 59–65) through to the extractive, slave-based labour necessary to obtain the coltan used in console development (p. 222–224). These examples take the hegemonic impact of informational labour from simply being a top-down system as Hardt and Negri propose, whereby intellectual labour shapes industrial labour, which in turn shapes agricultural labour in a pyramidic structure with intellectual labour at the peak. Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter make clear that the nature of industrial and extractive labour in itself shapes the conditions of intellectual labour as well, influencing the stories and identities that games can tell. As they state, [Fictional] subject positions may be utterly fantastic, quite realistic, or somewhere in between. But such in- game identities are never entirely separated from the options provided by the actual social formations in which the games are set, from which their virtualities derive and into which they flow back. Game virtualities remove us from, but also prepare us for, these actual subject positions. Mostly, as we have discussed at length, they simulate the normalized subjectivities of a global capitalist order – consumer, commander, commanded, cyborg, criminal – not to mention the rapid shedding and swapping between identities that is such an important aptitude of workers (DyerWitheford & de Peuter, 2009, p. 192) It would be a mistake to read the political value of the gaming avatar or a gaming identity as allowing someone to ‘live in another’s shoes’. There are numerous cases where games fail to achieve this because individual lives, especially the lives marginalised people whose experiences are ‘dipped into’ temporarily, are always more complex than can be represented in games, and the consequence is always more severe that can be represented. From a political perspective, we can re-read the above quote as suggesting that we take on others’subject positions not just to work towards new social formations. We can take this further to critique our current moment, addressing the forms of labour that define not just game production but capitalism more generally. Histories of Future Games There is a wealth of scholarship on the way that games allow us to think across time, predominantly historical societies. This scholarship has focused on historically themed games that allow us to think differently about the past, in historical game studies. Games have a different relationship to the representation of other times and places than other media forms: Chapman, Foka, and Westin (2017) locate the work of Uricchio (2005) as the starting point for the consideration of games as presenting a medium-specific form of historicity. Uricchio focuses on how historical research has often been shaped by the question of mediation of particular histories, with a long history of media being poorly received in the discipline (2005, p. 328). **Historical games enable a reinforcing or disruption of colonialist ideologies of the past (Chapman et al. 2017, p. 415); Spring (2015) notes that games allow for methods of representation that are not as available to other media forms; Metzger and Paxton (2016) note that games allow a new kind of interaction with the past. Postcolonial studies of gaming in particular expose how games make alternative conceptions of history possible**. The work of Souvik Mukherjee has explored cases of what we might describe as ‘alter-empire’ in historical games (2016) and also how we might frame the complexity of ‘tourism’ as resistant historical subjects of imperial forces (2017, p. 59–62, p. 70–71). Emil Lundedal Hammar has explored the complex relationship between history, memory, individuality and race within a context of political activism (2017) and in politically decontextualised revenge fantasies (2020) in a way that addresses how contexts of other times and places allow for playful reactions to political complications of the present. The theme of interaction is one that Apperley (2013) and Chapman (2016) both locate as being an important attribute of the way we think about the past that games allow both a connection to history and a departure from it, and through this, the rethinking of history becomes possible. The flipside to the investigation of the past is those analyses that explore a presentation of the future or at least ‘a’ future. **This literature includes a focus on the aesthetics of the future and alternative presents and also research into the way that some games that frame their futures in procedurality allow for a type of emergent future. Abraham and Jayemanne (2017) have called attention to the way that games could aesthetically present a vision of a future of ecological sustainability and survival for the planet, an approach that Abraham deploys in the analysis of military shooters (2018).** My own work has looked at the way that games allow people to rethink homes and domestic economies through Dwarf Fortress (2006) and the homesteading mechanic of many games (Fordyce, 2018). McClancy’s (2018) analysis of the Fallout franchise also exposes the concern around possible futures, specifically noting that the narrative of the Fallout series is what stakes a claim about how desirable any such future might be. Ruffino (2019) has identified a strand of procedural games that mimic Franklin’s (1979) analysis of capitalist futures, specifically noting that incremental games in particular offer a logic of infinite expansion and that players respond by withdrawing from the prospect of an ‘end’. Conversely, there is also scholarship that attempts to address the nature of what survival itself might look like, post-capitalism, such as van Ryn’s (2020) account of survival without an economy of exchange in Don’t Starve (2013). **There is also game scholarship that takes the notion of utopia to task in itself, often framed around the analysis of the Bioshock (2007) series. The Bioshock games focus on intensified notions of political ideologies from the real world hybridised with hyperbolic visions of capitalist consumption habits (see Nyman & Teten, 2018; Perez-Latorre & Oliva, ´ 2017; Schulzke, 2014).** The only thing to be wary of is when our imaginaries of the future are themselves stultifying and we are left without energy or investment to move forward. This is one of the dangers that the imaginaries presented in Bioshock truly risk that all futures that diverge from centrism are awful, so any change is disastrous. The same tools through which we reimagine the past can reimagine the future. Reading Games Politically In 10 years, I have found only one quote by Negri that is a sideline reference to video games. Squeezed between complaints about broadcast TV and pop music, Negri states: ‘Now, television has become interactive, producing trash culture and constructing an appropriate audience!’ (Negri, 2007, p. 48). Yet, video game experimentation can contribute to imagining past Empire; we can see in games a space that allows exploration and experimentation of future worlds. A game can display a new economic arrangement, it can consider alternative political configurations, it can enable experiments in subjectivity and community and all of these attributes are important for a political consideration of the future. While games do not do this equally, all games can contribute something to these debates in some respect. While the scholarship above has mostly focused on the role of the action, rules, play and narrative, there remains space within the autonomist tradition to consider games in terms of alternative subjectivities for political action.

### Alt – Refusal

\*Could be an ! – Subjectivity and/or an Internal Link to Cap – just don’t read the last part

#### The alternative is refusal – Empire is sustainable only through a complete hegemony over the mind of the subject, but its decentralized nature enables a withdrawal from its soon-to-be universalized values and towards liberation

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Empire appears in the form of a very high-tech machine: it is virtual, built to control the marginal event, and organized to dominate and when necessary intervene in the breakdowns of the system (in line with the most advanced technologies of robotic production). (39) The imperial order is formed not only on the basis of its powers of accumulation and global extension, but also on the basis of its capacity to develop itself more deeply, to be reborn, and to extend itself throughout the biopolitical latticework of world society. (41) The empire's institutional structure is like a software program that carries a virus along with it, so that it is continually modulating and corrupting the institutional forms around it. (197-98) This is the imperial Sprawl, ruled not through decrees and armies (well, mostly not through armies) but through communication/control networks that distribute virtual power. This power is internalized by imperial citizens as surely as if they had chips embedded in their brains. In Empire, subjectivity is multicentered, produced through institutions that are terminally unstable, always breaking down. As the integrity of social institutions (such as schools, families, courts, and prisons) fragments, and the once-clear subject-positions associated with them weaken, the call for imperial comprehensiveness is strengthened, inaugurating a comprehensive ideology, a finely distributed pragmatic myth of networked, globally interlocking power. This is the twenty-minutes-into-the-future of Philip K. Dick, J.G. Ballard, William Gibson, Pat Cadigan, and Mamom Oshii, where computerized communications operate 24/7, generating a mindscape of consuming subjects into which capitalist ideology feeds directly. It perpetually breaks down and reconstructs human consciousness, as in a Cadigan novel, into provisional target-identities to which the nostalgic, Utopian dream of wholeness can be sold and resold perpetually in variant, sometimes mutually contradictory forms, and which can be hired to convey its fictions of sovereignty ever deeper into the self that once imagined it was itself sovereign. In this empire, there are infinite possibilities of projection, but only one reality. The most natural thing in the world is that the world appears to be politically united, that the market is global, and that power is organized throughout its universality. Imperial politics articulates being in its global extension—a great sea that only the winds and the current move. The neutralization of the transcendental imagination is thus the first sense in which the political in the imperial domain is ontological. (354) Since contemporary imperial power does not emanate from one center, but rather from the cyberspatial ganglia of postmodern metropoli, resistance manifests itself in the daily refusal on the part of "the multitude" to follow commands. For Hardt and Negri, revolution is neither possible nor desirable, since no class can act as the self-conscious agent of history. Freedom rests, as in Gibson's world, in finding one's own uses for things. In contrast with sabotage, the resistance strategy of national modernism, resistance under Empire consists of withdrawing consent, of desertion (212). Even the greatest rebels are refuseniks, choosing to withdraw, leaving behind them, like the fused AIs in Neuromancer (1984), a world in which "things are things" (270). Although this strategy hardly promises much as a way of landing blows against the empire, it is a dominant motif in the countercultural "Lost in Space" (or alternatively, "Lost in the Urban Labyrinth") subgenre. (Ironically, Lost in Space [tv series, 1965-68; film 1998] itself is as hysterically conservative as Robinson Crusoe.) Where the overtly imperial mode accepts the hierarchical network of administration—Starfleet commanders still representing the Federation—even mainstream popular works such as Farscape (1999-2003) and Star Trek: Voyager (1995-2001) try to establish a de-centralized web of relationships in the uncharted territories, now just a wormhole away from the past (and the politics of empire).

### Alt – Self-Security

#### The alternative is a form of self-security – a bottom-up relationality that unsettles the securitized narratives in the postcolonial LIO. This allows us to imagine futures outside liberal institutions in a decolonial frame.

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**If the critique of the liberal peace project advanced here has any credibility, a fundamental change is called for in our mode of thinking about peacekeeping**. As a rule of thumb, it might be said that any postcolonial approach worthy of the name must go beyond highlighting the shortcomings of the present system to showing how things might be done differently. **This is hardly possible within the framework of liberal peacebuilding.** It is hard to imagine how a postcolonial take could be given to what is essentially a colonial undertaking. For this reason, I advance some thoughts about a preferred security schema within which an alternative to peacekeeping could emerge – rather than tinkering with the dominant framework of thought that informs the making of policy. **Accordingly, this section will not take up issues such as ‘institutionalization before liberalization’42 which leaves the structure of the peacekeeping project intact, or localization through regional bodies such the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) which remains an essentially top-down, state-centric approach**.43 We might start with the increasing recognition, even in international relations and other discourses of the international, that to change the existing structure of things we need to modify traditional scholarly procedures to bring out the heterogeneity of knowledge and the messiness of its construction. The Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of Social Sciences stresses that contemporary social science must break with mechanical models and open itself to complexity, uncertainty and creativity.44 Robert Cox argues similarly: social sciences should set aside the approaches of the past that sought to define persisting structures and laws, and adopt less deterministic approaches ‘by being sensitive to emerging and declining historical structures and movements of self-organisation in social and political relations’.45 Picking up on self-organization, it is my argument that the most promising approach is assumed to be anchored in the concept of self-securing. The idea of securing the self dovetails nicely with postcolonial thought – though postcolonialism has no proprietary claim on it. It addresses several of the lines of critique of the liberal peacekeeping project advanced earlier in the essay. Self-securing unsettles the understanding that security is best handled from ‘above’, traditionally by the state and now, quite often, by the state acting together with the United Nations. Following the thrust of complexity theory, it challenges hierarchy, centralization, linearity and separation (borders). **It would harness the social, so downgraded since the advent of neoliberalism, and thereby make evident alternative ways of building better relationships with others.** Of its very nature, self-securing looks to the everyday. An archive needs to be developed on neighbourhood and more dispersed practices of self-securing, the shaping and use of public space to provide meeting places, and the role of dissent as a form of community-building. Good use could be made of documented cases of popular responses to natural disasters and financial collapse in various parts of the world which show the capacity for self-organization. In such ways, people who are mostly the objects of security policies could be brought into the discourse: victims, the poor, those in pain and suffering. Clearly, pursuing these ideas is a research venture of a wide-ranging nature. One such project goes forward under the aegis of the Institute of Postcolonial Studies in Melbourne;46 others are working on similar material, some in related fields.47 A first step towards putting flesh on the bones of these arguments is to examine the pre-colonial practices of non-European peoples which helped regulate self –other relations. Frequently expressed in ritual, ceremonial exchange, and gifting, they broaden our understanding of the role of performance in the business of securing. This is not to romanticize the past or to imagine that earlier practices could somehow be transposed to the present, but rather to ask whether in modified form they might have a contemporary relevance. Account should also be taken of the variety and ingenuity of the adaptation of nonEuropean concepts and practices to the compulsions and inducements of the colonial order. A particular significance attaches to the experience of Aboriginal peoples, Karina Shaw has argued, because it provides a microcosm of the struggles faced by a large percentage of the world’s population and is revealing of the character of modern politics.48 **Then there is the rich tradition of alternative security practices developed on the Indian subcontinent during the colonial struggle and, on the diplomatic front, in the years immediately following decolonization**. There is also a growing body of contemporary work being done that takes its lead from complexity theory. The study of networks is a case in point. It has not made much headway in security studies except in relation to terrorist groups and criminal networks trafficking in drugs, but it might yet. Indeed, it could serve as a platform for putting security on a new footing. In other areas such as cyberspace, globalization and new transnational actors, the network metaphor and the relationality involved have figured large in debates about the changing politics of the international. Despite its association with postmodernity, Morgan Brigg points out that local people in many parts of the world have long used notions of tangled nets, and their untangling, as metaphors for managing and resolving conflicts.49 For many years networks have also been central to attempts to change the trajectory of development. In a classic article published in 1992 which appears on every development reading guide – or should – Arturo Escobar wrote of networks as part of the submerged cultural background from which social movements emerged. Stressing the centrality of everyday life to an understanding of social movements, he went on to point to the transformative potential of such movements because of their ‘self-producing and self-organizing’ character.50 Escobar has recently returned to this theme, showing how complexity theory and cyberspace strengthen the case for the principle of self-organization being the way to a more equitable global order.51 These last remarks lead into the question of how far the development constituency – or parts thereof – might connect with a revisioning of security along the lines we have been considering. Here I am thinking not so much of development networks that might be expected to be well disposed to self-organization in related fields, but to the development community more generally. It has been argued in this essay that NGOs have come to accept the close linkage between development and security, thus falling into line with the prescriptions of states and the World Bank. **It has also been suggested that despite humanitarian motivations the involvement of NGOs in the non-European world has often functioned to legitimize the present international system**. Tomohisa Hattoni has in fact argued that the extension and acceptance of gifts is a mechanism of consent to the capitalist order,52 and, moreover, that foreign aid works to confirm the existing material hierarchies between North and South.53 Duffield’s argument should also be kept in mind that the NGO movement did not expand politically by supporting peoples’ struggles against imperial domination or racial oppression but on the basis of emergency.54 Clearly, humanitarianism needs separate and sustained treatment, but the humanitarian urge should not be discounted because it is tinged with pragmatism and at times it is channelled to support unworthy causes. The question for us is: how can it be better directed to advance constructive social change? There is a strong case to be argued that humanitarianism as it relates to development could be so redirected by connecting with peacekeeping reconceived in terms of self-securing. If, as policy-makers now insist, development and security go together, recasting one should facilitate recasting the other. There is much in the practice of development that stands in need of overhauling. For one thing, less emphasis on immediate relief work and more on fostering self reliance in the longer term. Almost certainly this would mean elevating the social and downgrading the economic. Recently the renowned development economist Kari Polanyi Levitt spoke of her commitment to reclaim development, by which she meant ‘the right of a society to define its priorities on its own terms’.55 She went on: I used to make complicated development plans. I don’t really believe in that anymore. I believe development has to do with how people relate to each other, whether co-operatively and with synergy or competitively, with conflict. The one will produce development, the other will produce chaos.56 Working along these lines would bring development into a parallel track with the security agenda canvassed here. Advocacy is another area that could bring the reform agendas of development and security into a closer relationship. It has been aptly said that NGOs have tended to follow rather than lead public opinion. Nearly two decades ago, John Clark declared that the challenge facing NGOs was to shift attention from expanding their projects and increasing their turnover to marshalling their influence to effect changes in ‘attitudes, institutions and policies’.57 That there has been so little change, except in a few instances, must in large measure be attributed to the reluctance to speak out for fear of losing state and World Bank project money and putting at risk charitable and tax-deductability status. There is also the belief that representations of starving people and, to take a less common case, child sponsorship are more effective in bringing in funds from the general public. Yet if NGOs remain more intent on toeing the line with established authority and urging people to donate than to thinking critically about development issues, the consequences are very serious. The linkage between development and security provides a window of opportunity for the NGO sector to strengthen its educational and advocacy role. With established approaches to security increasingly in question, the case for NGO activism is more persuasive than at any point in the past three decades. This brings us to a point that I think has been implicit in much of the argument of this paper. Rather than being regarded as a discrete field, perhaps peacekeeping should be understood as but one of an ensemble of approaches to the problem of conflict, sitting alongside not only development but international political economy, world order studies, conflict resolution and similar. Peacekeeping might then become part of a consortium that addresses conflict with an awareness of the need for change in the structural relationship between North and South (remembering that there is a North in the South and a South in the North). I suggested above that peacekeeping needed to go out into the world and connect with the everyday. It is increasingly apparent – if as yet insufficiently acted upon – that in the South this involves listening to and taking bearings from people outside what is usually understood to be the formal political process. One thinks of members of social movements, squatter communities or ordinary people whose lives have been disrupted by violence: perhaps non-combatants unable to live up to the model of masculinity into which they have been socialized because they cannot provide for and protect their families;58 or women who find that the borders created by the state and the violence that results are refracted in their family relationships.59 **In many situations, whether a peace can be made or maintained may depend more on these grounded, personalized understandings – experiential knowledge – than on the geopolitical calculations and theoretical postulates of those skilled in state-building and diplomatic negotiation**. **What is perhaps less appreciated is that peacekeeping must connect with the everyday in the North as well as in the South**. Over the past two decades various writers have drawn attention to the culture of self-satisfaction that permeates Western societies, which is often accompanied by a marked impatience with the developing world and its problems.60 Taking account of the revival of interest in ideas about empire and the emergence of what has been called the ‘new racism’, one might speak of a culture of insecurity that drives forward the search for security in the formerly colonized world. The contention is persuasive that, at least in part, this insecurity goes back to imperial times.61 Now insecurity can be politically enabling if it is channelled in such a way as to establish commonalities with others.62 But it can also be very damaging if it is harnessed to the pursuit of overbearing external policies – as it mostly is. Here it is worth recalling Slavoj Zˇ izˇek’s point: ‘ruling ideas are never directly the ideas of the ruling class’.63 This is why it is so important to engage with the culture of the everyday; it is drawn upon selectively by the state to advance the interests of the state and of those who manage the state. Surveying the experience of peacekeeping and promoting development, it is striking that invariably the problems are located ‘out there’ in the otherness of the non-European world. Very seldom has analysis and prescription been related back to the role of the First World and what could be done within metropolitan societies or with regard to the structure of the international system. One of the objects of studying other peoples and cultures is surely to better understand ourselves, but it is not much in evidence in the debates about peacekeeping. Somehow, it appears, the discourse has failed to make significant use of knowledge about the part the West has played – and continues to play – in creating instability and insecurity in the Third World, together with widespread poverty. Colonial rule deepened existing divisions in the non-European world; it solidified religious and ethnic identifications; it eroded earlier ways of managing conflict. After decolonization the ruling security and development paradigms cut across the grain of politics as practised. At the same time, the structural violence of the leading powers and global agencies ensured the continued subordination of the Third World to the First. On a charitable reading, perhaps this was not so much by design as by default. Knowledges that could have made a difference were devalued or simply not taken up. On the first count, there was the dismissal of much non-European knowledge – as the World Bank infamously declaimed: ‘Poor countries – and poor people – differ from rich ones not only because they have less capital but because they have less knowledge’.64 On the second count, knowledge that is part of the Western canon – in imperial history, in postcolonial studies, in international political economy and in international law – was allowed to remain in separate compartments. Thus deeply troubling aspects of the politics of the First World were screened from view and characterizations of the many ‘lacks’ of the other were given free rein. The need now is to challenge conceptualizations of both violence and underdevelopment as a problem embedded in the difference of the non-European world. Or to put it another way, to carry out a spatial reorientation, focusing for a bit on here and not there and showing how ‘we’ are heavily implicated in ‘their’ predicament. The question then becomes: what can be done at home about fixing the processes of international exchange to provide the conditions for self-reliance to flourish?

### Alt – Techno-Opacity

#### In response to the 1AC’s call for transparency, the alternative is to embrace an algorithmic ethic of opacity as a precondition for political action. The alt is generative of ethical algorithmic governance.

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**Amid the widespread moral panic surrounding the black box of the algorithm and the political demands for transparency, accountability, and explainability, in this book I make a counter case for opacity and the giving of partial accounts. I have argued that responsibility for algorithmic decisions can never take the form of a clear-sighted account of the action**. “Responsibility,” as Thomas Keenan writes, “is not a moment of security or cognitive certainty” in which one makes a “choice between yes and no, this or that.”26 To establish a moment of cognitive certainty regarding the algorithm—to demand its transparency and accountability—is not at all the politics of a responsibility worthy of the name. Indeed, with its new forms of cognitive computing and cloud reasoning, as I discuss in chapter 1, the contemporary algorithm is well attuned to generating clear-sighted precise outputs from otherwise occluded situations. **Contra the demand for transparency, then, the opacity of the scene, and the undecidability of its salient features and attributes, is the precondition for politics and ethics. “What could responsibility mean,” asks Keenan, “without the risk of exposure to chance, without vulnerability,” without the undecidability of what is taking place in a scene**?27 Running against the grain of algorithmic logics that show, attend, and tell the meaning of a situation, responsibility means that one cannot see a clear path ahead because the meaning of the situation is undecidable. The multiple branching points of the decision tree or random forest algorithm do in fact carry the risk of exposure to chance and vulnerability. **A different kind of responsibility dwells at these forks in the path, bearing the opacity of future consequences of the weighting of one route over another**. In this book I differentiate the search for an encoded ethical framework for algorithms from an ethicopolitics that is already present within the algorithm’s arrangements. In so doing, I draw a distinction between a moral code of prohibition and permission (what algorithms may or may not do) and an ethics of the orientation one has to oneself and to others (how algorithms are generating relations of self to self, and self to others).28 This distinction follows Spinoza’s broader philosophical concern that “ethics has nothing to do with a morality.”29 Our ethicopolitical relations do not follow strictly from some already formulated moral code, for we never have the security of these grounds from which to act. As Deleuze has reflected on Spinoza’s ethics, “You do not know beforehand what good or bad you are capable of; you do not know beforehand what a body or a mind can do, in a given encounter, a given arrangement, a given combination.”30 Similarly, for Isabelle Stengers, “every time we use the term ‘ethics’ we must obviously distinguish it from the term ‘morality,’” so that her speculative ambition is ethical in the sense of ethos or habit.31 **Just as Spinoza’s ethics are ever in formation, forged through ethos, encounters, arrangements, and combinations, so a cloud ethics is located in the encounters, arrangements, and combinations through which the algorithm is generated. Some of these encounters and arrangements involve human beings; others are between unsupervised algorithms and a corpus of data; and more still involve algorithms interacting with other algorithms. This is an ethics, then, that puts into question the authority of the knowing subject and opens onto the plural and distributed forms of the writing of algorithms**. Understood in this way, “ethics is able to exceed its traditional determination” and be “displaced” and considered “anew” in the relations forged with other beings.32 The possibility of what Derrida calls “the opening of another ethics” is a different kind of opening to the imagination of the prizing open of a black box or the illumination of a dark calculus with moral oversight.33 It is an opening onto the edges and limits of an iterative writing that is profoundly political, each one of us drawn into the proximities of the output. Algorithms engage in writing in and through their dense relations with people and things in a data scene, their authorship uncertain and their emergence opaque. Here, in the opacity of not knowing in advance what the relations could be, we have found an opening for taking responsibility. If an ethical response to algorithmic decisions is to begin from opacity and not from the demand for transparency, then what does this mean for the strategies of a cloud ethics? Where the political demands for transparency reassert the objective vision of a disembodied observer, to stay with opacity is to insist on the situated, embodied, and partial perspective of all forms of scientific knowledge.34 Understood in Donna Haraway’s terms, to confront opacity would not be a matter of failing to open the black box or to see something, but rather it would acknowledge that “the knowing self is partial in all its guises,” that practices of visuality necessarily enroll the opacity of ourselves and others.35 Far from a lack of transparency limiting accountability, the condition of opacity “allows us to become answerable for what we learn how to see.”36 This “we” who learns, as I discuss in the machine learning practices of chapter 2, is a composite figure, “stitched together imperfectly” from the iterative learning of humans and machines.37 In the chapters of this book, I have been concerned to show how machine learning algorithms generate their outputs through the opaque relations of selves to selves, and selves to others, and how these outputs then annul and disavow the opacity of their underlying relations in the name of a crystalline clarity of the output. One mode of resistance to the clarity of the algorithmic decision resides within the opacity of the subjects and what cannot be known of their relations. Let us consider a practical example of such a strategy. In the experimental development of the neural networks for show, attend, and tell, the algorithm designers explain that when their model makes a mistake, they are able to “exploit” what it manifests to gain “intuition into what the model saw.”38 This kind of seeing on behalf of the algorithm sustains the god’s-eye vision of a computer scientist who may redistribute their way of seeing at will. A cloud ethics can stay with the difficulty of intuiting what the model saw as a form of partial, situated, and locally specific account. Among the examples of the mistakes used to productively generate new learning is “a woman holding a clock in her hand” and “a man wearing a hat and a hat on a skateboard.” The algorithms have learned to recognize a clock and a hat, even when these are absent in the scene, via their exposure to a corpus of data that has supplied the feature vectors for these objects. The algorithm’s relations with a contingent and opaque set of multiple other gradients have generated the mistaken presence of a clock and a hat (figures 6.4 and 6.5). The cnns have generated an output of attentiveness to the focus of the scene (shown in the images as an area of white light)—this output itself contingent on millions of past parameters—which enters the rnn as a data input. The rnn then generates the “tell,” or the natural language description of the scene, assigning a probability for each word in the descriptor. In the (mis)recognition of “A man is talking on his cell phone while another man watches,” the algorithm has assigned a probability of 1.00 (or a certainty) to the indefinite article A, for example, but probabilities of 0.46, 0.24, and 0.17 to the nouns man, cell, and phone. These likelihood scores—low and yet apparently the most probable—are entirely contingent on multiple algorithms’ past relations with unknown other scenes. As I explain in chapter 4, the mistaken recognition of the algorithm is not merely error or errancy, for the output is entirely reasonable given the algorithm’s relations with a data world. In terms of resistant practices, a cloud ethics is concerned not with fixing the algorithm or eradicating its errancy, but rather with attending to how these moments give accounts of algorithmic reason. What will take place when the recognition of a clock that is not present becomes the recognition of a weapon? What will be authorized by the most likely cell phone that is an absent presence in the scene? To be clear, a cloud ethics will point to the moments when partial and situated algorithmic reason is sheltered as “mistake” or “error” and will reopen what is incomputable in the making of a likelihood score. Such a strategy is not the same as making a calculation transparent or accountable because it recognizes that the 0.14 assigned to child or 0.46 and 0.37 to border and fence are contingent on a vast multiplicity of necessarily opaque relations between other people, algorithms, things, data, gradients, features, and images. When the algorithm “tells” us that this is what matters in a scene, one could never have a transparent account of how the story has been made tellable. Instead, there are only the intransigent political relations that persist in the scene, the moments of nonclosure that reopen the problem and the politics.

### Alt – AT: Economic Collapse

#### When the US invaded Iraq, they saw the possibility to get economic growth due to oil, yet the invasions that the US enacted both ruined Iraq, and eventually the costs from the invasions sent the US into a recession

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**Under Saddam Hussein, the Republic of Iraq was a major oil producer and profitable partner for major US oil companies,** as well as a lucrative market for US exports. It was a stable, unified secular state. The **first Gulf War in the 1990s led to the first phase of its fragmentation with the de facto establishment of a Kurdish mini-state in the north under US protection.** The **US** withdrew its military forces but **imposed brutal economic sanctions limiting economic reconstruction** from the devastation of the first Gulf War. **The second US-led invasion and full-scale occupation in 2003 devastated the economy and dismantled the state,** dismissing tens of thousands of experienced civil servants, teachers and police. **This led to utter social col- lapse** and fomented ethno-religious warfare that led to the killing, wound- mg or displacement of millions of Iraqis. **The result of G. W. Bush's conquest of Baghdad was a failed state. US oil and energy companies lost billions of dollars in trade and investment and the US economy was pushed into recession.**

### Alt – AT: Movements Fail

\*Could maybe be articulated as a framework or alt solvency card

#### Movements have staggered horizontally but exploded vertically – Empire’s decentralized and expanding nature means movements with a clarified common enemy can strike at its heart

**Hardt/Negri ‘2K** (Michael Hardt; professor of literature at Duke University. Antonio Negri; independent researcher and philosopher, previously a professor of political science at University of Padua. “Empire” pg 54-58 2000) // ELog

Consider the most radical and powerful struggles of the final years of the twentieth century: the Tiananmen Square events in 1989, the Intifada against Israeli state authority, the May 1992 revolt in Los Angeles, the uprising in Chiapas that began in 1994, and the series of strikes that paralyzed France in December 1995, and those that crippled South Korea in 1996. Each of these struggles was specific and based on immediate regional concerns in such a way that they could in no respect be linked together as a globally expanding chain of revolt. None of these events inspired a cycle of struggles, because the desires and needs they expressed could not be translated into different contexts. In other words, (potential) revolutionaries in other parts of the world did not hear of the events in Beijing, Nablus, Los Angeles, Chiapas, Paris, or Seoul and immediately recognize them as their own struggles. Furthermore, these struggles not only fail to communicate to other contexts but also lack even a local communication, and thus often have a very brief duration where they are born, burning out in a flash. This is certainly one of the central and most urgent political paradoxes of our time: in our much celebrated age of communication, struggles have become all but incommunicable. This paradox of incommunicability makes it extremely difficult to grasp and express the new power posed by the struggles that have emerged. We ought to be able to recognize that what the struggles have lost in extension, duration, and communicability they have gained in intensity. We ought to be able to recognize that although all of these struggles focused on their own local and immediate circumstances, they all nonetheless posed problems of supranational relevance, problems that are proper to the new figure of imperial capitalist regulation. In Los Angeles, for example, the riots were fueled by local racial antagonisms and patterns of social and economic exclusion that are in many respects particular to that (post-)urban territory, but the events were also immediately catapulted to a general level insofar as they expressed a refusal of the post-Fordist regime of social control. Like the Intifada in certain respects, the Los Angeles riots demonstrated how the decline of Fordist bargaining regimes and mechanisms of social mediation has made the management of racially and socially diverse metropolitan territories and populations so precarious. The looting of commodities and burning of property were not just metaphors but the real global condition of the mobility and volatility of post-Fordist social mediations.14 In Chiapas, too, the insurrection focused primarily on local concerns: problems of exclusion and lack of representation specific to Mexican society and the Mexican state, which have also to a limited degree long been common to the racial hierarchies throughout much of Latin American. The Zapatista rebellion, however, was also immediately a struggle against the social regime imposed by NAFTA and more generally the systematic exclusion and subordination in the regional construction of the world market.15 Finally, like those in Seoul, the massive strikes in Paris and throughout France in late 1995 were aimed at specific local and national labor issues (such as pensions, wages, and unemployment), but the struggle was also immediately recognized as a clear contestation of the new social and economic construction of Europe. The French strikes called above all for a new notion of the public, a new construction of public space against the neoliberal mechanisms of privatization that accompany more or less everywhere the project of capitalist globalization.16 Perhaps precisely because all these struggles are incommunicable and thus blocked from traveling horizontally in the form of a cycle, they are forced instead to leap vertically and touch immediately on the global level. We ought to be able to recognize that this is not the appearance of a new cycle of internationalist struggles, but rather the emergence of a new quality of social movements. We ought to be able to recognize, in other words, the fundamentally new characteristics these struggles all present, despite their radical diversity. First, each struggle, though firmly rooted in local conditions, leaps immediately to the global level and attacks the imperial constitution in its generality. Second, all the struggles destroy the traditional distinction between economic and political struggles. The struggles are at once economic, political, and cultural—and hence they are biopolitical struggles, struggles over the form of life. They are constituent struggles, creating new public spaces and new forms of community. We ought to be able to recognize all this, but it is not that easy. We must admit, in fact, that even when trying to individuate the real novelty of these situations, we are hampered by the nagging impression that these struggles are always already old, outdated, and anachronistic. The struggles at Tiananmen Square spoke a language of democracy that seemed long out of fashion; the guitars, headbands, tents, and slogans all looked like a weak echo of Berkeley in the 1960s. The Los Angeles riots, too, seemed like an aftershock of the earthquake of racial conflicts that shook the United States in the 1960s. The strikes in Paris and Seoul seemed to take us back to the era of the mass factory worker, as if they were the last gasp of a dying working class. All these struggles, which pose really new elements, appear from the beginning to be already old and outdated—precisely because they cannot communicate, because their languages cannot be translated. The struggles do not communicate despite their being hypermediatized, on television, the Internet, and every other imaginable medium. Once again we are confronted by the paradox of incommunicability. We can certainly recognize real obstacles that block the communication of struggles. One such obstacle is the absence of a recognition of a common enemy against which the struggles are directed. Beijing, Los Angeles, Nablus, Chiapas, Paris, Seoul: the situations all seem utterly particular, but in fact they all directly attack the global order of Empire and seek a real alternative. Clarifying the nature of the common enemy is thus an essential political task. A second obstacle, which is really corollary to the first, is that there is no common language of struggles that could ‘‘translate’’ the particular language of each into a cosmopolitan language. Struggles in other parts of the world and even our own struggles seem to be written in an incomprehensible foreign language. This too points toward an important political task: to construct a new common language that facilitates communication, as the languages of antiimperialism and proletarian internationalism did for the struggles of a previous era. Perhaps this needs to be a new type of communication that functions not on the basis of resemblances but on the basis of differences: a communication of singularities. Recognizing a common enemy and inventing a common language of struggles are certainly important political tasks, and we will advance them as far as we can in this book, but our intuition tells us that this line of analysis finally fails to grasp the real potential presented by the new struggles. Our intuition tells us, in other words, that the model of the horizontal articulation of struggles in a cycle is no longer adequate for recognizing the way in which contemporary struggles achieve global significance. Such a model in fact blinds us to their real new potential. Marx tried to understand the continuity of the cycle of proletarian struggles that were emerging in nineteenth-century Europe in terms of a mole and its subterranean tunnels. Marx’s mole would surface in times of open class conflict and then retreat underground again—not to hibernate passively but to burrow its tunnels, moving along with the times, pushing forward with history so that when the time was right (1830, 1848, 1870), it would spring to the surface again. ‘‘Well grubbed old mole!’’ 17 Well, we suspect that Marx’s old mole has finally died. It seems to us, in fact, that in the contemporary passage to Empire, the structured tunnels of the mole have been replaced by the infinite undulations of the snake.18 The depths of the modern world and its subterranean passageways have in postmodernity all become superficial. Today’s struggles slither si-lently across these superficial, imperial landscapes. Perhaps the incommunicability of struggles, the lack of well-structured, communicating tunnels, is in fact a strength rather than a weakness—a strength because all of the movements are immediately subversive in themselves and do not wait on any sort of external aid or extension to guarantee their effectiveness. Perhaps the more capital extends its global networks of production and control, the more powerful any singular point of revolt can be. Simply by focusing their own powers, concentrating their energies in a tense and compact coil, these serpentine struggles strike directly at the highest articulations of imperial order. Empire presents a superficial world, the virtual center of which can be accessed immediately from any point across the surface. If these points were to constitute something like a new cycle of struggles, it would be a cycle defined not by the communicative extension of the struggles but rather by their singular emergence, by the intensity that characterizes them one by one. In short, this new phase is defined by the fact that these struggles do not link horizontally, but each one leaps vertically, directly to the virtual center of Empire.

### Alt – AT: Perm

\*Specifically, this evidence is super good at answering arguments along the lines of “our unique impact scenario doesn’t trigger/outweighs the link” (i.e. perm double bind, perm do the alt in all other instances, or extinction outweighs) – also seems like it could be used as a framework card, idk exactly how though

#### The final instance is never really the final instance – Empire is constructed on the marginal event which guarantees its justification is effective and justified – the sole exception of the AFF constitutes infinite further construction

**Hardt/Negri ‘2K** (Michael Hardt; professor of literature at Duke University. Antonio Negri; independent researcher and philosopher, previously a professor of political science at University of Padua. “Empire” pg 38-40 2000) // ELog

What were traditionally called the royal prerogatives of sovereignty seem in effect to be repeated and even substantially renewed in the construction of Empire. If we were to remain within the conceptual framework of classic domestic and international law, we might be tempted to say that a supranational quasi-state is being formed. That does not seem to us, however, an accurate characterization of the situation. When the royal prerogatives of modern sovereignty reappear in Empire, they take on a completely different form. For example, the sovereign function of deploying military forces was carried out by the modern nation-states and is now conducted by Empire, but, as we have seen, the justification for such deployments now rests on a state of permanent exception, and the deployments themselves take the form of police actions. Other royal prerogatives such as carrying out justice and imposing taxes also have the same kind of liminal existence. We have already discussed the marginal position of judicial authority in the constitutive process of Empire, and one could also argue that imposing taxes occupies a marginal position in that it is increasingly linked to specific and local urgencies. In effect, one might say that the sovereignty of Empire itself is realized at the margins, where borders are flexible and identities are hybrid and fluid. It would be difficult to say which is more important to Empire, the center or the margins. In fact, center and margin seem continually to be shifting positions, fleeing any determinate locations. We could even say that the process itself is virtual and that its power resides in the power of the virtual. One could nonetheless object at this point that even while being virtual and acting at the margins, the process of constructing imperial sovereignty is in many respects very real! We certainly do not mean to deny that fact. Our claim, rather, is that we are dealing here with a special kind of sovereignty—a discontinuous form of sovereignty that should be considered liminal or marginal insofar as it acts ‘‘in the final instance,’’ a sovereignty that locates its only point of reference in the definitive absoluteness of the power that it can exercise. Empire thus appears in the form of a very high tech machine: it is virtual, built to control the marginal event, and organized to dominate and when necessary intervene in the breakdowns of the system (in line with the most advanced technologies of robotic production). The virtuality and discontinuity of imperial sovereignty, however, do not minimize the effectiveness of its force; on the contrary, those very characteristics serve to reinforce its apparatus, demonstrating its effectiveness in the contemporary historical context and its legitimate force to resolve world problems in the final instance.

#### Alternative approach is the only way to break from the squo – aff’s reformism and lesser evil mentality forces binaries that prevent fundamental change

Weizman, 2011. (Eyal, professor of spatial and visual cultures at Goldsmiths University of London, founder of the collective Decolonizing Architecture Art Residency in Bethleham. *The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza*. Verso Publishers, Print copy, page 21-24)

Behind the present use of the term 'lesser evil' is a rich history and various intellectual trajectories. What may otherwise seem to be a perennial problem, endemic to ethics and political practice, a dilemma that recurs in different moments in time in the same shape and form, might in fact reveal something peculiar about each moment and situation. The various political, theological and philosophical uses of the lesser evil idiom may suggest that it meant different things to different people in different periods and situations. Every political tradition and form of political practice developed its own ways of engaging with the lesser evil argument - and much has subsequently been lost in translation. For example, unlike the tradition of liberal ethics that would invoke him centuries later, Augustine was never content with lesser evils. Indeed, a significant aspect of the idea of the lesser evil has been lost in its process of secularization from early Christian theology into the utilitarian foundations of liberal ethics. For the original Christian toleration of the lesser evil was understood in relation to the telos of redemption that is ultimately in excess of all calculations. For Augustine, the name for this state beyond calculations was 'the kingdom of heaven'. In contrast to the teachings of the Christian theologians that they invoked, and locked within a perpetual economy of immanence, liberal ethics can be interpreted as a drive for the 'optimization' of a system of government. But what is the sense in optimizing those regimes when they perpetuate intolerable injustice? Even those of us without much use for a 'kingdom of heaven' and without much patience for the systems of pastoral government that should guide us to it, can still see in Augustine's argument an important challenge: how to engage in political practice within the complex existing force-fields of the present in a way that also aims to break away from them? This challenge is particularly acute for those who operate within or in relation to situations they deem intolerable and want to fundamentally change rather than reform. The practices of human rights could be used as effective tools against close societies and tyrannies, and were indeed often used in struggles that ended up replacing those regimes, they lend themselves easily for manipulation in the context of liberal democracies. At different times, Marx, Lenin, Kautski, Luxemburg, Trotsky and Gramsci grappled with the problem of the lesser evil in fighting for gains here and now, while also fighting for a different and better world on the other. At various points they advocated struggles for immediate gains - for example, proposing trade unions, whose function was to win a better deal for workers in an exploitative system. None of them, however, thought that trade unions were all that was possible, and none was satisfied with simply winning a better deal within an existing system. Unlike the revolutionary and militant communists who protested the drift towards a timid, reformist politics of choosing the lesser evil and of making compromises with capital, Marx thought that winning a ten-hour day was a considerable victory for the English proletariat. Marx's argument shifted the attention from the ten hours of work to the fourteen hours of non-work time. These he thought provided the opportunity to build an organizational platform, as well as the consciousness and experience needed to take over the means of production. To show that it is futile to object to all lesser evil compromises on principle, we could even enlist Lenin himself. In his attempt to explain the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk that lead to Soviet Russia's exit from World War I in 1918 after making an agreement with the western powers, Lenin returned to a scene of a road robbery described by Augustine. 'To reject compromises "on principle", to reject the permissibility of compromises in general, no matter of what kind', said Lenin, 'is childishness ... One must be able to analyze the situation and the concrete conditions of each compromise, or of each variety of compromise. One must learn to distinguish between a man who has given up his money and firearms to bandits so as to lessen the evil they can do and to facilitate their capture and execution, and a man who gives his money and firearms to bandits so as to share in the loot.'34 The deliberation of a political thought-practice must indeed insist on uncovering the force-field within which each of the dilemmas of the lesser evil exists, seeking to identify more extended and intricate political connections; looking further into the future, it should insist on political goals and the means of their achievement. At one end of the spectrum, in which the lesser evil argument occupies the middle ground, stand those who believe that every possible gain at present is insignificant in light of the essentially compromised state of the world. Part of the structure of this argument is found the principle of the politique du pire- the politics of making things worse. This line of thought believes in the redemptive potential of misery- or in its theological-political incarnation as dolorism: pain as a spiritual experience that allows people to see more clearly. Every form of improvement is necessarily seen as the normalization of exploitation or the pacification of injustice. Opting for the worst is, therefore, an attempt to undermine the field of alternatives of a pre-given choice and overcome its terms. But are the horrific spectacles of greater evils preferable to the incremental damage of lesser ones? Is the choice only between squabbling with power about the correct measure of its violence, helping to calibrate it and tend to its wounded, or on the other hand a call for its amplification in order to 'expose its contradictions' (contradictions seem only to sustain power's march) to shock a complacent population into rising up? Between refusal and tactical embrace the difficulty of the dilemma of the lesser evil is equally in practising and in avoiding it. The Greeks thought of the dilemma as one of the elements of tragedy. Each of the options that a tragic hero faces necessarily leads to different forms of horrific suffering: the dilemma was presented as a choice between the two horns of an angry bull. But the options must not only be about which of the horns to choose. Robert Pirsig has suggested several ways to subvert this complicity of the opposites: one can 'refuse to enter the arena', 'throw sand in the hull's eyes', or 'sing the bull to sleep' .35 The contemporary forms of power unpacked in this book are no longer so singular and unified. Rather than a bull, they may appear to take on the shape of a multiplicity, a diffuse field of forces simultaneously aggressive and benign. It is a form of power that not only charges forward; it surrounds, immerses and embeds. Political activists must constantly invent new forms of struggle that are recognisant of this paradigm of power, but which also evade and subvert its embrace, attempt to rewire its webs in order to escape its calculation. The characters that inhabit the chapters of this book have stepped right into the thick of this web of forces: their movement through them offer valuable examples and lessons. Some paths must be avoided at all costs; others illuminate possible courses of action within the intricate workings of the humanitarian present.

# FRAMEWORK

### AT: Realism

#### Realism serves as a globalist framing to homogenize all experience to a western conception of the world -- reject it

COLEBROOK 14 (Clare Colebrook - cultural theorist, currently appointed Edwin Erle Sparks Professor of English at Pennsylvania State University. She has published numerous works on Gilles Deleuze, visual art, poetry, queer theory, film studies, contemporary literature, theory, cultural studies and visual culture) (2014). Death of the PostHuman : Essays on Extinction, Vol. 1. Ann Arbor: Open Humanities Press. doi: 10.3998/ohp.12329362.0001.001//vivi

The word ‘globalism’ along with the word ‘biopolitics’ suffers from a curious double valence. As a descriptive term globalism can refer to the lost autonomy and destroyed difference among worlds: the formation of global media, markets and communications eliminated what was once a panorama of difference. Once upon a time the globe enjoyed divergent timelines and worldviews. Even if it was central to the colonialist imagination to romanticize the extent to which ‘other’ worlds were exotically untranslatable, mystical and embedded in a non-linear time, there is nevertheless a very real sense in which globalism has created an earth of a single time, single market and single polity. Globalism would be a mode of homogenization, disenchantment or rendering quantifiable that one could lament as having displaced an earlier world of distinct places for the sake of one quantifiable space. This reduction of distinction has significant material consequences; today, any particular country’s environmental or wage policies will directly alter the day to day life of bodies elsewhere on the globe. But global inclusion and simultaneity also trigger a series of imaginary ramifications. In positive terms this has been described by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in terms of a new multitude. Liberated from nation states and physical locales there can now be a humanity as such, a self-creating living labor that has no body other than that which it gives itself through its own immaterial productive powers (Hardt and Negri 2004). Thought less optimistically, one might say that the physical ability to occupy converging and synchronized worlds and times is coupled with a cognitive paralysis to think of any future that would not be one more chapter in a familiar collective narrative. This is evident in the terms that are used to describe the predicament of the globe. It is not only the case that events are materially and systemically linked, so that the volatile economies of even the smallest countries may precipitate global crises; it is also typical today to see all of financial history as similarly continuous and interconnected. This occurs both in short-term and long-term thinking; recent events have prompted the publication of a series of histories and genealogies, including the histories of debt, of money, of corporations, bonds and markets: all suggesting that the present is an expression and extension of a single history of something like ‘the’ globe (Ferguson 2008; Cashill 2010; Graeber 2011; Coggan 2012; Bakan 2005). Economic events are considered in relation to a past that we have been unable to think as anything other than differing by degree. Despite the new global conditions and linkages the 2008 cascade of economic crises were gauged to be either as bad as or worse than the great depression, while terms such as ‘recovery,’ ‘recession,’ ‘depression,’ and ‘crisis’ place the current state of play as a continuation of a past, a past that varies and recovers always in terms of one easily comprehended cycle. The lexicon deployed to assess and gauge the environment is similarly comforting in terms of its linear temporality and delimitation: Australia still refers to its condition as one of ‘drought,’ even when the period of insufficient rain and increasing desertification exceeds a decade; climate change policy refers to ‘mitigation,’ ‘adaptation,’ ‘sustainability’ and ‘viability’—all of which enable one to think of management (however difficult) rather than cessation, rupture or incomprehension. One might say that the imaginary is, indeed, global. A literal globalism—the stark reality of there being no escape, no outside, nowhere else to flee now that the earth has been forced to yield ever more to the human desire for life—is coupled with an incompatible global figuration. Things will cycle back to recovery. The globe can be taken and assessed as an object and managed, saved, revived or given the respect and care that it deserves. If where we are is a globe, then it can be imagined as delimited, bounded, organically self-referring and unified.

### FW – Epistemology First

#### Evaluate epistemology first – Empire is constructed through various self-legitimating hegemonic discourses, but under each is an alternative ontology of liberation which can only be revealed through a priori deconstruction

**Hardt/Negri ‘2K** (Michael Hardt; professor of literature at Duke University. Antonio Negri; independent researcher and philosopher, previously a professor of political science at University of Padua. “Empire” pg 46-49 2000) // ELog

The legacy of modernity is a legacy of fratricidal wars, devastating ‘‘development,’’ cruel ‘‘civilization,’’ and previously unimagined violence. Erich Auerbach once wrote that tragedy is the only genre that can properly claim realism in Western literature, and perhaps this is true precisely because of the tragedy Western modernity has imposed on the world.5 Concentration camps, nuclear weapons, genocidal wars, slavery, apartheid: it is not difficult to enumerate the various scenes of the tragedy. By insisting on the tragic character of modernity, however, we certainly do not mean to follow the ‘‘tragic’’ philosophers of Europe, from Schopenhauer to Heidegger, who turn these real destructions into metaphysical narratives about the negativity of being, as if these actual tragedies were merely an illusion, or rather as if they were our ultimate destiny! Modern negativity is located not in any transcendent realm but in the hard reality before us: the fields of patriotic battles in the First and Second World Wars, from the killing fields at Verdun to the Nazi furnaces and the swift annihilation of thousands in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the carpet bombing of Vietnam and Cambodia, the massacres from Se´tifand Soweto to Sabra and Shatila, and the list goes on and on. There is no Job who can sustain such suffering! (And anyone who starts compiling such a list quickly realizes how inadequate it is to the quantity and quality of the tragedies.) Well, if that modernity has come to an end, and if the modern nation-state that served as the ineluctable condition for imperialist domination and innumerable wars is disappearing from the world scene, then good riddance! We must cleanse ourselves of any misplaced nostalgia for the belle e´poque of that modernity. We cannot be satisfied, however, with that political condemnation of modern power that relies on the historia rerum gestarum, the objective history we have inherited. We need to consider also the power of the res gestae, the power of the multitude to make history that continues and is reconfigured today within Empire. It is a question of transforming a necessity imposed on the multitude—a necessity that was to a certain extent solicited by the multitude itself throughout modernity as a line of flight from localized misery and exploitation—into a condition of possibility of liberation, a new possibility on this new terrain of humanity. This is when the ontological drama begins, when the curtain goes up on a scene in which the development of Empire becomes its own critique and its process of construction becomes the process of its overturning. This drama is ontological in the sense that here, in these processes, being is produced and reproduced. This drama will have to be clarified and articulated much further as our study proceeds, but we should insist right from the outset that this is not simply another variant of dialectical enlightenment. We are not proposing the umpteenth version of the inevitable passage through purgatory (here in the guise of the new imperial machine) in order to offer a glimmer of hope for radiant futures. We are not repeating the schema of an ideal teleology that justifies any passage in the name of a promised end. On the contrary, our reasoning here is based on two methodological approaches that are intended to be nondialectical and absolutely immanent: the first is critical and deconstructive, aiming to subvert the hegemonic languages and social structures and thereby reveal an alternative ontological basis that resides in the creative and productive practices of the multitude; the second is constructive and ethico-political, seeking to lead the processes of the production of subjectivity toward the constitution of an effective social, political alternative, a new constituent power.6 Our critical approach addresses the need for a real ideological and material deconstruction of the imperial order. In the postmodern world, the ruling spectacle of Empire is constructed through a variety of self-legitimating discourses and structures. Long ago authors as diverse as Lenin, Horkheimer and Adorno, and Debord recognized this spectacle as the destiny of triumphant capitalism. Despite their important differences, such authors offer us real anticipations of the path of capitalist development.7 Our deconstruction of this spectacle cannot be textual alone, but must seek continually to focus its powers on the nature of events and the real determinations of the imperial processes in motion today. The critical approach is thus intended to bring to light the contradictions, cycles, and crises of the process because in each of these moments the imagined necessity of the historical development can open toward alternative possibilities. In other words, the deconstruction of the historia rerum gestarum, of the spectral reign of globalized capitalism, reveals the possibility of alternative social organizations. This is perhaps as far as we can go with the methodological scaffolding of a critical and materialist deconstructionism—but this is already an enormous contribution!8 This is where the first methodological approach has to pass the baton to the second, the constructive and ethico-political approach. Here we must delve into the ontological substrate of the concrete alternatives continually pushed forward by the res gestae, the subjective forces acting in the historical context. What appears here is not a new rationality but a new scenario of different rational acts—a horizon of activities, resistances, wills, and desires that refuse the hegemonic order, propose lines of flight, and forge alternative constitutive itineraries. This real substrate, open to critique, revised by the ethico-political approach, represents the real ontological referent of philosophy, or really the field proper to a philosophy of liberation. This approach breaks methodologically with every philosophy of history insofar as it refuses any deterministic conception of historical development and any ‘‘rational’’ celebration of the result. It demonstrates, on the contrary, how the historical event resides in potentiality. ‘‘It is not the two that recompose in one, but the one that opens into two,’’ according to the beautiful anti-Confucian (and anti-Platonic) formula of the Chinese revolutionaries.9 Philosophy is not the owl of Minerva that takes flight after history has been realized in order to celebrate its happy ending; rather, philosophy is subjective proposition, desire, and praxis that are applied to the event.

### DA – Militarism

#### Militarism DA: the ideology of empire is not just within the military itself, but maintained through a subtler hum of the machine within education, making it a critical site for the resistance of imperialism.

Johnson 18 [Brooke, Deakin, Jo; Taylor, Emmeline; Kupchik, Aaron (2018). The Palgrave International Handbook of School Discipline, Surveillance, and Social Control || Educating for War: Militarization and the Manufacturing of Consent Through Public Schooling. , 10.1007/978-3-319-71559-9(Chapter 4), 65–86. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-71559-9\_4 ] <jericho>

After several years living abroad, I returned to Southern California in late 2003. One afternoon, I was stuck in traffic behind a pickup truck and seeing little else from my compact car but the back of the truck, a black and white bumper sticker defiantly asked me, “Got War?” I stared at that bumper sticker modeled after a 90s “Got Milk?” ad for the next 16 miles and thought of little else. Got War? I was curious, what is this bumper sticker trying to tell me? What message is it trying to send? Do we not already have war? Do we need war? The original milk advertisement was silly, grown adults with childish milk mustaches staring into the camera. Is war as frivolous as a milk mustache? Something to be consumed and enjoyed? Something nostalgic even? This bumper sticker was stuck to the back of that pickup truck at the height of the Iraq War, and undoubtedly the USA was a nation at war, but then as it is now, the USA is also a nation of war. Hardt and Negri (2004) argue that we have entered an era of “perpetual war” where militarized aggression and war are no longer the exception, but rather the “normal state of affairs” (21). The USA has engaged in some type of military action for over 80% of its total history (Torreon 2015). The USA is not only the largest global arms exporter (SIPRI 2016), but it also leads the world in military expenditures ($596 billion in 2015); is responsible for 36% of the total world military spending (Perlo-Freeman et al. 2016); and spends almost three times more than the next biggest spender China ($215 billion) B. Johnson (\*) Northeastern Illinois University, Chicago, IL, USA 66 and more than the next top seven countries combined (Perlo-Freeman et al. 2016). The US military employs 3.5 million people and is the single largest employer of US youth (Dickinson 2012) and the single largest general employer in the USA (Department of Defense 2014) and astoundingly the world (Taylor 2015). Such statistics are easy to point out, clear examples of the influence and power of the US military globally and domestically, but what **about the subtler, quieter hum of the military machine**? Camouflage popping up in children’s clothing? Boot camp fitness classes at the gym? Humvees on grocery runs in the suburbs? Retired military personnel running schools? Flyovers at football games? “Got War?” bumper stickers? The reach of military influence is vast and varied, quietly **infiltrating the minutia of our everyday lives**. In fact, the culture of militarism seeps into so many different aspects of our lives that it **is taken for granted** and largely unnoticed (Finley 2012; Lutz 2012). The “step-by-step process by which a person or a thinking gradually comes to be controlled by the military or comes to depend for its well-being on militaristic ideas” is militarization (Enloe 2000, 3). It is a process of aligning cultural, institutional, economic, and social processes with militaristic values, beliefs, and practices. The more inline a society is with militaristic values and practices, the more accepted military action and the process of militarization itself becomes to the point where militarization is ordinary and even blandly normal (Enloe 2000). Militarization becomes as normal as a milk mustache and as easy as attaching a “Got War?” tagline. In a militarized society, a solution to any number of social problems is militarized including inner-city crime and violence, troubled youth, national security, and even struggling public schools. Military personnel are viewed as wielding the smart weapons of discipline and leadership to right any tilting ship. High-ranking military personnel are sent to negotiate international alliances in place of seasoned diplomats. Bravery is not diplomacy, compromise, or compassion, but martial aggression. Video games, children’s toys, films, and television programs glorify the military and martial ideals, and militaristic violence is another form of Friday night entertainment (Lenoir and Lowood 2000; Stahl 2010; Vavrus 2013). Military recruiters freely roam the halls of public schools argued to be important role models for “at risk” youth (read working class or poor kids of color). For example, The Troops to Teachers program pushes military personnel through the teacher credentialing process placing these teachers in “high need” schools. Military personnel are placed atop corporations and large organizations regardless of experience or expertise.1 B. Johnson 67 Militarization is more than just the dominance of military values across different aspects of civil society; it is also nestled within social inequalities. Domestic militarization is found in the violence focused on and against people of color, such as militarized policing (Gilmore 2000). It is “seen in the rise of the prison-industrial complex, the passing of retrograde legislation that targets immigrants, the appearance of gated communities, the widespread use of racial profiling by the police and the ongoing attacks on the welfare state” (Giroux 2003, 39). Militarization is situational and bound by social context. The militarization of children is normalized within the USA (JROTC and Boy and Girl Scout programs), but criticized heavily when it occurs abroad, especially in non-Western countries such as Somalia or Uganda (Macmillan 2011). The organized violence of military service by young people is respected, valued, and constructed in direct opposition to the disorganized violence of youth gangs or social justice groups—viewed as dangerous especially if these groups comprise poor and working-class youth of color (Basham 2011). But the militarization of public education is complicated. On the one hand, schools in the USA are **locations of intense militarization** pushing uncritical nationalism and blind obedience, both of which buttress militarization and permanent war (Elmore 2012). Schools are also **one of the most important institutional sites** **for resistance of militarization** and the simultaneous fostering of democracy as schools can provide the necessary skills for a critically conscious citizenry. It is important then to understand how **public education is militarized as well as how militarization can be and is resisted**. This chapter focuses on the justifications and implications of the militarization of public education in the USA, specifically in the Kindergarten to 12th-grade levels. There are two major periods of intensification of militarization in public education. Militarization increased dramatically beginning in the 1970s alongside the growing influence of neoliberalism and again after the events of 9/11 as fear and disdain for critical inquiry and dissent took hold of national subjectivity. This chapter illustrates how militarization works in tandem with neoliberalism and a culture of fear to discipline, control, and produce militarized consent through education policies, programs, and institutions.

### DA – War Games

#### War Games DA: the negative conception of debate as purely a game in which competitive incentives overdetermine knowledge production and sociality recreate conquest logics. They frame debate not as an academic space but as a game to be conquered, reducible to mere trophies and speaker points which reproduces the ideology of endless warfare.

### DA – Martial Politics

#### Martial Politics DA: Academia is deeply intertwined with the logics of militarization. Their model of “switch side debate” and “predictability” isn’t neutral but based in a fundamentally militarist starting point, and you should heavily err [x] on substance due to the bias of the university.

Howell 18 [Alison Howell (2018), Associate Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, Forget “militarization”: race, disability and the “martial politics” of the police and of the university, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 20:2, 117-136, DOI: 10.1080/14616742.2018.1447310]

Just as “militarization” has guided inquiry into contemporary police violence, it has also been used to call attention to worrying connections between the university and the US national security apparatus. One prominent example is the series of Vice News reports exposing the “100 Most Militarized Universities in America” (Arkin and O’Brien 2015a, 2015b). The authors of the study note that initially they were reluctant to use the term “militarization,” which was not meant to simply evoke … ROTC [Reserve Officer Training Corps] drills held on a campus quad. It was also a measure of university labs funded by US intelligence agencies, administrators with strong ties to those same agencies, and, most importantly, the educational backgrounds of the approximately 1.4 million people who hold Top Secret clearance. (Arkin and O’Brien 2015a) But “militarization” leads us to underestimate the depth and extent of national security ties to the university, past and present, and to assume that universities can revert to some non-militarized past. This limitation is also evident in scholarly literature. One of the central scholarly texts on the so-called “militarization” of the university is Giroux’s The University in Chains (2007). Cited hundreds of times, and reported on in popular media, it argues that the post-9/11 period saw a significant acceleration of the corporatization and militarization of the university (Giroux 2007, 2008). Giroux goes so far as to say that while corporatization had previously taken root in the university, “it is only in the aftermath of 9/11 that the university has also become an intense site of militarization” (Giroux 2008, 58). Furthermore, “militarization” of the university begins for Giroux only after World War II (see also Chomsky et al. 1998). These popular and scholarly works identify important changes in the nature of military involvement in universities. For example, the Vice report notes that funding now flows to intelligence-gathering disciplines (e.g., computer science) rather than solely weapons-oriented ones (e.g., physics). Yet research guided by the concept of “militarization” falls into the trap of imagining military encroachment on previously civil institutions: “the idea of the university as a site of critical thinking, public service and socially responsible research appears to have been usurped” (Giroux 2008, 63). This is a fantasy. **The university was never such a pure site. Many American universities were built with slave labor or its proceeds** (Brown University Committee on Slavery and Justice n.d.), and from the outset have contributed vitally to colonization and White supremacy. By positing a purely civilian “before” to a military “after,” “militarization” accounts wrongfully elide this history. In the American university no such “before” exists. This is not to say nothing has changed. Seeing the university as a site of “martial politics” allows us to provide a historical account attuned to the ways in which politics is shaped by the precise forms warfare takes. Most academic disciplines – the very categories by which we organize knowledge – were **fundamentally shaped by conquest, warfare and military funding**. This is not only true for IR, a discipline born out of colonialism and war (Vitalis 126 A. HOWELL 2015), but for any number of other disciplines from physics (Gusterson 1998, 2011) to business (Cowen 2014) to neuroscience (Howell 2017). Excavating these histories gives us a sense of how thoroughly we live with “martial politics.” Several disciplines were said to have been “militarized” after 9/11. Most controversially, medicine, psychiatry, psychology and anthropology all had major debates about involvement in torture and warfare in their professional associations. In anthropology, for example, this debate concerned the 2008 establishment of Project Minerva (which provided $50 million in defense funding to social sciences) and the recruitment of anthropologists in counterinsurgency warfare through the Human Terrain Program (Gusterson 2009). To describe this as the “militarization” of anthropology, however, is to ignore that anthropology is foundationally a colonial discipline set up to catalog “primitive” subject peoples, with a long history of entanglement with the security state, not least in Cold War-era counterinsurgency operations in Latin America and Asia (Gusterson 2009). The concept of “martial politics” allows us to pose new questions about the historical relationship between **formal knowledge production and forms of warfare**, rather than just relations between the university and the military. It allows us to ask how certain forms of warfare are produced by, and produce, academic disciplines. The nature of this mutual production will differ depending on the particular military strategy undertaken at any historical moment. The case of psychology is instructive here. After psychologists were implicated in devising, administering and overseeing torture at the US naval base at Guantánamo Bay (Howell 2007), concern was raised about the “militarization” of psychology (Ariggo, Eidelson, and Bennett 2012). Again, this concern assumes that the discipline was once free from involvement in war or colonialism, and that an unusual trespass occurred after 9/11. Not so. Since almost its very foundation, psychology has been tied to forms of military strategy. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, psychology was a fledgling discipline and was understood as a humanistic form of knowledge. That changed drastically in World War I. At that time Robert Yerkes, a eugenics proponent and professor of psychology, was President of the American Psychological Association. Convinced that psychologists could be of service in the war, and that war could be useful to psychologists, Yerkes approached the US Army with a proposition: he could help the Army with its personnel problem (of appropriately placing the massive number of new recruits) in return for funding and access to an unprecedented number of subjects on which to experiment: soldiers. World War I enabled the first mass scientific experiment in psychology in the form of intelligence testing. The data accumulated provided fodder for a generation of psychologists, establishing the experiment as the primary methodology of psychology and massively reshaping the discipline from a philosophical/humanistic one into an (American) science. This constitutes a symbiotic relationship: psychology was not “militarized” in World War I. Rather, it propelled a particular kind of warfare: industrial warfare conducted on frontlines, involving mass mobilization and requiring new personnel management techniques. Wartime support, in return, worked to reshape psychology into a science. The **academy is not the victim** of military breach but has foundationally been produced and formed, in its specificities, through warfare – and has formed warfare in return as a technology of security (Howell 2011). Psychology was already well steeped in the racist and ableist science of eugenics prior to World War I (Mitchell and Snyder 2003; Carey 2009; Thomson 2010), but through military funding it was able to systematize its eugenicism as a science of “intelligence.” This martial entanglement did not end with the war and the return of psychology to “domestic” applications. Intelligence data not only established psychology as a science but went on to practical applications in war-like relations of disability and race both within the US and other colonial settings. Three examples follow that demonstrate this move. First, the data from the Army experiment produced results that “proved” that the average American had the intelligence level of a 13-year-old, just above the level of “moron” (an ableist construct). This contributed to a moral panic about the degeneration of the “stock” of the American nation due to Southern European immigrants, and led to some of the first sweeping US immigration restrictions. It also bolstered mental hygiene and eugenics movements, promoting the sterilization of disabled, racialized, Indigenous or “promiscuous” women who were labeled feeble-minded (Carey 2003). This form of martial politics perpetrates violence especially on women’s bodies, managing their sexuality and reproductive capacities for the purposes of extirpating “dangerous” or degenerate populations. Second, since they were constructed by White men who saw “intelligence” in their own image, the Army tests unsurprisingly placed the “negro” at the bottom of a racist (and sexist) hierarchy of intelligence (Mensh and Mensh 1991; Gould 1999). With their sheen of objective science, these very same Army tests were administered in South Africa and other colonies, justifying colonial rule and later Apartheid. Finally, Carl Brigham, who was part of the Army experiment team, and later a Princeton University professor and member of the advisory council of the American Eugenics Society, went on to create the high school Scholastic Aptitude Tests (SATs). The SATs remain the cornerstone of one of the most pernicious and racist aspects of the Army tests’ afterlife: standardized testing. This regime, to this day, outrageously ranks African American students as having 128 A. HOWELL lower intelligence, or aptitude, significantly reducing access to higher education and thus economic mobility. All this history, all these contributions of the discipline of psychology to unjust dynamics surrounding race, disability, poverty and gender, are shuttered by a “militarization” framework because it assumes that when psychology is used in war (e.g., in torture) that this is an aberration rather than part of a broad history of violence done to marginalized people, citizens and enemies alike. In thinking through the “martial politics” of the university, any number of disciplines could be subjected to this kind of analysis. Returning to Maneuvers, consider the case of nursing, to which Enloe (2000) directs her attention in assessing the “militarization” of women’s lives. The chapter in question perceptively begins with Florence Nightingale, who is widely considered to be the “mother” of nursing, a pioneer in statistical visualization and a major figure in the reform of public health and medical care in both the Crimean War and Victorian workhouses. Yet Nightingale sits uneasily in a framework that inquires into the “militarization” of women’s lives because, as Enloe (2000, 204) shows, as a patriotic upper-class White English woman, she herself was active in propelling “militarization.” Because of its “militarization” framework, Enloe’s account misses the fact that warfare and nursing were both modernized and professionalized through their mutual encounter. Nightingale’s innovations transformed siege warfare, helping ensure British victory in the Crimea, and laid the foundations for World War I industrial warfare. After Nightingale returned from the war she was instrumental in creating nursing as a profession and discipline of study, using techniques developed for military purposes in “domestic” settings such as workhouses. The story here is not one of military encroachment on nursing; rather, nursing became a discipline and profession initially through war, and subsequently through war-like relations with the poor. This symbiosis between war and academic disciplines such as nursing, psychology and – for that matter – IR should make it unsurprising when war-like relations are propelled through knowledge created in these disciplines. When we view academic disciplines, or indeed the university as a whole, through the lens of “martial politics” it becomes clear they are not innocent domains sullied by military values. Rather, like the can of soup, their form and function are embedded in how they emerge out of and simultaneously shape warfare. Even when “militarization” accounts are historical, they lead us to misconstrue the importance and nature of that history. When there is violence in domestic political life – whether the outright violence of killer cops or the structural violence of the SATs – it is not that “war” is encroaching on “peace,” and it is not that “the military” is trespassing on the “civilian.” Rather, “martial politics” are fundamental to the constitution and continued production of liberal democracies such as the US. This is not directed equally at all parts of the population but targets those **who are constituted as a threat to the nation’s strength or civil order.**

# AFF ANSWERS

#### NOTE: HEG GOOD AND NATO GOOD ARE ANSWERS TO THE EMPIRE K

### Thesis – NOT an Empire

#### The US works with independent nation states and its model of global leadership is not like traditional empires

Ikenberry ‘04 (G John, 2004, Illusions of Empire: Defining the New American Order, Council on Foreign Relations, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20033908> (Accessed 7/14/22), G. John Ikenberry is Peter F. Krogh Professor of Geopolitics and Global Justice at Georgetown University and Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.) //**Doof**

The debate on empire is back. This is not surprising, as the United States dominates the world as no state ever has. It emerged from the Cold War the only superpower, and no geopolitical or ideological contenders are in sight. Europe is drawn inward, and Japan is stagnant. A half century after their occupation, the United States still provides security for Japan and Germany-the world's second- and third-largest economies. U.S. military bases and carrier battle groups ring the world. Russia is in a quasi-formal security partnership with the United States, and China has accommodated itself to U.S. dominance, at least for the moment. For the first time in the modern era, the world's most powerful state can operate on the global stage without the constraints of other great powers. We have entered the American unipolar age. The Bush administration's war on terrorism, invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, expanded military budget, and controversial 2002 National Security Strategy have thrust American power into the light of day-and, in doing so, deeply unsettled much of the world. Worry about the implications of American uni polarity is the not-so-hidden subtext of recent U.S.-European tension and has figured prominently in recent presidential elections in Germany, Brazil, and South Korea. The most fundamental questions about the nature of global politics-who commands and who benefits-are now the subject of conversation among long-time allies and adversaries alike. Power is often muted or disguised, but when it is exposed and perceived as domination, it inevitably invites response. One recalls the comment of Georges Clemenceau, who as a young politician said of the settlement ending the Franco Prussian War, "Germany believes that the logic of her victory means domination, while we do not believe that the logic of our defeat is serfdom." At Versailles a half-century later, he would impose just as harsh a peace on a defeated Germany. The current debate over empire is an attempt to make sense of the new uni polar reality. The assertion that the United States is bent on empire is, of course, not new. The British writer and labor politician Harold Laski evoked the looming Amer ican empire in 1947 when he said that "America bestrides the world like a colossus; neither Rome at the height of its power nor Great Britain in the period of economic supremacy enjoyed an influence so direct, so profound, or so pervasive...." And in deed, Dean Acheson and other architects of the postwar order were great admirers of the British Empire. Later, during the Vietnam War, left-wing thinkers and revisionist historians traced the same deep-rooted impulse toward militarism and empire through the history of U.S. foreign policy. The dean of this school, William Appleton Williams, argued in The Tragedy of American Diplomacy that the nation's genuine idealism had been subverted by the imperial pursuit of power and capitalist greed. Today, the "American empire" is a term of approval and optimism for some and disparagement and danger for others. Neoconservatives celebrate the imperial exercise of U.S. power, which, in a modern version of Rudyard Kipling's "white man's burden," is a liberal force that promotes democracy and undercuts tyranny, terrorism, military aggression, and weapons proliferation. Critics who identify an emerging American empire, meanwhile, worry about its unacceptable financial costs, its corrosive effect on democracy, and the threat it poses to the institutions and alliances that have secured U.S. national interests since World War II. THE "E" WORD No one disagrees that U.S. power is extraordinary. It is the character and logic of U.S. domination that is at issue in the debate over empire. The United States is not just a superpower pursuing its interest; it is a producer of world order. Over the decades-with more support than resistance from other nations-it has fashioned a distinctively open and rule-based international order. Its dynamic bundle of oversized capacities, interests, and ideals constitutes an "American project" with unprecedented global reach. For better or worse, other states must come to terms with or work around this protean order. Scholars often characterize international relations as the interaction of sovereign states in an anarchic world. In the classic Westphalian world order, states hold a monopoly on the use of force in their own territory while order at the international level is maintained through the diffusion of power among states. Today's unipolar world turns the Westphalian image on its head. The United States possesses a near-monopoly on the use of force internationally; on the domestic level, meanwhile, the institutions and behaviors of states are increasingly open to global-that is, American-scrutiny. Since September 11th, the Bush administration's assertion of "contingent sovereignty" and the right of preemption have made this transformation abundantly clear. The rise of unipolarity and the simultaneous unbundling of state sovereignty is a new and volatile brew. But is the resulting political formation an empire? And if so, will the American empire suffer the fate of great empires of the past: ravaging the world with its ambitions and excesses until overextension, miscalculation, and mounting opposition hasten its collapse? The term "empire" refers to the political control by a dominant country of the domestic and foreign policies of weaker countries. The European colonial empires of the late nineteenth century were the most direct, formal kind. The Soviet "sphere of influence" in Eastern Europe entailed an equally coercive but less direct form of control. The British Empire included both direct colonial rule and "informal empire." If empire is defined loosely, as a hierarchical system of political relationships in which the most powerful state exercises decisive influence, then the United States today indeed qualifies. If the United States is an empire, how ever, it is like no other before it. To be sure, it has a long tradition of pursuing crude imperial policies, most notably in Latin America and the Middle East. But for most countries, the U.S.-led order is a negotiated system wherein the United States has sought participation by other states on terms that are mutually agreeable. This is true in three respects. First, the United States has provided public goods particularly the extension of security and the support for an open trade regime in exchange for the cooperation of other states. Second, power in the U.S. system is exercised through rules and institutions; power politics still exist, but arbitrary and indiscriminate power is reigned in. Finally, weaker states in the U.S.-led order are given "voice opportunities"-informal access to the policymaking processes of the United States and the intergovernmental institutions that make up the international system. It is these features of the post-194S international order that have led historians such as Charles Maier to talk about a "consensual empire" and Geir Lundestad to talk about an "empire of invitation." The American order is hierarchical and ultimately sustained by economic and military power, but it is put at the service of an expanding system of democracy and capitalism.Fundamentally, then, the debate over the new American empire hinges on how extensive and deeply rooted these characteristics are-and whether its assertion of power since September 11 constitutes a fundamental break with this liberal past. THE GLOBAL RACKET In The Sorrows of Empire, Chalmers Johnson advances the disturbing claim that the United States' Cold War-era military power and far-flung base system have, in the last decade, been consolidated in a new form of global imperial rule. The United States, according to Johnson has become "a military juggernaut intent on world domination." Driven by a triumphalist ideology, an exaggerated sense of threats, and a self serving military-industrial complex, this juggernaut is tightening its grip on much of the world. The Pentagon has replaced the State Department as the primary shaper of foreign policy. Military commanders in regional headquarters are modern-day proconsuls, warrior-diplomats who direct the United States' imperial reach. Johnson fears that this military empire will corrode democracy, bankrupt the nation, spark opposition, and ultimately end in a Soviet-style collapse. In this rendering, the American military empire is a novel form of domination. Johnson describes it as an "international protection racket: mutual defense treaties, military advisory groups, and military forces stationed in foreign countries to 'defend' against often poorly defined, overblown, or nonexistent threats." These arrangements create "satellites"-Ostensibly independent countries whose foreign relations revolve around the imperial state. Johnson argues that this variety of empire was pioneered during the Cold War by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and the United States in East Asia. Great empires of the past-the Romans and the Han Dynasty Chinese-ruled their domains with permanent military encampments that garrisoned conquered territory. The American empire is innovative because it is not based on the acquisition of territory; it is an empire of bases. Johnson's previous polemic, Blowback, asserted that post-1945 U.S. spheres of influence in East Asia and Latin America were as coercive and exploitative as their Soviet counterparts. The Sorrows of Empire continues this dubious line. Echoing 1960s revisionism, Johnson asserts that the United States' Cold War security system of alliances and bases was built on manufactured threats and driven by expansionary impulses. The United States was not acting in its own defense; it was exploiting opportunities to build an empire. The Soviet Union and the United States, according to this argument, were more alike than different: both militarized their societies and foreign policies and expanded outward, establishing imperial rule through "hub and spoke" systems of client states and political dependencies. In Johnson's view, the end of the Cold War represented both an opportunity and a crisis for U.S. global rule-an opportunity because the Soviet sphere of influence was now open for imperial expansion, a crisis because the fall of the Soviet Union ended the justification for the global system of naval bases, airfields, army garrisons, espionage listening posts, and strategic enclaves. Only with the terrorist attacks of September 11th was this crisis resolved. Bush suddenly had an excuse to expand U.S. military domination. September 11 also allowed the United States to remove the fig leaf of alliance partnership. Washington could now disentangle itself from international commitments, treaties, and law and launch direct imperial rule. Unfortunately, Johnson offers no coherent theory of why the United States seeks empire. At one point, he suggests that the American military empire is founded on "a vast complex of interests, commitments, and projects." The empire of bases has become institutionalized in the military establishment and has taken on a life of its own. There is no discussion, however, of the forces within U.S. politics that resist or reject empire. As a result, Johnson finds imperialism everywhere and in everything the United States does, in its embrace of open markets and global economic integration as much as in its pursuit of narrow economic gains. Johnson also offers little beyond passing mention about the societies presumed to be under Washington's thumb. Domination and exploitation are, of course, not always self-evident. Military pacts and security partnerships are clearly part of the structure of U.S. global power, and they often rein force fragile and corrupt governments in order to project U.S. influence. But countries can also use security ties with the United States to their own advantage. Japan may be a subordinate security part ner, but the U.S.-Japan alliance also allows Tokyo to forgo a costly buildup of military capacity that would destabilize East Asia. Moreover, countries do have other options: they can, and often do, escape U.S. domination simply by asking the United States to leave. The Philippines did so, and South Korea may be next. The variety and complexity of U.S. security ties with other states makes Johnson's simplistic view of military hegemony misleading. In fact, the U.S. alliance system remarkably intact after half a century-has helped create a stable, open political space. Cooperative security is not just an instrument of U.S. domination; it is also a tool of political architecture. But Johnson neglects the broader complex of U.S.-supported multilateral rules and institutions that give depth and complexity to the international order. Ultimately, it is not clear what the United States could do-short of retreating into its borders or ceasing to exist-that would save it from Johnson's condemnation. PAX AMERICANA In Colossus, Niall Ferguson argues that the United States is indeed an empire and has been for a long time. To Ferguson, however, it is a liberal empire that upholds rules and institutions and underwrites public goods by maintaining peace, ensuring freedom of the seas and skies, and managing a system of international trade and finance. The United States is the imperfect but natural inheritor of the British system of global governance; it is open and integrative and inclined toward informal rule. Accordingly, Ferguson's worry is not that the world will get too much American empire but that it will not get enough. U.S. leaders, for all their benign intent, have unusually short attention spans and tend to go "wobbly." In Ferguson's view, the United States shares many characteristics with past empires. Like Rome, it has remarkably open citizenship. "Purple Hearts and U.S. citizenship were conferred simultaneously on a number of the soldiers serving in Iraq last year, just as service in the legions was once a route to becoming a civis romanus," Ferguson writes. "Indeed, with the classical architecture of its capital and the republican structure of its constitution, the United States is perhaps more like a 'new Rome' than any previous empire-albeit a Rome in which the Senate has thus far retained its grip on would-be emperors." The spread of America's language, ideas, and culture also invites comparison to Rome at its zenith. But Ferguson is even more taken by parallels with the British Empire. U.S. presidents, from Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, and John F. Kennedy to Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush, have put their power work promoting the great liberal ideals of economic openness, democracy, limited government, human dignity, and the rule of law-a "strategy of openness" that is remarkably similar, Ferguson argues, to the aspirations of the British Empire in the second half of the nineteenth century. After all, it was a young Winston Churchill who argued that the aim of British imperialism was to "give peace to warring tribes, to administer justice where all was violence, to strike the chains off the slave, to draw the richness from the soil, to place the earliest seeds of commerce and learning, to increase in whole peoples their capacities for pleasure and diminish their chances of pain.... " Most of Colossus retells the familiar story of the rise of U.S. global dominance as an exercise in liberal empire. What is distinctive about American imperialism, according to Ferguson, is that it has been pursued in the name of anti-imperialism. For each phase of U.S. history, Ferguson nicely illuminates the tensions between republican ideals and the exercise of global power and shows how those tensions are often resolved. The Cold War-and George Kennan's doctrine of containment-provides the ultimate example of this fusion of anti-imperialism and hard power. Security, openness, democratic community, political commitment, and the mobilization of U.S. power went together. The core of U.S. global rule involved the enforcement of rules of economic openness, but the United States was also willing to act forcefully to integrate countries into the liberal order. Ferguson's most interesting claim is that the world needs more of this liberal American empire. This argument stems in part from the uncontroversial claim that the current international order needs enlightened leadership and that only Washington can provide it. (Ferguson holds little hope that Europe will ever overcome its preoccupation with the internal contradictions of its enlargement.) It is especially the wider system of sovereign but failed states that needs imperial supervision by Washington. In vast swatches of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East national self determination has led to much grief. Ferguson argues without qualification that "the experiment with political independence-especially in Africa-has been a disaster for most poor countries." To Ferguson, the extension of liberal empire into these regions (even involving some form of colonial rule) is necessary. What precisely these imperial arrangements would look like, however, remains unclear. When Ferguson says that he is "fundamentally in favor of empire," he is to some extent pulling a conceptual sleight of hand. What Ferguson means by "liberal empire" scholars have previously called "liberal hegemony": a hierarchical order that is still very different from traditional forms of empire. By virtue of its power, the liberal hegemon can act on its long-term interests rather than squabble over short-term gains with other states; it can identify its own national interests with the openness and stability of the larger system. The United States thus shapes and dominates the international order while guaranteeing a flow of benefits to other governments that earns their acquiescence. In contrast to empire, this negotiated order depends on agreement over the rules of the system between the leading state and everyone else. In this way, the norms and institutions that have developed around U.S. hegemony both limit the actual coercive exercise of U.S. power and draw other states into the management of the system. Ferguson's case for the virtues of American empire hinges on his claim that in the aftermath of the Soviet Union's collapse, the world could have gone one of two ways: international order organized around independent nations or an American imperium. He maintains that a world of decentralized, competing states, many of which are not democracies, would result in chaos. This may be true; he is certainly right that stability and open markets are not easily sustained without the support of powerful states. But the notion of liberal empire conflates very different types of U.S.-led order. One in which Washington coerces other states into obedience is very different from a system of multilateral rules and close partnerships. The challenges of peace and economic development that Ferguson identifies are best pursued by advanced democracies working together. Ultimately, such a cooperative order would require that Washington transcend the atavistic habits of empire rather than pursue a more complete realization of it. In the end, Ferguson finds invoking the image of empire useful for political reasons. Unlike the British, Americans do not believe that they operate an empire. As a result, the United States makes a flighty and impatient imperial power (in contrast to the British, who acquired a cultural mentality for global rule). Ferguson thinks that speaking honestly about the reality of American empire will foster understanding of its duties and obligations. Yet precisely the opposite is true. The United States does not need to view the world as its Raj and deploy a colonial service to the vast periphery; it needs to find ways to exercise its power in sustained, legitimate ways, working with others and developing more complex forms of cooperative international governance. It is also extremely doubtful that the American people would accept such a massive imperial undertaking: last September, as soon as President Bush revealed the price tag for occupying Iraq, public support plummeted immediately.

### Thesis – Empire = Wrong

#### Empire fails to account for 9/11 and events afterwards, making it useless in a contemporary context.

Moore ‘03 (David, Hardt and Negri's Empire and Real Empire: The Terrors of 9-11 and After, <https://acme-journal.org/index.php/acme/article/download/689/553/> (Accessed 7/14/22) Economic History and Development Studies Programme, University of Natal, Durban, South Africa 4041.) //**Doof**

Are We All New Yorkers? It is ironic for Empire readers that the horror of 9-11 happened in the centre of the empire so vividly portrayed in that book. The Twin Towers symbolised everything Empire discussed. From the earth-encompassing power of finance capital, to internet capitalism’s connection and compression of space and time, and to the cosmopolitan nature of the workers there, the towers were the epitome of everything Empire loved and hated about the world today. Antonio Negri said ‘we are all New Yorkers’ in an interview after 9-11 (Cocco and Lazarrato 2002) and it is clear that the book he and Michael Hardt produced really does see the whole world as if it was New York. For Hardt and Negri, the global ‘multitude’ is composed of urban (and urbane) citizens whose autonomy and hybridity make institutions such as states, and ideologies such as religions, evaporate into the mists of the immaterial labour that now drive the world. The multitude’s labour is impossible to measure, so all of its members have equal value (cf. Resnick and Wolff 2001; Dyer-Witherford 2001) and they all really want the same thing. Be they waiters in the Greenwich Village cafés, analysts for the currency speculators on Wall Street, or professors at Columbia University – or at similar sites in New York’s image anywhere in the world – sometime soon they will all oppose capitalist exploitation and national oppression, replacing them with the joys of being a communist. The kind of resistance that brought the Twin Towers down, however, forces the irony to take an awkward and bitter twist. Al-Queda hardly represents the postmodern enemies of post-imperialism envisaged (for the most part) in Empire. Empire’s sweep is so vast and so fast that religion, nationalism and any of the other forces inspiring Osama bin-Laden and his many followers are in the dustbin. When these forces revisit the postmodern world their aspirations are ‘incommunicable’ (Hardt and Negri 2000, 54, Hardt and Negri 2001a; Negri 2002): it is as if they have arisen from the dead. Contrary to Empire, however, they dealt New York and – more importantly but also almost erased from the book – the state within which the city is ensconced a blow that catalysed a form of empire Hardt and Negri thought had disappeared. A ‘one state beats all’ form of imperial power has arisen from the ashes of Twin Towers. It is now wreaking terror in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq and chilling the hearts of European politicians and United Nations multilateralists – and it inspired 15 million members of the ‘multitude’ to demonstrate. But the people who guided their passenger-packed planes into the Twin Towers were not ‘New Yorkers’ in the mold of Hardt and Negri’s multitude. Nor were most of those in Iraq on whom bombs rained and American troops shot in March and April 2003. Neither are the Americans who supported the campaign. The actions, beliefs and structures of the world in the post 9-11 era are significantly different from those inscribed in Hardt and Negri’s Empire – as is the etiology of the event. There are three ways to assess Empire’s inability to foresee the world in the wake of 9-11. I list and analyse them in reverse order of theoretical priority (indicated in the abstract) because the spectacle of such an event as 9-11 demands that in this instance the ‘epiphenomenal’ comes first (Campbell 2001). Firstly, the act of terrorism that destroyed the Twin Towers and killed the approximately 3,000 people within it must be analysed in terms of the way in which Hardt and Negri understand the nature of resistance to global capitalism (or, in their lexicon, ‘the informational mode of production’). Their uncertainty about the agents and strategies of resistance lends ambiguity to their thinking about 9-11 and similar events. Secondly, the importance of the ‘state’ as a structure within both core and peripheral components of global society must be re-stated and theorised in the light of Empire’s elision of that task. The contradictions inherent in state formation in the third world combined with those of the construction and maintenance of American empire in the current global conjuncture create both the terror of ‘resistance’ from below and ‘régime change’ from above. Hardt and Negri tend to wish these complexities away in their construction of a world full of libertarian flows of desire and capital. The ‘terror from above’ that has been visited on Afghanistan and Iraq in the wake of 9-11 suggests the increasing dominance of American state power qua state power, instead of the erasure of such authority as predicted in Empire. Thirdly – and most critically in terms of structural fundamentals – it is necessary to undertake a foundational ‘political economy’ critique deconstructing Hardt and Negri’s assessment of the nature of the global capitalist system. Their hasty ironing out of the fundamentally uneven development of the global complex of state-society formations is simply unsustainable when one gets down to the ‘nitty-gritty’ of political economy. Empire smoothes out all of the contradictions of ‘third world’ development in spite of itself. This myopia regarding the underdeveloped world is at the root of Hardt and Negri’s too exuberant celebration of global cyber-capitalism – and thus also at the centre of their erasure of the state and their misunderstanding of the resistanceterror nexus. This essay will thus reposition empire on the ‘real world’ rather than the ethereal one created in Empire – while acknowledging that much of the required rethinking has been inspired by the simultaneously frustrating and stimulating book.

### Turn – Anthro

#### Turn - Empire’s concept of biopower is anthropocentric and reductionist.

Youatt ‘08 (R, August 2008, Counting Species: Biopower and the Global Biodiversity Census, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/30302207> (Accessed 7/14/2022), Department of Political Science Reed College Environmental Values Vol. 17 No. 3) //**Doof**

Driven both by the global loss of biodiversity and by the lack of knowledge about the vast majority of species that are being lost, conservation biologists and some of their allies in the environmental movement have called for and started a massive global census of biodiversity.1 Most prominently, E.O. Wilson has proposed a new mobilisation of scientific resources to complete a global survey of species.2 The identification of biodiversity ʻhotspotsʼ is the first step in a cascade of biodiversity investigation, Wilson hopes, which will culminate in a full inventory of global biodiversity and of the places where it is being lost. With complete information about the global population of biological species, Wilson is optimistic that we can undertake more refined conservation measures and ultimately move towards greater sustainability. In this article, I take the position that the global biodiversity census is as much about power and political life and the boundaries between nature and society as it is about scientific information gathering for conservationist ends. Drawing on Foucaultʼs concept of biopower, I suggest that the biodiversity census provokes us to think about the ways that biological nonhumans are embroiled in, and challenge, the technologies of power that see life itself as a political object. To the extent that the ʻactionʼ in the biodiversity census seems to rest largely with the human scientists who do the categorising, naming, counting, and labelling of nonhuman species, one analytic stance towards **this scientific practice is an anthropocentric one.** Here, the focus is on considering the field of social power in which scientific efforts take place, and asking questions about the discourses, resources and networks that make a biodiversity census plausible and possible. But **what if nonhumans can be legitimately considered to be active participants** in the field of biopower, just as human subjects who are censused are? Can nonhumans be sites of resistance to biopower, and disrupt its governing impulses? I argue that it is possible, and indeed necessary in the context of biodiversity, to extend the idea of biopower to include nonhumans as participants. Like human subjects, nonhumans are regulated and rationalised in matrices of knowledge and science, through which they are readied as productive resources for capitalism and mined as repositories of genetic information. Nonhuman participation in an ecological field of biopower also involves being part of an array of authority in environmental discourses, with effects for both humans and nonhumans, and constructing new possibilities for biosocial collectives. However, because nonhumans generally lack the capacity to be self-regulating subjects but are nonetheless necessary authorities in figuring biodiversity truth discourses, I suggest that they hold a different kind of place in biopower than self-regulating human subjects do. More specifically, because nonhumans constitutionally (rather than intentionally) refuse to internalise the meanings of human language, they are able to resist becoming self-regulating subjects to a significant extent, relying instead on their own semiotic interpretations of the environment and acting accordingly: for example, through migrating, reproduc- ing, consuming resources and filling ecological niches in unexpected ways, biotic nonhumans are constantly challenging the normalising will of biopower. At the same time, because environmental interventions to save species come to be justified on the grounds of global environmental well-being, the health and continued existence of nonhumans becomes an increasing imperative. In spite of the fact the biodiversity census may extend the reach of an ecologically unfriendly capitalism, I conclude that it will, on balance, reap important ecological goods in hybridising political practice and acknowledging extra-human locations of power. The article proceeds as follows. I start in Section 1 by reviewing the global biodiversity census proposal. In section 2, I consider how scientific power is extended through the census and what sources of power it draws on to do so. The science of censusing nonhumans requires a significant mobilisation of social power – financial, technological, institutional and discursive – in order to succeed. But because knowledge projects like demography have effects and techniques that reach beyond these sources of social power into life itself, I suggest that we cannot fully explain the importance of the biodiversity census through these means. In section 3, therefore, I extend Foucaultʼs concept of biopower into the nonhuman world as a means to explain the productive power and regulatory qualities of the census. Because the subjects of the biodiversity census are mostly nonhuman, however, I also consider how the concept of biopower mutates in light of their participation. 1. THE GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY CENSUS PROPOSAL Spurred by the problem of a major extinction event in which we do not even know what or how much is being lost, the basic knowledge-problem that the global biodiversity census is aimed at addressing is counting and describing all the species that currently exist in the world. According to the United Nations Environmental Programʼs (UNEP) Global Biodiversity Assessment, the best ecological estimates of extant species range from 3.5 million all the way to 111.5 million species, with the most likely figure at around 13.5 million.3 Only 1.75 million of those species are currently identified and described, however, or about 13 per cent.4 Each year, only 13,000 new species are formally described, a snailʼs pace given the magnitude of the task.5 Even when species have been described, the data often remains limited. Some species may have become extinct since being identified. May et al., for example, estimate that about 40 per cent of identified beetle species are known from a single examination in a single locality, sometimes an observation made decades ago.6 E.O. Wilsonʼs census proposal includes training and deploying a cadre of thousands of specialists in systematics, taxonomy and classification. He calculates that given 40 years of productive classification work per scientist, at the pace of ten species identified per year, approximately 25,000 professional lifetimes are needed, a number which ʻfalls well short of the number of enlisted men in the standing armed forces of Mongolia, not to mention the trade and retail personnel of Hinds County, Mississippiʼ.7 In the perfectly rational system that he hopes for, each expert would be assigned to a specific classificatory activity. While there are currently only three people in the world who are sufficiently expert in classifying termites, for example, Wilson would up their number proportionally to match the fact that termites comprise ten per cent of the total biomass of tropical regions. Wilson also champions investment in new computer technology that can combine scanning-electron microscopes with image-recognition software. Its goal would be to process and identify species instantly and to flag new specimens as they are passed through. The data held in the GenBank project, a computer database aimed at collecting information on all known DNA and RNA sequences, could be folded into this process. Given the massive numbers of species and the difficulty of resource mobilisation, other proposals suggest sampling procedures to get representative data on the global biopopulation. For example, Terry Erwin suggests that we aim for ʻmassive but achievable biotic inventoriesʼ that give us a relative fix on biodiversity.8 While it may not achieve Wilsonʼs goal of describing all species, targeting specific taxa and sampling certain species would have the effect of rationalising what is currently an ad hoc process. In the face of an ever larger human population, the United States census now makes limited use of representative sampling procedures, which its proponents argue make it more accurate than a large-scale but flawed collection of data about every individual.9 A global biodiversity census would aim to do the same. Some of the questions that surround the biodiversity census are scientific ones, such as concerns over the basic species concepts it employs and the problems of scale involved in identifying micro-species like bacteria.10 Given that the activities of science are not self-contained but always embedded in social relations, additional kinds of questions need to be asked, however. Yet little scholarly attention has been paid to what this biodiversity censusing effort means in political or social terms. Political ecologists have usefully inquired into the general effects of biodiversity discourses and the ways in which they are intertwined with regimes of power and governmentality,11 but they have not asked whether there is anything specific about the language and practice of censusing nonhuman bio-entities that is politically important. Environmental ethicists seem to have ignored the ethical dimensions of the topic altogether.12 Anthropologists and ethnobotanists have looked increasingly at the relationship between biological and cultural diversity, finding strong geographical and evolutionary correlations between the two and suggesting that a broader biocultural value linking nature and humans might be found in diversity complexes.13 However, they have not inquired into the importance of censusing as a technique by which the differences in biocultures might be constituted. Political scientists have written extensively and insightfully about the practice and effects of censusing human populations,14 but have not taken up how censusing nonhumans relates to political questions about power. The rest of the article aims to fill some of these gaps, particularly with respect to questions of how power functions in contemporary environmental science and politics. 2. THE BIODIVERSITY CENSUS AND THE SOCIAL POWER OF SCIENTISTS Taken as a socially-embedded activity, the production of successful scientific knowledge necessarily requires mobilisation of economic resources, expansion of institutional power, and discursive legitimation.15 Successful science, in other words, must be socially forged. This point does not suggest that the status of scientific truth-claims is fully dependent on social interests; rather, the point is that thinking about a scientific activity like the biodiversity census requires attending not only to activities of classification and arguments over species concepts, but also to how those activities are made possible in the first place. In short, what kind of social power does the biodiversity census draw on, depend on and reproduce? What makes the use of a biodiversity census seem intuitively obvious as the right tool to address biodiversity loss? Here, I consider two forms of social power, both crucial to the census project. First, I ask what financial and institutional resources are necessary to allow agenda-setting power and the capacity to steer future resources in advantageous ways.16 Second, I suggest the allure of the census rests partly on the way that biodiversity scientists are able to tap into discursive power, particularly the seductive power of discourses like panopticism and discovery.17 I consider these forms of power in turn. The institutional push for a global biodiversity census is centred in the United States, where it has harnessed major sources of funding, including the National Science Foundation (a $14 million fund for ʻplanetary biodiversity inventoriesʼ), the Packard Foundation and Harvard University. It has created a network of scientific-political organisations mainly based in the United States and Europe dedicated to censusing different parts of the natural world and promoting the ʻcompletion of the Linnaean enterpriseʼ18 into a ʻCatalogue of Lifeʼ – the Census of Marine Life, NatureServe, the Global Taxonomy Initiative of the Convention on Biodiversity, Species 2000 and the All-Species Foundation. There has been increased funding for the academic fields of taxonomy and bioinformatics.19 New professional lives have opened up around these resources – ʻeach species merits careers of scientific study and celebration by historians and poetsʼ, as Wilson puts it.20 The biodiversity census makes these possible first through the act of species identification and then through the subsequent study of species behaviour, ecological roles and potential uses for humanity. The key institutions of the global biodiversity census are organised around information and communications technologies, which worm their way right into the names and missions of the organisations involved. The Global Biodiversity Information Facility (GBIF) and the Integrated Taxonomic Information System (ITIS) (in partnership with US federal agencies including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)) are two of the global clearinghouses for establishing quality specieslevel data, aiming to be ʻopen portalsʼ of biodiversity data.21 GBIFʼs mission is to ʻdevelop methods for sustainably using biodiversity … [by] rapidly, openly, and freely delivering primary data about biodiversity to everyone in the global community, using digital technologiesʼ.22 The political intent is universal access, while its method of delivery is technological. The universally-wired nature of ʻtheʼ global community is taken for granted, even as a global digital divide and the barriers of expertise suggest that no such community exists. One critical role that information technology plays in organising the global biodiversity census is in its ability to suggest a panoptic biological future.23 ʻImagine an electronic page for each species of organism on Earthʼ, Wilson asks us, ʻavailable everywhere by single access on commandʼ.24 Genealogically related to projects like Diderotʼs Encylopedie, the modern ʻEncyclopedia of Lifeʼ is the endpoint and ultimate goal of the censusing project, organised in a technology that claims to outrun space and time. The rhetoric of ʻachievingʼ a global biodiversity census also taps into complex Western narratives of discovery and conquest of nature (ironically, since the conservation agenda of the census is aimed in part at preserving the wildness of nature). This rhetoric also draws on the position of social power held by the modern sciences to reveal the unknown to human publics. Wilson exhorts supporters of the census to have ʻfaith in the sprint to the finish of the global censusʼ, promising that ʻunknown microorganisms ... will be revealedʼ and that ʻnever again, with fuller knowledge of such extent, need we overlook so many golden opportunities in the living world around usʼ.25 Similarly, the All-Species Foundation tells us that the global biodiversity census ʻoffers an unsurpassable adventure: the exploration of a little-known planetʼ.26 Finally, the discursive power of the census is connected to economic life, in the way that it renders nonhuman agents ready for postmodern capitalism as semiotic constructions (as in genetic codes for bioprospectors or images in nature videos).27 As Arturo Escobar argues, whereas ʻnatureʼ marked modern capitalismʼs attitude towards the nonhuman, ʻbiodiversityʼ is a term of postmodern capitalism, in the way that it readies nonhuman nature for semiotic use rather than material use.28 Indeed, postmodern capitalism may protect nature materially even as it commodifies it semiotically, as in the case of protecting the Amazon rainforest for its pharmaceutical potentials.29 Yet, as Escobar argues, ʻonce the semiotic conquest of nature is completed, the sustainable and rational use of the environment becomes imperativeʼ.30 That is, once biodiversity discourses help conserve an area as a biodiversity reserve which is made valuable in terms of code-commodity, it also becomes part of a political system of global environmental governance that continues to manage it for capitalism. Thus, conservation biologists have mobilised an expanding pool of financial and institutional resources, drawing in part on the seductive qualities of the dream of panopticism and the historical glory of exploration. To the extent that the agenda of global environmental governance is steered by their expertise, consensus and public statements,31 they have also garnered increased authority in speaking about matters of conservation, ecotourism and economic development. While these forms of social power (institutional, financial, technological, discursive) explain some of what is at stake in the biodiversity census, I want to suggest that the power of a global biodiversity census also rests in its hybridising force. It introduces nonhumans into the discursive heart of an otherwise anthropocentric modern human politics, economy and knowledge that has generally denied that nonhumans have formed a part of these projects.32 It creates a framework through which humans interact with, pattern and position the diversity of natural nonhumans. Understanding the importance of the biodiversity census therefore extends questions of power past its traditional human context into an ecological context. The important questions, then, are: for whom does this extended politics and power work?33 What happens to anthropocentric understandings of power upon the participation of nonhumans in the process? Does the (re)introduction of nonhumans tell us anything about the ʻwhereabouts of powerʼ, to use John Allenʼs phrase?34 Can power be nearly everywhere, or does it have a specifically local character in relations between things and thus an uneven distribution? To answer these questions, I turn to the idea of Foucaultian biopower, which considers how power works at the micro-levels of individual life, in relation to the more traditional forms of power considered thus far. 3. BIOPOWER AND THE CENSUS In this section, I start by considering how human censuses are understood to relate to politics and governing institutions, specifically through the Foucaultian idea of biopower. Because biopower is concerned with the ways that techniques like censusing operate on the terrain of ʻlife itselfʼ, it is particularly suited to thinking about the biodiversity census, which similarly involves a strategy for administering and rationalising life in ways that reach into nonhuman biological life as such.35 The consideration of censusing nonhuman life through the lens of biopower involves a basic trade-off. On one hand, the **extension of biopower into nonhuman realms raises the spectre of a more subtle, but nonetheless corrosive, form of human power over the natural world.** On the other hand, because power and resistance are always co-existent, nonhumans may disrupt the functioning of environmental governance in new and distinct ways. Specifically, biopower faces difficulty in creating self-regulating nonhuman subjects who internalise conditions of subjection. 3.1 Self-regulating subjects and the justification of power In contrast to absolute power commanded by the Hobbesian sovereign to ʻtake life or to let liveʼ, Michel Foucault argues that the modern form of biopower which replaced it in the nineteenth century was a regulatory and disciplinary form of power that involved ʻthe administration of bodies and the calculated management of lifeʼ.36 Biopower organised and administered life, through a variety of techniques or methods of power that dragged human life itself into the grid of power-knowledge. Institutions such as universities, public health agencies and the army, and regulatory forms of knowledge, such as demography and modern medicine, not only analysed life-processes but permeated them as well. Yet it was not just the use of these techniques or the presence of these institutions that characterised nineteenth-century biopower. Two parallel political shifts made biopower distinct from sovereign power. The first shift was that the right of the sovereign to have power over life and death was no longer justified based on protecting the sovereign from external threat (as in conscription in cases of war) or internal threat (as in the death penalty). Rather, the power over life and death was now justified in terms of the population itself, in modern democratic language. When war was waged, it was not to protect the sovereign, but in the name of the people and their continued existence. The justification for biopowerʼs interventions into the details of life – reproductive health, the ways in which we die, normalising vaccinations – was similarly made in the name of the population. One effect of this shift, Foucault notes, is that the death penalty became more difficult to sustain logically: ʻhow could power exercise its highest prerogatives by putting people to death, when its main role was to ensure, sustain, and multiply life, to put this life in order?ʼ37 In other words, the justifications for powerʼs activities have social effects that exceed the justifications themselves. What effect, then, will extending ʻprotecting lifeʼ to ʻprotecting biodiversityʼ have, if we consider the biodiversity census as an extended example of the logic of biopower? Part of the answer is that direct resource exploitation becomes more difficult, since power over life/death of animals, plants, insects or trees can no longer be justified by needs of the human population/sovereign to fight natural necessity with all its might.38 Ecological biopower thus involves both broader social trends like the rise of modern ecological consciousness and the emergence of conservationist ethics as part of it structural logic. At the same time, what becomes easier is both the management and regulation of nonhuman biological life by humans and the direct intervention in, and mutation of, biological and ecological life-processes, all in the name of bio- or eco-systemic ʻhealthʼ. Here, biopower can be understood as a logic of eco-governance that simultaneously subverts the resource-driven agenda of modern capital by trying to conserve material nature1 and enables and rationalises an entirely new form of intervention in life itself. The ecological sciences, on this reading, are one of the crucial institutions through which interventions into life are enacted, and the biodiversity census is one of its primary power-knowledge techniques. Thinking about biopower as involving nonhumans also has the consequence of changing the population in whose name powerʼs exercise is justified. If the idea of biopower adequately describes the intrusion of scientific, economic and regulatory techniques into the lives of nonhumans, then administering nonhuman life must be justified in the name of an expanded population as well – in this case, in the name of a global ecological population of species (and their genes), guided by an ethic of preserving and fostering biodiversity. In sum, in the name of planetary health (a metaphorical extension of modern biopowerʼs concern with human public health to a planetary scale), a new population is configured into which biopower intervenes, one explicitly composed of human and nonhuman members participating in ecosystemic communities. The second, parallel shift that Foucault notes was involved in the move from sovereign to regulatory power was that there was an unsettling effect on the practice of governing. Unlike sovereign power, regulatory biopower had the imperative to promote life, to ʻoptimise forces, aptitudes, and life in generalʼ, and its ʻhighest function was perhaps no longer to kill, but to invest life through and throughʼ.39 Yet, crucially, it had to do so in ways that did not make the population more difficult to govern.40 In other words, however life was politically managed, it had to be done in ways that ensured governability. This aspect of biopower was aimed at producing self-regulating subjects who internalised the qualities that promoted life but did not fundamentally disrupt social functioning. Self-regulating subjects were both efficient for power (since subjects did powerʼs work for it) and governable. Yet in this respect, the movement of nonhuman entities into the population in whose name biopower acts represents a potential location of freedom, or at least resistance, precisely because many nonhumans are constitutionally incapable of being self-regulating subjects who can internalise the conditions of subjection in biopowerʼs own terms. Nonhumans do not ʻknowʼ that they are a species or a member of a specific phylum, in those terms, or that they have a particular gene-sequence; rather, they have their own frameworks of understanding the moments of interaction with scientists and modes of environmental experience that guide their actions. In this respect, biotic nonhumans differ from the human subjects of biopower, who, as Foucaultʼs analysis suggests, become self-regulating subjects partly in virtue of the way that their consciousness is structured by biopower – by its language, its categories, and the techniques of self-making. When one looks at the minority of bio-entities that could be made partially self-regulating – genetically modified crops, pet clones, lab-grown tissue replacement, gene therapy and pre-selection, regulated game preserves in which species are fenced in or are trained to learn the boundaries of safe haven from human predators – they form a small fraction of the bio-population. Even in those cases, moreover, there are significant doubts over whether they can be made into self-regulating subjects in the same sense as humans. Their ability to accede to and internalise the normalising effects of power is limited by their biological constitution. Though they have varying kinds of subjective experience, they cannot be said to have the self-reflexive kind of subjectivity that humans do. Whereas human subjectivity is marked by the dual ability to be a distinct Self in contrast to the environment and to have the reflexive thought that ʻI am a Selfʼ, nonhumans are generally limited to the former possibility. If biopower cannot make most nonhumans into self-regulating subjects, then their governability rests solely on whether they can be controlled indirectly through the patterned grids of scientific prediction. Yet as groups and individuals, biological nonhumans routinely confound predictability, within their own kinds of subjectivities. They respond to ecological change by unexpectedly shifting migration patterns and locations. They expand in unanticipated ways into ecological niches that humans open directly (e.g., suburbs as feeding grounds for raccoons; rabbits introduced in Australia for hunting who subsequently overran the countryside; garbage dumps as sources of food for omnivorous bears) and indirectly (e.g., red-tailed deer population explosions in New England upon the over-hunting of deer-predators, causing substantial economic damage and fatal car accidents). Some species mutate at evolutionary speeds that far exceed those of humans (e.g., pesticide resistant strains of bugs or penicillin-resistant viruses). They sometimes form new relations with other species to the detriment of humans (e.g., birds as carriers of Asian bird flu). They remake ecosystems into new stabilities and undermine others. In short, while the lack of subjectivity and reflexivity in nonhuman populations is usually read as a source of acquiescence to human interrogation, it seems to also have an opposite effect, in that it constitutes them as ready sources of resistance and disruption to the desires of biopower to establish governable populations. Foucault says of biopower: ʻit is not that life has been totally integrated into techniques that govern and administer it; it constantly escapes themʼ.41 Nonhuman agents effect some of the very same escapes simply by living. Life itself escapes biopower. 3.2. Array of authorities A second component of biopower is ʻone or more truth discourses about the “vital” character of living human beings, and an array of authorities competent to speak that truthʼ.42 In the context of the nineteenth-century societies that Foucault was analysing, these truth discourses about living beings included fields like demography and medicine. In the context of twenty-first-century biopower, Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose suggest that they might be extended to include fields like genomics, cloning and reproduction.43 What is critical to the truth discourses surrounding these fields is that there be an array of authorities, like the human sciences, public health agencies or social theorists, that both problematise a certain issue and endeavor to intervene in the field raised by that problematisation. These authorities both render the issue socially visible and strive to rationalise solutions. Just as scientists play a central role as authorities in the truth discourses of human sciences, so too are they central to the truth discourses of biodiversity loss. The project of the biodiversity census involves conservation biologists as a critical part of the authorities competent to create a truth discourse around species loss and conservation, through the rationalisation of species into an ordered catalogue of nonhuman life. But the involvement of nonhumans in this truth discourse exceeds a simple presence as scientific objects, and raises questions about whether we can think of biopower as authoritative about nonhumans without any account of how nonhumans might themselves testify to those truth claims, resist them, or actively participate to some degree in the making of scientific knowledge. An alternative account of scientific practice that moves towards such a distributed model of authority comes from Bruno Latour and others involved in theorising an actor-network approach, in which human and nonhuman agents are seen as collaboratively involved in the construction of scientific truth claims.44 On this account, scientific authority depends in part on the (nonlinguistic) ʻtestimonyʼ of nonhumans who are marshalled by scientists to establish the veracity of scientific accounts.45 While it is still human scientists who problematise the field of biodiversity loss, then, the array of authorities competent to ʻspeakʼ the truth discourses surrounding that field is distributed among both human and nonhuman. This line of argument about authority has three consequences. First, it speaks to the question of the ʻwhereabouts of powerʼ. One of the criticisms of Foucaultʼs analytic of power is that once it is taken past a specific institutional site into the broader practices of governing, it seems to be everywhere and nowhere.46 In a broader sense, space and place themselves seem to disappear from power. In the case of biodiversity sciences, at least, extending the participants in the biopower formation to nonhumans gives power concrete locations – in the places where data is collected, in the laboratories where representative samples are brought under the microscope, and in the bodies of species who experience different life-possibilities and pathways because of the process of classification. What makes biodiversity discourses potent at all, in other words, is the marshalling of human and nonhuman authorities to its truth-claims in particular places and particular biological bodies. Second, the intrusion of nonhuman life into authority-generating processes like the biodiversity census disrupts the human subject at the centre of modern biopower by forcing a new set of constituents into the political field who cannot quite be captured by it in the same way. Because the biopower depends on the relative flourishing of life, biopower cannot speak and act authoritatively on behalf of the health of global biopopulations and simultaneously extinguish them. The necessity of nonhuman life for biopower both enables its extension and increases the living things that disrupt biopowerʼs desire for smooth governing. To return to Foucaultʼs analysis of the death penalty, if biopower (in contrast with sovereign power) complicated the state killing its own citizens, then so too should ecological biopower be seen to complicate the domination of nonhumans (in modern relations with nature), including the ongoing anthropogenic species extinction event. Finally, if the Latourian understanding of authority as distributed between both scientists and scientific objects is correct, this critique should also apply to humans, in the human sciences that Foucault was considering. The authority of scientific claims depends not only on scientists, academics and public servants, but on the very human subjects that make authoritative claims possible. Not only is resistance coexistent with power within human subjectivity, as Foucault claimed,47 but a more distributed kind of authority also resides in the practices of biopower, among the subjects who take part in its data collections, experiments and interventions. 3.3. Biosocial collectivities In Foucaultʼs historical analysis, the formation of biopower occurs within the context of the rise of the modern nation-state. Yet the biodiversity crisis, which I have been thinking of here in terms of an extension of human biopower into biodiversity-power, presents a political situation in which there is a veritable state of emergency (species loss), and yet there is no state in which to declare such a state of emergency. This observation is true in two senses. It is true, first, in a spatial sense, in that the biodiversity crisis is global, yet there is no global state in which such a crisis could effectively be addressed.48 While a layer of global environmental governance may be growing and even using environmental problems as a way through which its expansion is made plausible,49 it does not yet have the logical or practical means to resolve the wider problems of social justice and development involved in the biodiversity crisis.50 In a second sense, there is also no political formation that accepts the participation of nonhumans within its confines. The nation-state is a modern, secular and thoroughly human mode of organisation, one that is based around a community of humans who in turn decide what is right or good for themselves and their environment. Its reasoning is decidedly and openly anthropocentric, as ecologists who advance biodiversityʼs cause almost all accept as a necessary part of communicating the biodiversity crisis to human publics.51 Similarly, the discourses of global governance draw on a thin kind of global political community,52 but they do not grasp nonhumans as participants in their ideological vision. Global governance is hardly democratic with respect to humans, much less politically inclusive of nonhumans.53 Understood in this way, when global governance discourses address biodiversity loss, they do so either as the next logical step in the postcolonial mission (moving from ʻcivilisation, progress, poverty, [to] environmental sustainabilityʼ),54 or as simply another problem area for governance to address.55 In the context of biopower that I have been considering, what then is the effect of global biodiversity census without a global state? If the modern census was part of a power-knowledge formation that was both organised by and constitutive of the nation-state as part of biopower, then a global biodiversity census should have some transformative effects in constituting political forms. The hypothesis that I want to suggest is that a biodiversity census will help construct new ideas of a multi-layered and multi-species global community. As a way into this hypothesis, consider the effect of the modern human population census on ideas of community. Benedict Anderson, for example, argues that the modern census was integrally related to the creation of the categories necessary for the creation of postcolonial nation-states. Anderson argues that the ʻ(confusedly) classifying mind of the colonial stateʼ created identities through the census that might not have been recognised as such by those who were censused and classified.56 The census involved a ʻtotalising classificatory grid, which could be applied with endless flexibility to anything under the stateʼs real or contemplated controlʼ.57 Yet by undertaking this project, the conditions of postcolonial nationalism were shaped and forms of intelligibility were constructed (and imposed) that were not otherwise there. For present-day aspirants to statehood, a census remains an important marker of a consolidated national citizenry, as in the push for a Palestinian census as a way towards achieving a de facto Palestinian state.58 Similarly, then, a global biodiversity census might be understood as part of constructing a global biocitizenry and in forming a global ecopolitical community. Rabinow and Rose suggest that biopower must include ʻstrategies for intervention in the name of life or health, initially addressed to populations that may or may not be territorialised upon the nation, society or pre-given communities, but may also be specified in terms of emergent bio-social collectivitiesʼ.59 Like Foucault, Rabinow and Rose are concerned with human populations, but their use of ʻbio-social collectivitiesʼ that are not necessarily dependent on a territorial population suggests the possibility of forms of community that are not tied to the nation-state. If the nation-state is not necessarily the right analogy for biosocial collectivities of humans and nonhumans, then Michael Hardt and Antonio Negriʼs expansion of biopower past Foucaultʼs state-bound apparatuses of governing points towards how a de-territorialised collectivity might be theorised.60 If Foucaultʼs use of biopower was used in the concrete historical analysis of the transition in nineteenth-century Europe from the sovereign state of absolute power over life and death to one ʻin the name of the peopleʼ of disciplinary and regulatory power, Hardt and Negri push the historical analysis forward another step by drawing from Gilles Deleuze the idea of a transition from a Foucaultian disciplinary society to a society of control. Disciplinary society exists in relation to individual subjects, setting the parameters of what is normal and deviant, prescribing the rules of social behaviour, and constructing the boundaries of the social space in which its citizens rattle around. Power in disciplinary society is concentrated in institutions. By contrast, a society of control moves into the very interior of its subjects. It regulates not from outside but through its distribution and internalisation into ʻbrains and bodiesʼ.61 It is a form of power that exists in networked interiorities (i.e., the linked, self-regulating consciousness of subjects), not in external impositions, limits, sanctions or structurings. Power in a society of control is also unique in the way that it is able to make biopower its exclusive terrain of reference. For Hardt and Negri, it is also a more totalising form of power than disciplinary power – it ʻextends throughout the depths of the consciousness and bodies of the population – and at the same time across the entirety of social relationsʼ.62 It is such an organising power that Hardt and Negri see as globally operative in the social production of subjects. But Hardt and Negri are critical of the way in which the global society of control has been considered in a disembodied way. They argue that the abstractions of language, communication, and intellectual ideas have been given productive precedence over the material and corporeal. 63 In their neo-Marxist reading, the potential of a biopolitical analysis rests with its study at the level of labour, production and bodies. If Marxist analysis of modern capitalism understood **communication as external** or secondary to the material relations of production, **Hardt and Negri want to read it as internal** and immanent to production in postmodern capitalism. The semiotic reconfiguration of postmodern capital that Escobar suggests is thus the very productive activity in Hardt and Negriʼs framework, and biopower is a Foucaultian/Marxist hybrid.64 In such a framework, biodiversity is something produced, and the ʻthingsʼ of biodiversity – the individuals, the species, the communicative fabric of science around which knowledge of them is built, the development projects of which biodiversity is a component – are implicated in a global society of control. Like Foucaultʼs conceptualisation of power, Hardt and Negriʼs vision of biopower as a field or fabric of social and capitalist production is an image that makes us see a total matrix of power. Yet their relative exclusion of nonhumans is curious, since **there is a slew of nonhuman agents outside of that productive field**. There is a multitude of nonhumans, so to speak, that includes the ʻbacterial proletariatʼ, in E.O. Wilsonʼs colourful metaphor and the nomadic animal populations who routinely exceed national borders.

### Alt Fails

#### The alt fails to solve, only incremental changes at the nation-state level can solve, while sweeping global reforms solving is nothing but a utopian pipe dream.

Fukuyama ‘04 (Francis, 7/25/2004, An Antidote To Empire, The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/25/books/an-antidote-to-empire.html (Accessed 7/14/2022) Yoshihiro Francis Fukuyama is an American political scientist, political economist, and writer.) //**Doof**

Well before 9/11 and the Iraq war put the idea in everybody's mind, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri had popularized the notion of a modern empire. Four years ago, they argued in a widely discussed book -- titled, as it happens, ''Empire'' -- that the globe was ruled by a new imperial order, different from earlier ones, which were based on overt military domination. This one had no center; it was managed by the world's wealthy nation-states (particularly the United States), by multinational corporations and by international institutions like the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund. This empire -- a k a globalization -- was exploitative, undemocratic and repressive, not only for developing countries but also for the excluded in the rich West. Hardt and Negri's new book, ''Multitude,'' argues that the antidote to empire is the realization of true democracy, ''the rule of everyone by everyone, a democracy without qualifiers.'' They say that the left needs to leave behind outdated concepts like the proletariat and the working class, which vastly oversimplify the gender/racial/ethnic/ class diversities of today's world. In their place they propose the term ''multitude,'' to capture the ''commonality and singularity'' of those who stand in opposition to the wealthy and powerful. This book -- which lurches from analyses of intellectual property rules for genetically engineered animals to discourses on Dostoyevsky and the myth of the golem -- deals with an imaginary problem and a real problem. Unfortunately, it provides us with an **imaginary solution to the real problem**. The imaginary problem stems from the authors' basic understanding of economics and politics, which remains at its core unreconstructedly Marxist. For them, there is no such thing as voluntary economic exchange, only coercive political hierarchy: any unequal division of rewards is prima facie evidence of exploitation. Private property is a form of theft. Globalization has no redeeming benefits whatsoever. (East Asia's rise from third- to first-world status in the last 50 years seems not to have registered on their mental map.) Similarly, democracy is not embodied in constitutions, political parties or elections, which are simply manipulated to benefit elites. The half of the country that votes Republican is evidently not part of the book's multitude. To all this Hardt and Negri add an extremely confused theory, their take on what Daniel Bell labeled postindustrial society, and what has more recently been called the ''knowledge economy.'' The ''immaterial labor'' of knowledge workers differs from labor in the industrial era, Hardt and Negri say, because it produces not objects but social relations. It is inherently communal, which implies that no one can legitimately appropriate it for private gain. Programmers at Microsoft may be surprised to discover that because they collaborate with one another, their programs belong to everybody. It's hard to know even how to engage this set of assertions. **Globalization is a complex phenomenon**; it produces winners and losers among rich and poor alike. But you would never learn about the complexities from reading ''Multitude.'' So let's move on to Hardt and Negri's real problem, which has to do with global governance. We have at this point in human history evolved fairly good democratic political institutions, but only at the level of the nation-state. With globalization -- and increased flows of information, goods, money and people across borders -- countries are now better able to help, but also to harm, one another. In the 1990's, the harm was felt primarily through financial shocks and job losses, and since 9/11 it has acquired a military dimension as well. As the authors state, ''one result of the current form of globalization is that certain national leaders, both elected and unelected, gain greater powers over populations outside their own nation-states.'' The United States is uniquely implicated in this charge because of its enormous military, economic and cultural power. What drove people around the world crazy about the Bush administration's unilateral approach to the Iraq war was its assertion that it was accountable to no one but American voters for what it did in distant parts of the globe. And since institutions like the United Nations are woefully ill equipped to deal with democratic legitimacy, this democracy deficit is a real and abiding challenge at the international level. The authors are conscious of the charge that they, like the Seattle anti-globalization protesters they celebrate, **don't have any real solutions** to these matters, so they spend some time discussing how to fix the present international institutions. Their problem is that any fixes are politically difficult if not impossible to bring about, and promise only marginal benefits. Democratic institutions that work at the nation-state level don't work at global levels. A true global democracy, in which all of the earth's billions of people actually vote, is **an impossible dream**, while existing proposals to modify the United Nations Security Council or change the balance of power between it and the General Assembly are political nonstarters. Making the World Bank and I.M.F. more transparent are worthy projects, but hardly solutions to the underlying issue of democratic accountability. The United States, meanwhile, has stood in the way of new institutions like the International Criminal Court. It is at this point that Hardt and Negri take leave of reality -- arriving at an imaginary solution to their real problem. They argue that instead of ''repeating old rituals and tired solutions'' we need to begin ''a new investigation in order to formulate a new science of society and politics.'' The woolliness of the subsequent analysis is hard to overstate. According to them, the fundamental obstacle to true democracy is not just the monopoly of legitimate force held by nation-states, but the dominance implied in virtually all hierarchies, which give certain individuals authority over others. The authors dress up Marx's old utopia of the withering away of the state in the contemporary language of chaos theory and biological systems, suggesting that hierarchies should be replaced with networks that reflect the diversity and commonality of the ''multitude.'' The difficulty with this line of reasoning is that there is a whole class of issues networks can't resolve. This is why hierarchies, from nation-states to corporations to university departments, persist, and why so many left-wing movements claiming to speak on behalf of the people have ended up monopolizing power. Indeed, the **powerlessness and poverty in today's world are due not to the excessive power of nation-states, but to their weakness.** The solution is not to undermine sovereignty but to **build stronger states** in the developing world. To illustrate, take the very different growth trajectories of East Asia and sub-Saharan Africa over the past generation. Two of the fastest growing economies in the world today happen to be in the two most populous countries, China and India; sub-Saharan Africa, by contrast, has tragically seen declining per capita incomes over the same period. At least part of this difference is the result of globalization: China and India have integrated themselves into the global economy, while sub-Saharan Africa is the one part of the world barely touched by globalization or multinational corporations. But this raises the question of why India and China have been able to take advantage of globalization, while Africa has not. The answer has largely to do with the fact that the former have strong, well-developed state institutions providing basic stability and public goods. They had only to get out of the way of private markets to trigger growth. By contrast, modern states were virtually unknown in most of sub-Saharan Africa before European colonialism, and the weakness of states in the region has been the source of its woes ever since. Any project, then, to fix the ills of ''empire'' has to begin with the strengthening, not the dismantling, of institutions at the nation-state level. This will not solve the problems of global governance, but surely any real advance here will come only through slow, patient innovation and the reform of international institutions. Hardt and Negri should remember the old insight of the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, taken up later by the German Greens: progress is to be achieved not with utopian dreaming, but with a ''long march through institutions.''

### Alt DA – Collapse Bad

#### Alternative produces a collapse of the international system

Hunt ‘07 (Michael H., The American Ascendancy: How the United States Gained & Wielded Global Dominance, p320-324, The University of North Carolina Press, Michael H. Hunt is Everett H. Emerson Professor of History Emeritus at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.) //**Doof**

While U.S. hegemony entails perplexities and burdens, an abandonment of hegemony may carry risks. Diminished U.S. leadership could prove dangerously disruptive of the international system and imperil the well-being of peoples everywhere, Americans included. A U.S. retreat could undermine an international economy that has generated impressive global abundance and peace beneficial to many. Simply consider the resources now available today (an annual worldwide output of $30 trillion at the end of the twentieth century) compared to fifty years earlier when it was a tenth that figure. Imagine what this amazing, unprecedented leap in global productivity has meant to health and welfare in all lands. Without U.S. leadership, so the defenders of hegemony claim, these gains might well have been limited, even nonexistent. A future of diminished abundance might prove distinctly unpleasant: greater discord among states and peoples leading to rising cultural intolerance, flaring nationalist fervor and rivalry, deepening international divisions, and fraying economic ties that would slow growth and press down longevity and health in wide swaths of the human population. This would be a world of narrower horizons, fewer choices, and less interaction among peoples and cultures. It would also be a world with diminished capacity for addressing mounting global problems. Advocates for maintaining U.S. dominance along current neoliberal lines hold the ideological high ground. The predominant version of American nationalism took a distinctly activist turn in the course of the twentieth century. From the 1890s to the 1920s the notion of the United States as a dynamic republic with the vision and energy to manage the world’s affairs began to come into its own. Republicans dedicated to an assertive policy along a broad front contributed to this shift in thinking. So too did Woodrow Wilson with his fervent support for the ideal of a progressive international society. In 1941 Henry Luce blended this set of nationalist ideas in his vision of an American century marked by the advance of political freedom, unhampered commerce, and general economic abundance. The most activist U.S. leaders after World War II drew from this creed, as appealing to visionary Wilsonians such as Harry Truman as to corporate-minded Republicans such as Ronald Reagan and the younger Bush. Over the past half century it has become an orthodoxy so potent in its appeal that challengers risk exile from membership in the foreign policy establishment and exclusion from government posts. Such is the allegiance commanded by the one true faith. Or as John Adams observed pungently, “Power always thinks it has a great Soul, and vast Views.”¹⁰ Even so, a good case can be made for a U.S. retreat from hegemony and toward a more modest and sustainable role in the world. A searching critique has no reason to linger on matters of style, particularly such easy targets as a policy governed by restless unilateralism or simplistic assumptions. Such a critique should instead turn to the hegemonic project itself. The place to begin a critical evaluation is with the tendency of the champions of hegemony to oversell the product. They point to its historical achievements to the neglect of the costs it has imposed on others. The leaders of the United States have managed hegemony with a lamentably heavy hand—with scant respect for human life and scant respect for human diversity. Millions died and many societies suffered profound disruption as a result of the U.S. interventions that dot the pages of this account. To those costs would have to be added an intolerance of views on markets and the state that diverge from U.S. preferences. As a result, U.S. pressure has in some cases blocked or disrupted socioeconomic and political experiments favored by others, especially in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. In other cases, an insistence on an American way has generated tensions with major states such as China or regions such as western Europe with divergent interests and values; that insistence has also strained ties with genuinely international organizations such as the UN. On virtually every front U.S. leaders have left themselves open to charges of hypocrisy—of ignoring if not violating the ideals of democracy and self-determination that they publicly profess. A look into the future reveals more grounds for doubts about the hegemonic project. Put simply, the time for U.S. hegemony may have passed. As the relative U.S. advantage in economic might and cultural appeal slips, attempts to exercise hegemony may prove increasingly counterproductive, doing more to further undermine than to confirm U.S. dominance. The U.S. economy labors under limits. Persistent structural problems include oil dependency, low domestic savings, and deep trade and federal budget deficits. The core U.S. cultural model—a faith in unending corporate-driven growth and the unending delights of consumerism—may be fading at least in the developed world. Western Europe and Japan have both drawn alongside the United States in their technological capacity, their income levels, their capital resources, and the depth and integration of their home markets. They need no longer look to the United States as a model in any of these areas. The consumer revolution led by Americans may have at least in these two regions run its course. Rising per capita income beyond a point (in the range of $15,000 in a fair sampling of countries recently surveyed) seems to produce no greater individual satisfaction while imposing costs captured not by conventional GDP data but by social GDP estimates.¹¹ In military affairs, the United States has retained, even increased, its dominance. But to what end? Its massive nuclear stockpile can be used only at the risk of profound and widespread moral revulsion and in some circumstances of devastating counterstrikes. Its high-tech forces may be the wonder of the world. But they are effective only against the most peripheral and isolated of states (in what one observer has dismissed as “theatrical micromilitarism”), and they have limited capacity to rebuild what they have destroyed.¹² The exercise of military might has proven a poor substitute for the intricacies of diplomatic negotiation, the trade-offs indispensable to international comity, and the long-term commitment of resources to economic development and human welfare. Finally, hegemony may hurt the hegemon. Evidence can be found in the privileging of corporate interests harmful to popular welfare, a fixation with military power that amounts to a national obsession, an increasingly infantilized and inert public, and the rise of an imperial presidency antithetical to genuine democracy. These trends validate a sharply critical view of foreign adventures that prevailed during the country’s first century. Proponents of republicanism claimed that crusades, even crusades conducted in the name of freedom, threatened freedom at home. The history of republican experiments across history showed that foreign entanglements and adventures created dangerous concentrations of political power within and undermined the very civic virtues on which the survival of any republic depended. Vindicating this republican fear is the rise of the imperial president and the concomitant atrophy of the democratic process. While most Americans today may not see hegemony through this anxious republican lens, many have voiced their discontent with the outward thrust of U.S. policy. Some express it in frustration and chagrin directed not against U.S. leaders but against a seemingly ungrateful, unyielding, dangerous world and call for scaling back international commitments. The most restive have contended that a more isolated, less burdened America would be better off— less vulnerable to attack, less dependent on fickle friends, less likely to get entangled in distant quarrels, and more secure in its homeland and its domestic liberties. Others refuse to go this far and instead put the blame squarely on U.S. leaders—political and corporate—whose free-market, environmental, and human rights policies have betrayed values as important at home as in the international community. Taken together, these critical reactions suggest a broad-based skepticism about hegemony. But the critics may be so fundamentally divided philosophically, politically, regionally, and socially that they cannot cobble together a common program to serve as an alternative to hegemony. A retreat from hegemony need not lead to isolationism. This myth about the nature of U.S. foreign relations in the past, which was constructed in the first place for the very purpose of justifying U.S. dominance, is likely to figure prominently in any defense of the status quo. But the notion of isolation is flawed as history and as a source of lessons. Today as earlier, the United States has a major stake in a productive, peaceful, and just global society. By extension, the United States has an obligation rooted in self-interest if not calculations of altruism and long-term human welfare to help mobilize a collective international response to the problems generated by that society. A retreat implies that the United States would act in world affairs not as the leader but as a leader, perhaps in some circumstances the first among equals. Engaging in a genuinely collaborative relationship with other states and taking international institutions and norms seriously may hold out the best hope of extending the considerable achievements of the previous fifty years and in the bargain maintaining U.S. influence and advancing U.S. well-being. The historical case for the efficacy of collaboration is compelling. The U.S. role after World War I calmed, for a time at least, the arms race, gave the Europeans a chance to sort out their monetary tangle, and sustained the turn-of-the-century drive to create humane standards of international conduct. The post–World War II record is even more striking. The achievements in setting norms (such as outlawing genocide), rehabilitating defeated Germany and Japan, and creating a framework for global prosperity were the result of collaboration richly repaid in international support and respect, not to mention enhanced U.S. security. This collaborative element helped not only to distinguish the U.S. from the Soviet side during the Cold War, but also to determine the outcome of a competition that was as much about systems and values as military might. International cooperation is not an illusion; it yields results far better than a course defined by narrow self-interest and pursued by brute force. Whatever the attractions of a more modest, collaborative internationalism, winning broad acceptance of such an approach faces serious difficulties. It requires that Americans think about their role in the world in a fresh, genuinely global way quite distinct from the cautious opportunism familiar from the first U.S. century and the rising assertiveness that has marked recent decades. It also requires a sensitivity to the intricacies of the global system and the cultural diversity of its parts. That sensitivity will not come easily to today’s body politic, which features a disengaged, ill-schooled public and a political class beholden to interest groups and trapped by shallow rhetoric and narrow, short-term calculations. Above all, the middle way offers nothing heroic to a country of individualists that may be dependent on civic nationalism as one of the few sources of collective identity. Indeed, calls for serious, long-term support for economic development programs, genuine respect for international norms, and tolerance for regional diversity collide with prevailing nationalist and neoliberal notions, which continue to inspire bold dreams of global transformation under the American aegis and in the American image. A retreat from hegemony would require a lot: a more cosmopolitan understanding of other cultures, a more sophisticated grasp of U.S. limits, a genuinely democratic electoral system responsive to popular preferences, and a better informed electorate able to think through those preferences. The fate of the current ascendancy with its hegemonic dimensions may well hang on how Americans measure up to these high standards and how rapidly structural problems eat away at the foundations of our hegemony. What the next page of the national story has to say may depend on how well we take into account the possibilities and constraints created by a history of burgeoning state power, strong nationalism, and intrusive global forces.